Wed, Mar 12, 2003 page9

• It's past time for the US to face up to North Korea's nuclear plot

  • By Ralph Cossa
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  While the George W. Bush administration is to be commended for not overreacting (or reacting in kind) to North Korea's saber rattling and for its continuing assertion that it seeks a diplomatic solution to the current nuclear stand-off, Washington needs to stop pretending that there is no "crisis" or that there is no difference between one to two suspected nuclear devices and a full blown North Korean nuclear weapons program involving the extraction of enough plutonium to make -- or sell -- numerous bombs.

  This is both a peninsula security and a non-proliferation crisis, and must be dealt with as such.

  To be fair, it is wrong to accuse the Bush administration of ignoring the problem. A great deal of diplomatic effort has gone into tightening the noose around Pyongyang and demonstrating to its leadership that its actions are only further isolating the "hermit kingdom" and putting its people at greater disadvantage.

  US President George W. Bush's willingness to wave some carrots in front of Pyongyang -- his promise of a "bold approach" toward future cooperation in return for North Korean compliance with its previous nuclear obligations -- is likewise a positive gesture which has not been sufficiently recognized and praised by Seoul.

  Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's assertion that the US can deal simultaneously with Iraq and North Korea and his alert order to prepare for the deployment of strategic bombers and attack aircraft to East Asia if needed, underscores Bush's reminder that "all options remain on the table" despite his current commitment to a peaceful solution.

  Based on his behavior thus far, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il appears to have drawn the conclusion that he has a free pass to misbehave as long as Washington remains focused on (and refuses to be diverted from) Iraq. "All options" assertions are likely viewed as not very credible, especially since Seoul keeps handing out the carrots while ruling out the sticks. Unless Washington and Seoul can jointly convince the North that its decision to actively pursue nuclear weapons will threaten, rather than enhance, North Korea's national security, Pyongyang's efforts to pursue a nuclear weapons program will continue unabated.

  In criticizing the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea, many Koreans (North and South) call for a return to the policies of the Clinton administration. They forget that former president Bill Clinton was prepared to use force to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.

  When former US secretary of defense William Perry says "the credibility of our determination to remove the nuclear threat even if it risks war" is a key ingredient in any possible solution to the current stand-off, he speaks from experience; he was drawing up the plans for military action at the same time former president Jimmy Carter was striking the deal that made military action unnecessary in 1994.

  But the other key ingredient, according to Perry, is "the courage and the confidence to pursue creative diplomatic alternatives to war." Washington needs to be -- and to appear in the eyes of its allies, and especially to South Koreans -- more flexible and forthcoming in dealing with Pyongyang.

  This does not mean that asking Carter or a more acceptable (to the Bush administration) alternative, such as former president George Bush, to go to Pyongyang is the answer, although sending a high-level emissary -- former secretary of state James Baker or former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft -- at some point in the future should not be ruled out.

  It does mean that making the North Koreans an offer they can't refuse, or one which, if refused, would leave little doubt that North Korea is interested in nothing less than developing nuclear weapons.

  The Bush administration needs to go beyond vague references to a "bold approach" and, as Scowcroft recently argued, "offer a clear vision of the diplomatic solution it favors -- and a road map to get there." The urgency of the crisis, Scowcroft argues, "brooks no delay over matters of form." While the administration's offer of a five-plus-five forum remains a reasonable one, agreeing to bilateral discussions does not "reward" Pyongyang for past indiscretions. Combining both approaches could provide a way forward.

  Several security specialists -- including Scowcroft and, separately, former State Department officials Robert Einhorn and Alan Romberg -- have offered various "win-win" formulas where Washington agrees to full-scale negotiations in exchange for and concurrent with a freeze in all North Korean nuclear activities -- as opposed to the current precondition that a verifiable halt must precede such talks. This would test the North's sincerity and help convince others that more drastic measures are required, should Pyongyang come up with reasons to reject this offer as well.

  Meanwhile, South Korea's new President Roh Moo-hyun has stated that he is committed to working closely with Washington, Tokyo, China, Russia and others to "resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue." If so, rather than just call for talks, he should formally offer to host a multilateral senior officials meeting (at the assistant secretary or higher level) to bring all the concerned parties, including North Korea, to the table before Pyongyang takes steps -- such as beginning to reprocess its spent fuel -- that may force a military confrontation.

  For its part, Washington should reinforce its earlier stated willingness to meet separately with Pyongyang along the sidelines of such a meeting, which should also include a North-South bilateral discussion on the nuclear issue. An agreement by Washington and Seoul that reprocessing represents a "red line" that will require a reassessment of the current joint US-South Korea commitment to a peaceful solution would provide some added incentive for Pyongyang to accept such an offer.

  Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal.
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