Talk about "Asian Values" is rarely heard nowadays. Its currency seems to have been devalued along with East Asia's once booming economies. For Asia's financial crisis of a few years back uncovered many excesses that hid behind the rhetoric of Asian values -- the cozy relations between governments and elites; rampant corruption, cronyism and nepotism.
But of equal importance in causing this diminishment is the fact that real reformers came to power in some Asian states, such as Kim Dae-jung in South Korea, and brought with them a more universal view of human rights. Good governance -- in both the public and private sectors -- is the post-crisis mantra. With transitions underway in Thailand and Indonesia, democracy is increasingly what Asians want. Although a return to the old discourse about Asian values is unlikely, some Asians may nevertheless reassert their differences on human rights, democracy and governance as memories of the crisis grow distant.
The worst reason for this will be the oldest reason: some pre-crisis elites retain influence and/or power. Because reform threatens their privileges, it must be resisted. Other former elites may try to link self-protection to anti-Western rhetoric and nationalist sentiment. This holds the potential to be a potent weapon in dealing with outsiders like the IMF, or when foreigners buy [at bargain prices] into banks, public utilities and big companies.
Alongside elite self-interest, the pain of ordinary workers and citizens is a genuine and widespread concern. Displaced by new competition, workers have gone on strike in countries like Korea, where the old "iron bowl" of employment protection has shattered. In Thailand, the rural poor organized against a reform minded Democrat government while its party rivals canvassed on the old politics of patronage and money. If united, entrenched elites and the mass of workers and the poor can create a powerful stumbling block to reform.
Lingering resentments about colonization may also be tapped. Many segments of society still harbor reservations about foreigners and foreign investors, not only in countries new to global markets, like Vietnam, but even in countries with decades of economic openness. Moreover, in the wake of IMF-imposed remedies, many Asians feel marginalized. This is why Malaysia's Premier, Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, strikes a cord beyond his country when he rails against American hegemony. Nationalism in Asia is both a proud and convenient flag to hide behind.
A newer reason renewing Asia's sense of difference is that, thus far, human rights and democracy have not delivered good governance, stability or growth. Human rights advocates in Indonesia, for example, used the crisis to argue for political prisoners to be released, for East Timor to be given its independence, and for provincial human rights violations to be investigated. But this was no recipe for restoring stability and growth.
To succeed in restoring a strong growth path, East Asia must deliver justice for more than individual human rights violations. As the proponents of Asian values argued, all human rights -- civil and political as well as social and economic -- need to be strengthened. If not, advocates of democracy and human rights will face a backlash. Already, some Indonesians are nostalgic for Suharto's new order.
A third, newly emerging reason for an Asian approach to human rights is more benign. It is an increasing sense that the aim should be to be both universal and Asian, not one or the other. For the crisis of 1997-98 brought Asians closer together. Governments cooperate more fully through the ASEAN plus 3 process that links 13 East Asian countries. A greater sense of regional identity exists even if regional cooperation is limited and most people think it should not take the form of a closed bloc or union.
Open regionalism is an edict not only for the trade regime. It can also apply to other areas of cooperation, including human rights. So, the idea of an ASEAN or Asian regional mechanism should be re-evaluated. Asia is, after all, the only continent without such a regime to complement international institutions. The time may now be right because some countries have started their human rights commissions.
Indeed, the new generation in the region is both more Asian and more open to the universal. For them, an understanding of the US and US-influenced international standards is second nature. The influence has come through popular and consumer culture as well as private sector business, non-government organizations and civil society groups. But this does not mean that Asia will be homogenized, like a McDonalds' franchise.
A new Asian culture is being articulated. Much of it is set within a Western framework, but some particulars do differ. In Asia, hybrids are emerging that are both modern and "universal" while still being Asian. Significantly, what is emerging is being negotiated at the level of individuals and communities, not states and national leaders.
Asia cannot go back to what was before. But unless stability, growth and a sense of confidence are renewed, greater tension with the West and narrow forms of pan-Asian nationalism are possible. This need not be antagonistic, as in the past. The hope this time is that Asia's people -- not just their semi-autocratic leaders -- seek their own balance between the universal and a redefined sense of what Asia is.
Simon SC Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and Professor of law at the National University of Singapore.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
In the first year of his second term, US President Donald Trump continued to shake the foundations of the liberal international order to realize his “America first” policy. However, amid an atmosphere of uncertainty and unpredictability, the Trump administration brought some clarity to its policy toward Taiwan. As expected, bilateral trade emerged as a major priority for the new Trump administration. To secure a favorable trade deal with Taiwan, it adopted a two-pronged strategy: First, Trump accused Taiwan of “stealing” chip business from the US, indicating that if Taipei did not address Washington’s concerns in this strategic sector, it could revisit its Taiwan
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) challenges and ignores the international rules-based order by violating Taiwanese airspace using a high-flying drone: This incident is a multi-layered challenge, including a lawfare challenge against the First Island Chain, the US, and the world. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defines lawfare as “controlling the enemy through the law or using the law to constrain the enemy.” Chen Yu-cheng (陳育正), an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies, at Taiwan’s Fu Hsing Kang College (National Defense University), argues the PLA uses lawfare to create a precedent and a new de facto legal
International debate on Taiwan is obsessed with “invasion countdowns,” framing the cross-strait crisis as a matter of military timetables and political opportunity. However, the seismic political tremors surrounding Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chairman Zhang Youxia (張又俠) suggested that Washington and Taipei are watching the wrong clock. Beijing is constrained not by a lack of capability, but by an acute fear of regime-threatening military failure. The reported sidelining of Zhang — a combat veteran in a largely unbloodied force and long-time loyalist of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — followed a year of purges within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
On the last day of the extended legislative session on Friday last week, the Legislative Yuan, with a slight majority held by the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), continued to refuse to review the government’s annual budget for this year, which is already overdue. It was the first time in Taiwan’s constitutional history that the government budget was not reviewed in its supposed legislative session. Instead, the opposition rushed to pass three controversial bills, which many people have criticized as self-serving. Since the Executive Yuan submitted its annual budget proposal to the Legislative Yuan in August last
RSS