A sudden national crisis can make or break a political leader. In today's world, much depends on the degree of control the leader develops over politics and the media. Up to this point, US President George W. Bush has had American tradition to help him dominate both. Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) has China's system to give him control of party and media. President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), in a system much like Bush's, has had to struggle with both, with only the beginning of democratic tradition available.
In the US, before Sept. 11, Bush was struggling with the bitterness of his contested election results, opposition control of the Senate, the powerful liberal media overwhelmingly painting him as a lightweight and ultra-conservative president and an economy that was heading downward. Without the crisis of Sept. 11, one would have to speculate that he would be following his father as a one-term president. Instead, he has an almost unbeatable advantage as he looks to a second term next year.
When Sept. 11 happened, suddenly, young Americans, whose memory did not go back further than Vietnam and who had come to have little respect for politics, were waving flags and singing patriotic songs. Opposition political leaders immediately competed to make publicly clear their support of the president. Most importantly, the media, both print and TV, competed to show their president in action, working to meet the new threat Americans faced. The lightweight president had become America's strong leader. And it was traditions, not laws, and his own strength that made it possible.
In China, the SARS crisis did not come suddenly, except for Hong Kong and foreign countries. The jolt came only when China publicly admitted there was a crisis. Since China's politics are closed to the public, how much political maneuvering went on before the announcement is not clear. It still isn't.
With maximum control over the media and much of its politics, Hu has galvanized both the party and the media to address the crisis, but by using the same methods that were established during the Mao Zedong (毛澤東) era. Neighborhood leaders and committees in the cities, and village governments in the rural areas, through the party, have been activated and are once again being intrusive in peoples lives. The media floods the news with stories of heroes or super achievers.
Any news on what is taking place within leadership circles, however, is purely speculative. In a crisis, such strict discipline at all levels is a luxury not available to leaders in democracies.
From the PRC Standing Committee's view, China faces other challenges that go beyond the SARS crisis. The government's credibility has been thrown into doubt, domestically as well as internationally. Economic growth may remain the top objective, but control and stability, always a priority, is now number one on all the leadership's agenda. The party, not the People's Liberation Army, has been tasked with maintaining discipline in enforcing the rules with regard to SARS. But the old party ain't what it used to be, and the PLA, given its chairman, may not want -- or even be asked -- to help.
In the PRC, the actions taken (once they were forced to do so by world opinion) are being portrayed in all forms of the media as having a leadership that is strongly gaining control of the crisis. The methods used to establish that portrayal indicates the leaders either do not fully understand the change its market economy has brought to managing the country, or they are using the formulas of managing past crises while they think through a different set of options.
The methods being used now, however, are a step back in political terms that could backfire after the crisis passes. In China, after the SARS crisis subsides, who will gain or lose among the already established leadership will be decided by a very few.
In Taiwan, how well the president manages the same crisis may not only influence his prospects for another term, but with him the ruling party and its ideology. Being in a democracy, the president does not have the tools the Chinese president has. He has checks and oversight by officials and private organizations that inhibit subterfuge. He cannot deploy his party members to supervise and discipline the general public.
Most important, he most certainly cannot control the media. As long as Taiwan is a democracy, a president never will. But neither can the media block government's ability to communicate with the public.
Bush captured much of the media attention by demonstrating his personal and very active involvement and unusually strong language against countries that supported the terrorist threat. Hu simply directed his controlled media to his best advantage.
In Taiwan, Chen has been more visible in the media on the SARS crisis, but whether it is a result of the changed economic relationship with China or the normally hostile (to him) media, his government has yet to dominate the news to the extent Bush or Hu have done.
Both Bush and Hu stepped back at a time of crisis and also used tradition as an element of governance. Both used nationalism to garner support for their actions in coping with crisis. But while the US was a victim of a terrorist action that caused the crisis, China was a perpetrator of the action that brought on the SARS crisis.
Bush and the American public reached back to a tradition of putting patriotism above partisanship when the country faces an external threat. Hu reached back to the tradition of using the control mechanisms of the Mao era when the country faces the threat of instability.
Chen and the people of Taiwan have only a short history of democracy. Laws have yet to be changed much less having traditions to support governance. In the aftermath of the first peaceful transition of government, political behavior clearly demonstrated that a bank of tradition of this kind was sorely needed.
More recently, with the SARS crisis, there seems to be more willingness among politicians and the media to put country above partisan interests. Predictably, however, this is seen mainly in the domestic element of the crisis.
Developing traditions on external matters, like so much else in its international affairs, requires a form of consensus that still bedevils Taiwan.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.The views expressed in this article are his own.
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