Tue, Sep 03, 2002 page8

• Beijing pursuing a new policy toward Taiwan

  • By Bonnie Glaser
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  China's policy toward President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of "listening to his words and watching his deeds" has ended, I was told by a senior Chinese official in Beijing in mid-August. That policy, adopted shortly after Chen was swept to victory in March 2000, had signaled that although Beijing distrusted Chen and expected he would take steps to advance the DPP party platform of establishing an independent Taiwan, China would refrain from passing final judgment on the new president's intentions or taking steps to confront him.

  But in the aftermath of Chen's Aug. 3 pronouncement that there exists "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait and his contention that holding a referendum on Taiwan's independence is a "basic human right," Beijing has revised its policy toward Taipei.

  China's reaction implicitly rejects Taipei's explanation that Chen was not calling for independence, but merely was reiterating the long-standing position that the ROC is a sovereign state and was speaking only of the value of legislation permitting a referendum rather than calling for a public vote on Taiwan's political status.

  The new policy, say Chinese academics, harbors "no illusions" about Chen, calls for increased pressure on Washington to rein in Chen's pro-independence leanings and accelerates the development of credible military options against Taiwan to deter further moves toward formal separatism and to facilitate the use of force should that ultimately be deemed necessary by China's top political leaders. The extent to which China's new policy differs from the old one remains to be seen, however.

  The united front policy, that seeks to entice anti-independence politicians to visit China and woo Taiwan's businesspeople to in-crease investment in China while isolating pro-independence forces in Taiwan, remains in place. Bei-jing will also continue to issue visas to DPP members so long as they visit in a capacity other than their official party position and do not advocate independence. A leading expert in China on Taiwan affairs asserted, "It is our constant policy to work on these people and explain to them the true nature of our policy. We want to win over as many people as possible."

  China will also continue to promote the establishment of direct cross-strait postal, trade and transport ties, known as direct links, but will continue to insist that these ties be conducted as an internal affair of a country. "If we proceed with negotiations between enterprises, we won't touch on political issues, either the `one country, two systems' or `one country on each side,'" assured a senior official from China's Taiwan Affairs Office.

  The debate in China over whether Chen is a pragmatist that Beijing can deal with or is determined to separate Taiwan from the mainland has been muted, at least temporarily. This is unfortunate since a growing number of experts in China had adopted the view that an appropriately flexible mainland policy would eventually be rewarded with Chen's acceptance of an ambiguous definition of "one China" that would pave the way for cross-strait political dialogue.

  "Those moderate voices are much less likely to be heard now," noted one Chinese scholar. Following Chen's Aug. 3 comments, Chinese officials vilified him by name for the first time since he assumed the presidency, equated his statements with former president Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) "state-to-state" reformulation of cross-strait relations and charged that Chen had "laid bare his true colors of stubbornly upholding Taiwan independence.'"

  According to my interlocutors, it will henceforth be difficult for anyone in China to take issue with this assessment.

  Beijing's response to Chen's "one country on each side" statement has been relatively restrained compared to 1996, when missile drills were conducted close to Taiwan in response to Lee's "state-to-state" formula. Distraction due to intense haggling over the leadership succession in preparation for the 16th Party Congress provides only a partial explanation. China has also learned important lessons from its previous excessively harsh reactions to Taiwan's policy surprises. Beijing recognizes that too much brawn is counterproductive to the longer-term goal of winning over the hearts and minds of the people on Taiwan.

  Experts in China say that a strong response would play into Chen's hands, enabling him to "play up the China threat and unite the Taiwan people to resist the mainland." Moreover, any use of military pressure against Taiwan invites strong warnings from the US. The Chinese are especially cautious to not take steps at this time that could trigger renewed Sino-US friction on the eve of the summit between Chinese President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) and US President George W. Bush.

  "We were not as silly as Chen expected," remarked the head of a leading foreign policy institute in Beijing. "We pay more attention to continuously developing Sino-US relations."

  Another lesson learned in at least some circles in Beijing is that Washington is earnest in its policy of not supporting Taiwan independence because the failure to do so could drag the US into a war in the Taiwan Strait. As noted, in 1996 China reacted with a certain level of military muscle, but even then it was constrained by the Clinton administration's unequivocal disapproval of Lee's "state-to-state" formula.

  This time, muting its reaction yet further, Beijing recognized the Bush administration's adept handling of Chen's remarks, even though its response was less overtly critical and less visible than its predecessor. Bush officials remained consistent and clear, reiterating Washington's "one China" policy and its positions of not supporting Taiwan independence and insisting on peaceful resolution.

  Beijing was disappointed that the US did not directly rebuke Chen -- many urged the US to condemn Chen as a troublemaker as the Clinton administration had done with Lee in 1999 -- but Chinese officials nevertheless welcomed the timely reaffirmation of US policy. The Chinese initially feared that Chen had consulted with Washington in advance of delivering his remarks and were greatly relieved to be convinced that there was no such conspiracy.

  The debate in China continues over whether economic integration of the two sides of the Strait will promote eventual political integration or abet the separatist trend. A growing number of experts argue that close economic interaction and greater interdependence would facilitate peaceful reunification, but most add the caveat that this goal can only be achieved when both economic development and political systems in China and Taiwan become more comparable than they are today.

  At the same time, there is unanimity on spending more money on defense and accelerating China's military buildup against Taiwan. One PLA officer stated bluntly: "A peaceful solution requires political attractiveness and the support of a powerful military capability to coerce Taiwan to unify. China lacks both of these."

  Bonnie Glaser is a Washington-based consultant on East Asian affairs and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
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