At a TSU rally on Aug. 11, Presi-dent Chen Shui-bian (
retreated from his bold Aug. 3 speech in which he called for a referendum on independence.
Chen's reference on Aug. 3 to "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait marked a distinct shift from a defensive strategy, secretly seeking independence, to an offensive one, overtly advocating it.
But his remarks at the TSU rally represented a return to a more traditional stance. The president echoed statements he had made on July 21 and July 29, when he urged the people of Taiwan to "keep on walking down the right path" and to "unite and stop fighting among [themselves], in the face of China's military threat."
But Chen didn't dare emphasize that Taiwan and China were two different countries. Instead, he let former president Lee Teng-hui (
Chen's failure to assess the impact of the policy change implied by his Aug. 3 speech goes a long way toward explaining the backpedaling.
The widespread negative reaction to his change in tenor has made the president far more aware of the constraints inherent in Taiwan's cross-strait policy and of the wide gap between his ambitious goals and Taipei's limited means.
When Chen backed legislation for a referendum on independence, he targeted three different audiences -- the US, China and the Taiwanese public -- with well-defined goals in mind.
Chen's intentions were honorable: he tried to tell Washington about his concern over Taiwan's growing diplomatic isolation.
His awkward speech, how-ever, did not serve US-Taiwan interests. The US priority in the Taiwan Strait is to avoid tensions. Chen, in Washington's eyes, suddenly embraced the role of
troublemaker by hinting at independence and therefore a potential confrontation with China.
The George W. Bush administration clearly doesn't want an unpredictable ally that could drag the US -- against its own interests -- into what it considers to be an unnecessary cross-strait conflict.
Taiwan immediately dispatched Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen (
If Washington is not convinced by Tsai's explanations, the outcome could be a rapprochement between the US and China at Taiwan's expense.
Chen, aware of the stakes, started to backpedal last week by claiming that the media had oversimplified his comments. He also offered another translation of his remarks on "one country on each side," saying it was more accurate to understand that Taiwan and China have "equal sovereignty."
Chen also miscalculated the impact of his "either side" comments on cross-strait relations. Since Beijing had not reciprocated his goodwill gestures, Chen thought that by taking a tougher stance, he'd be able to break the current standoff and force China to the negotiating table.
To limit the risk of a misunderstanding, the MAC sought to "clarify" and counterbalance the president's words by declaring that Taiwan's cross-strait policy had not changed.
Unfortunately for Taipei, Bei-jing's response has failed to live up to Chen's expectations. One negative outcome is the diminishing hope for a resumption of the cross-strait dialogue.
It came as no surprise that Beijing, on Aug. 7, barred MAC officials and DPP legislative aides from entering its territory.
Chen lost face for the second time, after the Nauru diplomatic setback. By that point, China understood that the negative international reaction to Chen's move toward Taiwanese independence and his sudden backpedaling indicated that he was making an empty threat.
In the long term, opening talks on direct links will be more difficult, given China's now even deeper distrust of Chen.
In an attempt to remove those suspicions, the government on Aug. 9 announced that Chinese citizens would be allowed to invest in real estate in Taiwan.
Chen also left the Taiwanese people perplexed. First, Chen sought to reassure his core DPP supporters by calling for legislation that would allow for a referendum on independence.
Second, he needed to re-establish his leadership after the loss of Nauru by taking a tougher position vis-a-vis China.
And third, with the 2004 presidential election in mind, Chen emphasized cross-strait tensions to divert the focus of voters from government inefficiency and a poor economic outlook.
Through these actions, however, Chen, dashed the hopes of businessmen who expected a breakthrough in direct-links talks. A few days later he tried to limit the economic damage by adding that he had no intention of changing the status quo.
Polls show that most people resented Chen's sacrifice of stable relations with China by suggesting formal independence, sending his popularity to a record low of 45 percent.
To appease the business sector, the government backpedaled. Contradicting Chen's advocacy of the "go south" policy, it stated on Aug. 9 that local chipmakers could apply to set up wafer plants in China.
In retrospect, Chen's Aug. 3 speech backfired because he failed to take into account political reality. For if "walking down its own road" means that Taiwan should isolate itself from the inter-national community, then it is taking a dangerous path, indeed.
The crisis triggered by Aug. 3 highlighted the consequences of the dichotomy between Taiwan's means and its goals. Ideals alone are simply not enough to achieve goals. And Chen clearly lacked the means to implement a policy aimed at altering the status quo by gaining international recognition of Taiwan's independence.
While it requires great courage to fight from a position of overwhelming inferiority, Chen's act of despair jeopardized the nation's interests and standing in the international community.
Not only did Chen fail to consult Washington about his Aug. 3 plans, he failed to air his intentions with his closest national security aides, the Washington Post revealed on Aug. 10.
Since that time, Chen has learned a hard lesson in the reality of power.
At the TSU rally, he read a carefully worded statement that left little room for improvisation or ideological maneuvering. But Chen's address on Aug. 11 may herald his transformation from politician to statesman.
A politician is only concerned by the conquest and preservation of power. In contrast, the sharp management of power and a focus on long-term interests define the statesman.
Trung Latieule is a former editorial assistant at the International Herald Tribune and now a freelance reporter based in Taipei.
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