Following the proposal for a cross-party "alliance for national stabilization," the hottest issue in the political arena right now is the inter-party leadership summit.
Upon President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) taking over the DPP chairmanship, the summit was included in the agenda of the party's Central Standing Committee. DPP Secretary-General Chang Chun-hsiung (張俊雄) has been placed in charge of promoting the conference, which has apparently been made a top priority for the new secretary general.
Chang has repeatedly said that Chen is very sincere in his hope to sit down and talk with the opposition party chairmen. Any issue can be discussed and the sooner, the better, Chang said.
But there is a proviso: the parties will negotiate in advance to prioritize important issues for discussion.
Despite his apparent sincerity, whether or not the conference will be held depends on the decisions of the opposition KMT and PFP.
Interestingly, the alliance for national stabilization and the inter-party leadership summit are said to be in contradiction with each other.
When Chen proposed the idea of forming an alliance for national stabilization during his African trip, both the KMT and the PFP criticized the proposal, saying that if such an alliance were established, how could it be possible to hold an inter-party leadership summit? They contend the alliance aims at recruiting traitors and splitting up the "pan blue" camp.
Why does the contradiction exist? Changes in the political situation have caused the two concepts, with similar goals but different forms, to turn into two opposite ideas.
Both proposals are basically compromises put forth to resolve the DPP's minority status in the legislature.
When Chen was sworn in as president in 2000, his governance was severely impeded by the DPP's shortage of seats in the legislature. Then Cabinet secretary-general Chiou I-jen (邱義仁) described the situation in a most vivid way.
He said that even when Chen "fell on his knees begging" for legislation to be passed, he was still rejected. At the time, Chen hoped that a ceasefire could be reached through party-to-party negotiations. His proposal was naturally rebuffed since the opposition was stronger than the ruling party.
Prior to the legislative elections, Chen put forth the idea of forming a cross-party alliance for national stabilization in the hopes that, if the DPP released some ruling power, a governing team with the "pan blue" camp could be established in the legislature.
After the polls, the DPP became the biggest party in the legislature, and also had the TSU to fall back on.
The cross-party alliance was then put on the back burner since the two "green" parties combined could nearly reach a majority.
What's known is that since the DPP can control the legislature and Chen now doubles as party chairman, both the cross-party alliance and the inter-party leadership summit have changed from being a passive, defensive project to an aggressive move for stability. This means the two balls are now in Chen's court.
If the KMT and the PFP fail to realize that they are now in a defensive position and continue to engage in saliva wars, saying they "would rather sleep than participate in the conference" -- as PFP Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) responded -- they will only add credit to Chen's governance.
Chin Heng-wei is editor in chief of Contemporary Monthly magazine.
Translated by Jackie Lin
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