One of the most significant US foreign policy initiatives in many years is articulated in an obscure section of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003, passed by the US House of Representatives. Section 1202 of the bill calls for training and senior exchanges between the armed forces of Taiwan and the US and presents opportunities to deter China's use of force against Tai-wan and to save American lives should the US be called upon to intervene.
Opponents of Section 1202 are under intense pressure from Bei-jing. It is no secret that the Chi-nese embassy in Washington is actively lobbying against inclusion of the provision in the authorization bill. According to the July 29 edition of the Weekly Standard, leading the charge against closer ties between the US and Taiwan in the administration are Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and National Security Council senior staffer James Moriarty.
In effect, Section 1202 would require a greater focus on the operational training of Taiwan's armed forces, relax long-standing restrictions on flag officer visits to Taiwan and promote interoperability between US and Taiwan military forces. All three measures are a legitimate and requisite response to Beijing's military build-up opposite Taiwan. These requirements also are consistent with the nature of the US' unofficial relations with Taiwan, and do not imply an alliance relationship.
One of Taiwan's greatest weaknesses is not its lack of modern equipment, but its lack of exposure to modern training practices. This includes joint training with modern foreign militaries, such as with those of the US. Development of an effective training regimen, to include observation of and participation in US exercises, would pay significant dividends not only in Taiwan's military readiness, but also in the ability of the US to operate alongside Taiwan's armed forces in a crisis situation.
With a small number of exceptions, Taiwan is restricted from observing US exercises, particularly those that involve third parties (most US exercises involve foreign observers or participants). Training with US forces, at least beyond that associated with specific foreign military sales, is prohibited.
Taiwan's armed forces also suffer from a lack of dialogue with senior members of the US military. Administration officials argue that because senior Taiwan military officers are able to interact during visits to the US, senior US military visits to Taiwan are unnecessary. However, a 30-minute office call on a two- or three-star military officer is hardly worthwhile from a mentoring perspective. Taiwan needs a measured, regular flow of senior US general officers, particularly those with joint operational experience, who can spend significant time on the island to relate experiences with counterparts who have been denied this knowledge.
Field grade officers involved in the defense relationship have done a commendable job over the last several years. However, nothing can substitute for general officer mentorship. Taiwan and US forces also need to have integrated operations at multiple levels. To date, there is no evidence that the US Department of Defense has made any effort at interoperability. The reason is political: interoperability is viewed as synonymous with an alliance-like relationship, thus violating the 1979 communique that dismantled the US-ROC Defense Treaty. This is a fallacy that must be shattered.
Interoperability would aid in US intervention in a conflict should national-level decision makers deem such intervention as necessary. It would not only enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of US operations with Taiwan, but would also reduce the possibility of "friendly fire" accidents. Interoperability does not guarantee US intervention; nor does it imply a formal alliance.
The US defense department stresses interoperability with a range of ad hoc coalition partners with whom the US does not have a formal alliance relationship. Tai-wan stands alone as the sole exception of this policy. White House and State Department opposition to Section 1202 is based upon the perception that it would complicate relations with Beijing. Some senators and Senate staffers also oppose the language for that very reason. But if the Pentagon is serious about enhancing Taiwan's self-defense and ensuring the effectiveness of ad hoc coalition operations with Taiwan in a crisis situation, it will support inclusion of Section 1202 in fiscal year 2002.
American lives depend on it.
Wu Ming-chi is the president of Formosan Association for Public Affairs.
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