When meeting two delegations from Taiwan, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen (錢其琛) said in Beijing on July 5 that the direct links can be promptly established if they are viewed as domestic affairs [by Taipei]. That being so, political disputes over the "one China" principle will not be involved. Meanwhile, when meeting representatives from the Taiwanese political group Mountain, China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS, 海協會) Chairman Wang Daohan (汪道涵) said in Shanghai on July 7 that Beijing still places its hopes on President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) -- although he found Chen's refusal to admit the "one China" principle hard to understand.
The subtlety of Qian's talk lies in the word "viewed," because the rest of his talk is exactly the same as the so-called "1992 consensus," which also suggests that cross-strait talks on practical matters do not have to involve political issues over the "one China" principle. At the time, both sides of the Taiwan Strait handled the differences by allowing each side to have its own interpretation of the principle. With the word "viewed" added, no written agreement or even interpretation will be necessary. Thus, according to Beijing, it will be acceptable if the cross-strait links are taken as domestic links (by Taipei).
In the view of international precedents on aviation rights, it's only necessary to define what kinds of routes are allowed between two countries or two areas -- in order to describe the status of these routes. There is no need to define whether a transport link is international or domestic. Based on international precedents, in the future, it's only necessary to define which countries' planes will be allowed to fly across the strait. There will be no need to define the transport link as a "cross-strait link," "special cross-strait link," "domestic link" or "special domestic link" in an aviation contract.
If the word "viewed" can be explained like this, it means that Beijing has taken the opening of direct links as a major priority on its Taiwan policy. Beijing has already found a shortcut to achieve this goal, as its unchanged political stance seems to be somewhat flexible at present.
But for such an important political issue, is it best for Taiwan to view direct links as domestic links without any written agreement or interpretation? If the both sides do not raise political issues, they can certainly avoid possible disputes easily. But if one side suggests "viewing" direct links as domestic links while the other side makes no any interpretation, is this a tacit recognition? In fact, this is exactly why the principle of "one China," with each side having its own interpretation" was adopted in 1992.
The Chen administration has repeatedly declared that "the opening of direct links is the path that we must take." But it has refused to accept the "1992 consensus." Now, it must quickly think over the handling of the issue of "viewing the direct links as domestic affairs." Nevertheless, Chen clearly said during his African trip that "it's not acceptable" to view direct links as domestic affairs. Obviously, it seems that all the disputes have returned to their origin in 1992.
Cheng An-kuo is a former vice chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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