Ever since Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) became president, he has faced three difficult political problems. The first is that three parties have divided the political world among themselves. Next is the problem of policy integration between the party, the legislative caucus and the ruling team. And finally, there is the problem of keeping the Presidential Office, the Cabinet and the various ministries and commissions in step.
After last year's legislative elections, the DPP at least obtained the status of being the largest party in the legislature, and resistance to passing legislation has somewhat subsided. Moreover, even though members of the political elite have differing interpretations of the fact that the constitutional system still has a dual executive -- and even though the bureaucracy is still waiting to learn the true essence of neutrality -- with Yu Shyi-kun's appointment as premier and the gradual rise of former members of Chen's city government team to high-level positions, the chaotic state of executive departments could be improved significantly. Next comes the problem of how to tame the DPP, which was essentially the mission of its Extraordinary National Congress.
In recent years, the direction of DPP reforms has mainly been in the area of so-called "internalization." In other words, once the legitimacy brought by the election of public officials is confirmed, the next step becomes how to shake off the constraints imposed by traditional supporters. Specifically, this means how to arrange things so that the distribution of power within the legislative caucus is reflected in the central standing committee. This requires looking at whether the three legislative whips shall serve on the central standing committee, and whether legislators can moonlight as chiefs of party headquarters.
Though the DPP has had to handle its sudden transition to ruling-party status, the basic tone of party reforms will not experience any immediate changes. Reforms have already ceased to be simply a matter of generational transition. The question of whether to get rid of individualism in order to strengthen the systemization of the party's constitution is no longer relevant. Instead, what matters is how Chen controls the DPP.
As Chen swallows up the state apparatus, he can openly dangle administrative resources and personnel appointments in front of key figures, incorporating his "pets" onto his team. And as it's not possible for Chen to incorporate some of his own staff members, how can members of the other DPP factions hope to be brought into the fold? To Chen -- unless the DPP disintegrates -- these appointments will always either constitute an administrative stumbling block, or, to some extent, be an obstacle to his re-election.
It is especially difficult to guarantee that Chen's "new middle way" policies won't be used by potential challengers within the party as a basis to form alliances. Some might even interpret the "new middle way" as a violation of party discipline, and -- following the Chiu Chang (
Recently, the most demanding act in the DPP's reform program was ensuring that the president assumed the post of party chairman. Essentially, Chen nominated himself for the chairmanship, also setting in place his nomination for another term as president, taking him one step closer to handpicking a successor. In addition, in a crude imitation of the KMT, the establishment of three vice-chairmanships was proposed.
On the surface this seems to be a wish to divide responsibility for the party, the legislative caucus and government liaisons between the three chairmanships. However, if this action is not used to arrange for party elders to leave office, at most it merely constitutes appointing party whips for the purpose of maintaining control over the party. Does this mean that these positions will be used to groom presidential candidates? In sum, apart from certain city mayors and county commissioners, a good talking to is probably enough to convince the majority of dissenting voices within the party.
Chen cannot be completely blamed for his personal desire to let "the government lead the party." The emergence of alliances in the DPP has consistently lacked any sense of organization, being completely decided by miscellaneous alliances and an inter-factional terror balance. Internal party operations are formally regulated, but regulations lack lasting cohesive power -- not to mention a lack of stable leadership and righteous elders. After all, in a jungle where everyone is looking after number one, isn't it pragmatic to be the one who makes the first move? However, when party loyalty and discipline are narrowly interpreted as existing for the purpose of political control -- and those in power are opportunists -- party organizations merely become part of the personal election machine. Where is the party's founding spirit or camaraderie to be found? Apart from ethnic identity, what is the foundation of the party's election support?
Discussions on the street often neglect the fact that parties must see to it that their legislators conform with the party's principles, charter and stance, and forge a connection with the voters. Ambiguous positions not only create confusion over identity and instability in the party's policy direction, but create a situation where even the most basic requirements of democratic politics -- namely, being responsible to the voters -- will cease to be protected.
Of course we oppose the KMT's past practice of "no separation between party and government," but "the party leading the government" isn't necessarily wrong. If party politics is the only means by which to pursue democratic politics, we shouldn't allow this means to be weakened. Otherwise, other social forces (such as big business) are bound to take advantage of the situation and assume policy-making authority.
Shih Cheng-feng is an associate professor of public administration at Tamkang University.
Translated by Scudder Smith
In a stark reminder of China’s persistent territorial overreach, Pema Wangjom Thongdok, a woman from Arunachal Pradesh holding an Indian passport, was detained for 18 hours at Shanghai Pudong Airport on Nov. 24 last year. Chinese immigration officials allegedly informed her that her passport was “invalid” because she was “Chinese,” refusing to recognize her Indian citizenship and claiming Arunachal Pradesh as part of South Tibet. Officials had insisted that Thongdok, an Indian-origin UK resident traveling for a conference, was not Indian despite her valid documents. India lodged a strong diplomatic protest, summoning the Chinese charge d’affaires in Delhi and demanding
Immediately after the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) “Justice Mission” exercise at the end of last year, a question was posed to Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal regarding recent developments involving the exercises around Taiwan, and how he viewed their impact on regional peace and stability. His answer was somewhat perplexing to me as a curious student of Taiwanese affairs. “India closely follows developments across the Indo-Pacific region,” he said, adding: “We have an abiding interest in peace and stability in the region, in view of our significant trade, economic, people-to-people, and maritime interests. We urge all concerned
In the past 72 hours, US Senators Roger Wicker, Dan Sullivan and Ruben Gallego took to social media to publicly rebuke the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) over the defense budget. I understand that Taiwan’s head is on the chopping block, and the urgency of its security situation cannot be overstated. However, the comments from Wicker, Sullivan and Gallego suggest they have fallen victim to a sophisticated disinformation campaign orchestrated by an administration in Taipei that treats national security as a partisan weapon. The narrative fed to our allies claims the opposition is slashing the defense budget to kowtow to the Chinese
In a Taipei Times editorial published almost three years ago (“Macron goes off-piste,” April 13, 2023, page 8), French President Emmanuel Macron was criticized for comments he made immediately after meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in Beijing. Macron had spoken of the need for his country to find a path on Chinese foreign policy no longer aligned with that of the US, saying that continuing to follow the US agenda would sacrifice the EU’s strategic autonomy. At the time, Macron was criticized for gifting Xi a PR coup, and the editorial said that he had been “persuaded to run
RSS