On March 19, not long after US President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the UN Security Council members that advocated peace convened an emergency meeting. Apart from hearing a fourth report by chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Russia and Syria also called for the disarmament of Iraq by peaceful means and emphasized the necessity of weapons inspections. In addition, they reprimanded the US and Britain for their insistence on going to war, saying that they had not only shown disdain for the resolutions of the Security Council but had also shattered the UN's determination to maintain world peace.
Ironically, just hours later the US and British alliance launched the first strike in this "war of liberation," a move that will inevitably influence the post-Sept. 11 international order.
Is this really an unavoidable war? Or is it the result of careful and deliberate strategic planning to resolve a political impasse by means of war and create a "new order"?
First, is this a war about face? Why is Bush so intent on waging war? Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, fighting international terrorism and homeland security have become the most important principles behind US global strategic policy.
Meanwhile, in military terms, the strategies of deterrence and containment were supplanted by a strategy of pre-emptive strikes. Under this new strategy, detailed in the Quadrennial Defense Review that was released on Sept. 30, 2001, "rogue states" that have weapons of mass destruction and links with international terrorist organizations are the primary threat to US national security. Since the Gulf War in 1991 did not solve the problem of Iraqi arms, after the winding down of the US war in Afghanistan, Iraq has naturally become a secondary target of the US war on terrorism.
Secondly, between 1991 and 1998, the UN carried out only intermittent weapons inspections in Iraq, and after 1998 the inspections were halted. This shows that Iraq did not cooperate with UN weapons inspectors and did not stop developing weapons of mass destruction.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi government continued to use autocratic measures to control its own people and also constituted a threat to its neighbors in the Middle East. Iraq's possession of roughly 8 percent of global oil reserves as well as a strategic geographic position were factors the US had to consider in its policy of building a new Middle East. In October of last year, Bush sought the authorization of both houses of Congress to use military force against Iraq.
On Nov. 8, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1441. After having completed the domestic and international legal groundwork, commencing military action against Iraq became merely a matter of selecting a time. Thus, the three weapons-inspection reports to the UN were, for the US, just a way of winning more time for military preparations. Whether they had any real content was not of primary importance.
What was relatively unexpected for the US was the powerful anti-war sentiment of three European allies: Germany, France and Russia. This created a split between the member nations of the Security Council and severely tested the long-standing trans-Atlantic alliance, making it impossible for the world's only superpower to act as it would have liked.
As Harvard professor Joseph Nye has emphasized, the arrangement of global power can be modelled by a three-dimensional chess game. The highest layer of military power is dominated by the US alone. The middle layer of economic power is divided between the principal economically-advanced nations. But the lowest layer of power lies in the trans-national ability to set the agenda.
This is "soft power," and every actor on the international stage can participate, as can be seen in the global anti-war movement's impact on the hawkish nations. For example, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who has been most forceful in his support of military action against Iraq, has endured severe pressure from fellow members of the Labour Party. Although the use of "all necessary means" to disarm Iraq was granted to him on March 19, the pressure had significantly affected US work to deploy troops in the Persian Gulf region.
In sum, the US is protecting its status as the world's superpower. Attacking Iraq is not being done just to eradicate the potential threat of terrorism. It also includes considerations of face.
What kind of a war will this be then? The Gulf War of 1991 was a war between a third wave, information-age society and the second wave, industrial society of Iraq. It was a war of "surgical operations."
Twelve years later, comparing US technology and advanced tools of war with the lack of any perceptible increase in Iraqi military strength or troop numbers, it appears that Iraq will not so much be a match for the US as it will a testing ground for new weapons. In other words, this is a state of asymmetrical, high-tech warfare. The US enjoys absolute superiority on the battlefield. However, if Hussein wants to risk everything and use chemical or biological weapons, that would also be an asymmetrical move. Thus the US will accelerate the pace of the war in order to avoid giving Iraq such an opportunity.
At the same time, the US will also avoid a ground war with Iraq on the defensive or entering into street fighting. The main principle guiding US military strategy in the second Gulf War is to use high technology to conduct a rapid and decisive war without contacting the enemy directly.
Finally, ordering the start of a second Gulf War is one thing, but bringing it to a close and handling the aftermath will be a more complex problem. After the war, rebuilding Iraq, reordering the Middle East and quelling the suspicions of European allies will test Bush's diplomatic skills.
Moreover, the question of whether military action unsanctioned by the UN Security Council will foster US unilateralism, or whether it will stimulate the Security Council to undertake structural reform, will also be a matter on which the existence of the UN as a collective organization for global security will hinge.
In sum, this war, which has kept nations waiting anxiously, has now finally broken out. Both the US and Iraq intend to use this opportunity to resolve some historic grievances as well as to adjust the order in the Middle East. But the US attack on Iraq is not just a matter between Bush and Hussein. It will likely bring about even greater changes to international security arrangements than either the Sept. 11 incident or the war in Afghanistan.
Wong Ming-hsien is an associate professor in Tamkang University's Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies.
Translated by Ethan Harkness
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