Tue, Mar 18, 2003 page8

• Will China confront North Korea?

  • By Robert Scalapino
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  On Oct. 1, 1949, as Chiang Kai-chek's (蔣介石) defeated KMT troops fled for Taiwan, Mao Zedong (毛澤東) declared that "China has stood up." China has, indeed, stood up, and continues to rise as one of the world's largest economies. Last year, China alone accounted for roughly 60 percent of global export growth. But in a crisis, China's diplomatic influence usually resembles that of some peripheral backwater.

  Nowhere does this seem truer than in China's own backyard. Beijing's seeming silence over the nuclear ambitions of North Korea has left US, Japanese and South Korean officials alike wondering when it will "stand up" to assert its influence over its neighbor and erstwhile ally.

  One reason China seems paralyzed in the current crisis is that, among the world's major powers, it is almost alone in having a genuine "two Koreas" policy. Since China established diplomatic relations with South Korea in the early l990s, economic ties have grown dramatically, and cultural relations have expanded at a comparable pace. China also reciprocated former president Kim Dae-jung's overtures in the political-security realm, despite South Korea's strategic ties with the US.

  But in recognizing South Korea, China took greater care than, say, Russia, in seeking to ameliorate North Korea's anxieties. China is North Korea's most important trading partner, with turnover exceeding US$700 million last year, up 30 percent from 2001. Indeed, China is believed to supply about 70 percent of the North's oil, and has doubled its sales of grain and vegetables. While China no longer promises the North military support (except in the event of external attack), "consultations" are pledged.

  Privately, China's leaders are dubious (at best) about North Korea. They think that economic reform is long overdue, and, like others, consider Kim Jong-il's political system bizarre. For their part, North Korea's elite understands that they have no true allies at present, not even in Beijing. Yet Kim Jong-il's two trips to China illustrate his interest in Beijing's reforms and his desire to cultivate its support.

  How much the Chinese know about the inner workings of North Korea's policy-making and power structure and how much influence they can have, are uncertain. China claims that its power over Pyongyang is limited. What China wants above all is to prevent North Korea from collapsing, whatever the cause.

  Conflict on the Korean Peninsula, nourished by the vitriolic language often employed by Kim Jong-il's regime, is China's nightmare. War between the Koreas would confront Beijing with a flood of hundreds of thousands of refugees. Equally important, China is wary of the prospect of Korea being unified under South Korean rule and backed up by continued strategic support from the US.

  Fortunately, North Korea's leaders prefer survival to suicide. They know that despite the extensive damage that they could inflict on the South, in the end, they would be destroyed by US and South Korean power if combat ever starts. Hence, war initiated by the North, while not unthinkable, seems unlikely.

  A third possibility is an indefinite continuation of the status quo. This, too, seems doubtful. North Korea is a failing state economically, a fact that Kim Jong-il and his cronies appear to recognize. Since the mid-l990s, they have been exploring -- albeit cautiously and uncertainly -- avenues of change, including flawed price liberalization in the middle of last year. Whatever the eventual outcome, the status quo is untenable.

  A fourth alternative, favored by China and other key players, is an evolutionary process that combines economic reform with increased interaction with the external world, focusing initially on South Korea. China will move carefully but firmly in promoting this path. It is anxious to see a US-North Korea dialogue begin, one capable of alleviating the North's anxieties about an American attack and America's concerns about a renewed nuclear program.

  Indeed, the main factor fueling the current crisis and complicating its resolution is that the North has only one bargaining chip: threats. Aside from a pledge of non-aggression, its central interest is in obtaining economic assistance. Yet the US and others are wary of being labeled appeasers.

  Well aware of the complexities and hazards -- and seeking to avoid alienating any of the parties -- China is willing to play the role of convener, but not adjudicator, of an American-North Korean dialogue. Thus, its proclaimed "disagreement" with North Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty was relatively mild.

  Nonetheless, China's stake in the outcome of the current crisis is big enough to make it a party to a wide range of exchanges, formal and informal, bilateral and multilateral -- all with the objective of promoting change without upheaval on the Korean Peninsula. In this respect, the US and China have common interests, as do Japan, Russia, and South Korea. China, too, believes that if advocates of "regime change" do not push North Korea too hard, a strategy can be pursued that is based on slow evolution rather than a precipitous break -- and a possible violent breakdown.

  Robert Scalapino is professor of government and co-chair of the Center for Korean Studies, University of California at Berkeley. His publications include 38 books and monographs on East Asian politics.

  Copyright: Project Syndicate
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