"No surprises." This was one of the pledges President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) made to Washington, both at his inauguration and again after his DPP made a better-than-expected showing in last year's legislative elections and formed an alliance with the even more pro-independence TSU.
From the beginning, Chen seemed fully aware of the damage that former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) surprise "special state-to-state" description of China-Taiwan relations had inflicted on Taipei's relations with Washington during the Clinton administration. "This will not happen again," Chen seemed to be promising.
Well, don't look now, but here we go again. Chen's assertion in a video-conference address to the World Association of Taiwanese Associations in Tokyo that there is "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait and, even more provocatively, that Taiwan's future should be decided by a referendum -- a long-recognized Chinese "red line" that Chen had previously pledged not to cross -- seemed to come as a surprise, not only to Washington and Bei-jing, but even to many of Chen's advisors and supporters.
We now see the same back-peddling, that "this does not reflect a change in policy," that followed Lee's earlier purposefully provocative remarks, which also caught many of his senior advisors by surprise.
As surprising as they were though, Chen's comments did not come completely out of the blue. They were preceded by remarks three weeks ago that "we would not rule out going our own way" if Beijing continued to reject Tai-pei's goodwill. His Aug. 4 speech contained several new references to Taiwan "walking down our own road ... our Taiwan road" along with a specific reference to his earlier speech.
What gives? Is Chen trying to get himself branded a "troublemaker" in Washington's (and Beijing's) eyes. Only Chen knows for sure. One simple word might provide some insight, however: Nauru. It is no coincidence that Chen's initial "own road" remarks came only a few hours after the president of Nauru announced in Hong Kong that his nation was severing diplomatic ties with Taipei in favor of Beijing. This reduces to 27 the number of nations that have diplomatic relations with Taipei.
Nauru's decision proved once again that a country's friendship can't be bought, but can be rented if the price is right. In this case, the enticement reportedly turned out to be US$60 million in Chinese financial aid, plus a promise to pay Nauru's $77 million debt to General Electric. Taipei announced that it was unwilling to enter into "cash competition" for Nauru's affections, even as it continues to pay generous amounts of "rent" elsewhere.
Chen's "own road" comment appears based, at least in part, on his continued frustration over Taipei's lack of success in gaining increased "international breathing space." To the contrary, the Nauru "defection" appears part of a broader campaign to lure more of Taiwan's partners into Beijing's camp.
But Beijing needs to stop and ask itself the consequences of further success. If only a handful of states recognize the ROC, why continue to pretend it still exists? While Beijing refuses to acknowledge the ROC's legitimacy, almost any new name (especially Republic of Taiwan) would be worse.
Chen seems to be warning Beijing that its continuing efforts to tighten the diplomatic noose may leave him with no option other than to pursue an independence path. Chen's reference to a referendum as a "basic human right" -- without setting a date or, for that matter even specifically calling for one -- may signal that the other "no's" included in his inaugural address (including no declaration of independence) might also be reconsidered if Bei-jing continues to isolate and humiliate his administration.
This is, of course, a very dangerous game and one that could prove as counterproductive to Taiwan-US relations as Lee's "state-to-state" comments.
Why run the risk of alienating a Washington administration that has proven to be exceptionally supportive of Taiwan? How does this serve Taipei's long-term interests? These are questions for Chen and the DPP to seriously ponder if it continues rhetorically down the "Taiwan" road.
Washington also needs to ask itself if its highly publicized assertion that it will do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan defend itself has given Taipei the confidence it needs to engage Beijing -- its stated purpose -- or to openly challenge its giant neighbor; an action that is clearly not in the US' national security interest.
Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS [pacforum@hawaii.rr.com], a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
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