President Hugo Chavez was forced from power not because of opposition protests but because of his own mistakes. He returned to power two days later because of his opponents' mistakes.
Understanding the positions of the actors is a necessary step if today's impasse is to be bridged. By last year's end, a growing but dispersed opposition believed that President Chavez should go but disagreed how this should happen. Their complaints were many: the government's land reform law, its oil policy, poor record on corruption, politicization and militarization of the public sector, disrespect for unions and other institutions, support for guerrillas in Colombia and for Fidel Castro, illegal arming of militants, hostility to the US, and threats to free speech. Even though the charges were serious, the opposition lacked a smoking gun to clearly disqualify President Chavez, especially in the eyes of foreign governments.
President Chavez scorned the opposition's litany. His legitimacy rested on free elections and his project for economic and social justice. He predicted resistance from those whose privileges would disappear. They would seek to block him, especially through their control of the media. He would respect their right to say as they pleased but would pull no punches in countering their "lies." He used his appearances on television to denounce his enemies and mobilize citizens, particularly poor ones, to support his revolution. He sowed conflict.
The tide of events shifted to favor the opposition and facilitate coordination among its disparate parts, including politicians, business leaders, civil society organizations, active and retired military officials, intellectuals, labor unions and even members of religious groups. A successful national strike last December convinced many that the president no longer commanded a majority among voters. Chavez responded with intransigence, seeming to think that his hold on power depended on whether he could still turn out a big crowd.
Like a flawed hero, Chavez fell prey to his aggressive character in ways that endangered his international standing. In mid-February, the Organization of American States criticized his abusive language in television broadcasts that chilled public debate. Shortly after, Chavez recklessly decided to consolidate his hold on the state oil company by appointing cronies to its board. The move sparked a managerial revolt that threatened Venezuela's biggest source of income. Smelling blood, business and labor leaders called for a national strike to support the company.
Any observer could see that the march of several hundred thousand people on the presidential palace on April 11th would likely provoke repression and a clash with Chavez supporters. As violence exploded, Chavez began a television address announcing the shutdown of private television stations; meanwhile the media projected scenes of blood and chaos on one half of the TV screen and afterwards reported that snipers were firing against the defenseless crowd.
Here, at last, was the smoking gun. Or so it seemed. Representatives of the armed forces announced that, as defenders of the constitution, they could not support the president. After announcing that the president had resigned, they charged Pedro Carmona, head of the businessmen's federation, with forming a government.
Many people expected that Venezuela would follow the example of several Latin American countries by respecting constitutional procedures to legitimize a new government. No one can understand why Carmona abandoned his allies, entrenched a narrow group of associates in his proposed government, or declared himself virtual dictator for a year instead of following the democratic script. He thus validated the condemnation of Latin American leaders and lost vital military and political support even before he swore himself in.
The next day, chaos, looting and panic spread. Arbitrary arrests of Chavez officials began, even as their colleagues regrouped to retake the presidential palace. The news media suspiciously stopped reporting on these facts, later protesting (too much) that they were under threat and feared instigating further violence. Unwilling to go to war amongst themselves or against the enraged crowds, the military brought back the president as the only hope for restoring order.
A repentant Chavez sought pardon for his errors, promised generous treatment for the rebels and moved swiftly to negotiate a solution for the oil industry. But his return leaves the political constellation of forces much as before. The dictatorial turn of the transitional government fortified the view in the Chavez camp that the opposition is a tool of right-wing economic groups and opportunists willing to turn confused citizens into cannon fodder. For the opposition, the government's attempts to close down the media strips bare Chavez's anti-democratic credentials. They blame the president for the dead and wounded on both sides and consider him incapable of changing his ways or his policies, despite his promises.
A fragile consensus for conciliation and an independent commission to investigate the facts opens a window for dialogue, but no one thinks the crisis has ended. Many on both sides may prefer that the full facts not come out.
Janet Kelly is Professor of political economy at the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administracion, Caracas.
Copyright: Project SyndicatE
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