On May 21 Beijing invited Taipei to talk about postal, commercial and transportation links across the Taiwan Strait through authorized businessmen. Yet on May 20, 2000, the world was asking whether there would be a war, with the DPP's Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) being sworn in as president. The party had advocated Taiwan's independence, against which Beijing had threatened military attack. Curiously, two years of calm in the Strait followed. What has happened? Where will Beijing and Taipei go from here?
Armed conflict failed to materialize because Beijing was pragmatic and Washington demonstrated its resolve in maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait. The critical contribution, how-ever, was Chen's prudent and practical policy toward China.
First, Chen has continued to express goodwill toward Beijing. He promised at his inauguration that "during my term, I will not declare independence." In his 2001 Lunar New Year speech, Chen asked: "Why can't we strive for economic and cultural integration -- to pursue a new cross-strait structure of political integration and permanent peace?" His integration approach even raised the eyebrows of some independence advocates around him.
Second, Chen has promoted a policy of exchange across the Strait. In November 2000, he lifted the ban on Chinese journalists being stationed in Taiwan. In January last year, he allowed and arranged for the "small three links" between the offshore islands and Fujian Province. This transformed Kinmen and Matsu, the site of intensive shelling in 1958, into a symbol of peace. Chen also significantly relaxed controls over mainland-bound investment earlier this year.
Third, Chen has exercised utmost restraint to avoid provoking Beijing. He has often reined in criticism of Beijing within his party. For example, when Beijing released its third Defense White Paper in October 2000, Taipei for the first time refrained from questioning it.
Mere calm in the Strait is insufficient. Chen realized that, and has repeatedly appealed for the resumption of cross-strait consultations, suspended since 1999 by Beijing. On June 20, 2000 just a month into his presidency, he publicly invited Beijing's leader, Jiang Zemin (江澤民), to meet with him anywhere and without pre-conditions. In November last year, he expressed a yearning to find his family roots in China. In early May this year, Chen again invited Beijing leaders over, this time for tea.
Chen's multifarious efforts to engage Beijing have not produced any quick results. Two blind spots in Beijing's perception seem to have blocked its leaders from breaking through a self-imposed impasse of refusing to talk to Taipei until Taiwan accepts Bei-jing's "one China" principle in whatever form it is defined by Beijing.
First, Beijing's intransigence has actually nurtured pro-
independence sentiment in Taiwan. After Taipei lifted the ban on Taiwanese visiting China in 1987, a "mainland fever" swept the nation. Whenever an earthquake, flood or drought struck China, Taiwanese donated generously to disaster relief efforts. But a series of actions by Beijing disappointed the Taiwanese, chilled the fever and gradually reduced the donations to nil.
These actions included the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen massacre and the March 1996 test firing of missiles during Taiwan's
presidential election campaign. Following the missile tests, an opinion poll found that those who supported Taiwan's independence (20.5 percent) for the first time outnumbered those who supported for unification with China (18.8 percent). Conversely, whenever Beijing softened its posture on Taiwan, the pro-unification percentage would immediately edge up.
Second, Beijing thinks Taiwan is a mirror image of China. The centrally-controlled media that exists in China has long since become history in Taiwan. Given its robust media and energetic legislature, no leader in Taiwan can defy the majority without losing power at the next election.
About 60 percent of Taiwanese prefer peace and prosperity by maintaining the status quo. Not talking to Taipei does not endear Beijing to the real master on Taiwan -- its people. Beijing's refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan is even more counterproductive. Beijing should try to win over the hearts and minds of Taiwanese people if it really wishes to pursue unification and confidently let the Taiwanese choose their own destiny.
Beijing seems to have gingerly learned this lesson in recent years, but how thoroughly remains to be seen. On March 15, 2000, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) appeared on TV. Broaching war and shaking his fist, he warned voters in Taiwan, "Do not indulge in impulse with consequences that you will live to regret." Three days later, Chen was elected president by a margin of just 2.4 percent of the votes. Beijing was low-key and passive for months afterwards.
At the APEC meeting in Shanghai last October, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan (唐家旋) rudely prevented Taipei's representative from speaking. In the elections for Taiwan's legislature last December, Chen's minority party won a plurality.
On Jan. 24, Chinese Vice-Premier Qian Qichen (錢其琛) publicly welcomed "the broad membership of [the] DPP to visit the mainland." On May 9, Chen responded by announcing his plan to send DPP delegates in August, after he takes over the party's chairmanship. On May 22, his administration indicated that the civilian sector could participate in cross-strait negotiations on transportation links.
While the previously frozen atmosphere between Beijing and Taipei is loosening up, the People's Liberation Army continues to deploy short-range ballistic missiles -- with more than 400 already aimed across the Strait -- and to carry out military exercises aimed at seizing a modernized, subtropical and hilly island. Beijing still tries to block Taipei from participating in and contributing to international organizations such as the WHO.
Some have confidence in China's economic potential, and others think Taiwan's democracy will never perish. In the long run, however, time is not on the side of China or Taiwan. Time, rather, is on the side of people on both sides of the Strait. The interests of both people are basically the same. While governments may be temporary, people will be there forever.
Taipei and Beijing should strive toward a win-win relationship. Consultation is the key to peace and prosperity. If Jiang can speak about "creating a peaceful and prosperous new century" as he did in Berlin on April 19, why can't he do the same in Taipei?
Lin Chong-Pin is senior adviser at the National Security Council. This commentary was first published in the Asian Wall Street Journal (June 6th edition) under the title "Taiwan's Olive Branch."
US President Donald Trump has gotten off to a head-spinning start in his foreign policy. He has pressured Denmark to cede Greenland to the United States, threatened to take over the Panama Canal, urged Canada to become the 51st US state, unilaterally renamed the Gulf of Mexico to “the Gulf of America” and announced plans for the United States to annex and administer Gaza. He has imposed and then suspended 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico for their roles in the flow of fentanyl into the United States, while at the same time increasing tariffs on China by 10
As an American living in Taiwan, I have to confess how impressed I have been over the years by the Chinese Communist Party’s wholehearted embrace of high-speed rail and electric vehicles, and this at a time when my own democratic country has chosen a leader openly committed to doing everything in his power to put obstacles in the way of sustainable energy across the board — and democracy to boot. It really does make me wonder: “Are those of us right who hold that democracy is the right way to go?” Has Taiwan made the wrong choice? Many in China obviously
About 6.1 million couples tied the knot last year, down from 7.28 million in 2023 — a drop of more than 20 percent, data from the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs showed. That is more serious than the precipitous drop of 12.2 percent in 2020, the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. As the saying goes, a single leaf reveals an entire autumn. The decline in marriages reveals problems in China’s economic development, painting a dismal picture of the nation’s future. A giant question mark hangs over economic data that Beijing releases due to a lack of clarity, freedom of the press
US President Donald Trump last week announced plans to impose reciprocal tariffs on eight countries. As Taiwan, a key hub for semiconductor manufacturing, is among them, the policy would significantly affect the country. In response, Minister of Economic Affairs J.W. Kuo (郭智輝) dispatched two officials to the US for negotiations, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co’s (TSMC) board of directors convened its first-ever meeting in the US. Those developments highlight how the US’ unstable trade policies are posing a growing threat to Taiwan. Can the US truly gain an advantage in chip manufacturing by reversing trade liberalization? Is it realistic to