Sat, Mar 09, 2002 page8

• Bush's stance on China will pay off

  • By Arthur Ding 丁樹範
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  Taiwan has taken a positive view of US President George W. Bush's recent performance in Beijing, as evident in the comments of Vice President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) and Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugene Chien (簡又新). Bush showed a frank and even hardline attitude on the Taiwan issue, disregarding his host's sensibilities and expectations. I believe this resulted from both structural and personal factors.

  The structural factor refers to China's threat against Taiwan. If we look back at the history of the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations, it is clear that one of the cornerstones of the three Sino-US communiques and the establishment of Sino-US ties is the idea that the problem across the Taiwan Strait must be resolved by peaceful means. The US will strengthen its security and military relations with Taiwan if China steps up its military intimidation toward Taiwan or if China's military modernization might affect the military balance across the Strait. In other words, the US takes a dynamic, not static, viewpoint toward the cross-strait military balance.

  In 1982, then-US president Ronald Reagan issued such an instruction following the signing of the Second Shanghai Communique with Beijing. Reagan said the US was willing to accept the communique and put a cap on arms sales to Taiwan. But the US would ignore the communique's restrictions if China stepped up its military intimidation toward Taiwan or if China's military modernization might affect the military balance across the Strait. According to this logic, the second communique was doomed to be null and void from the time it was signed because it could never be put into effect.

  The US' dynamic viewpoint also applies to its arms sales to Taiwan. For years, the US has defined its arms sales as defensive weapons for Taiwan to shore up its self-defense capabilities. But the definition of the word "defensive" is also dynamic, depending on the extent of China's military threat. If China's military menace exceeds a certain level, some offensive weapons will likely be interpreted as defensive.

  One typical example is the US' agreement last year to sell diesel-powered submarines to Taiwan. China has actively undertaken military modernization in recent years, to an extent that has put the US on high alert and given rise to worries that the speed and scope of the modernization has surpassed Taiwan's self-defense capabilities. As a result, the US gave a nod to the submarine sales in the hope of boosting Taiwan's offensive capabilities and its overall defensive power.

  The personal factor, on the other hand, refers to the world view of Bush and his foreign-policy team. They basically regard the Asia-Pacific region as a priority. And China is only part of its Asia-Pacific policy.

  The Bush administration holds that the US should not only shake off Beijing's objections to its Taiwan policy, but also take better control of its policy toward the two sides of the Strait.

  This idea was effectively imple-mented when Reagan was in office but, in the Clinton era, a lack of emphasis on foreign policy resulted in the "three nos" policy that put his government in a thorny situation. Now that mem-bers of the Reagan administration are back in charge of foreign policy under Bush, naturally the US administration is eager to get rid of China's objections.

  The Reagan and Bush governments share three concrete beliefs on dealing with China.

  First, holding fast to their stance and even ignoring the Chinese leaders' endless complaints. Bush gave full play to this maneuvering strategy during his Beijing trip. It is predictable that Beijing will not bother the US again in regard to the Taiwan issue before Bush steps down.

  Second, trying to improve relations with China, giving Bei-jing face and making it feel valued. In the Reagan era, US navy ships made port calls in China for the first time since the two nations established diplomatic ties, a visit that made China believe bilateral relations were improving. This time, Bush chose to visit China on the 30th anniversary of the late president Richard Nixon's China tour, deliberately highlighting the symbolic meaning of his visit, giving Beijing face and some room for imagination.

  Third, stressing mutual benefit and not making concessions easily. US anti-terrorism policies after the Sept. 11 incident serve as a typical example. The US certainly needs China's backing on these policies, but the Bush administration further emphasized that terrorist acts also affect China's national interests. Therefore, the US has no need to bargain away Taiwan in exchange for China's support.

  A similar strategy is reflected in its policy toward North Korea. The Bush government believes that stability in the Korean Peninsula is also in China's interests. The US and China, as a result, should cooperate in every regard to prevent North Korea's detrimental acts.

  It is worth noting that the US-China-Taiwan security structure has changed, strengthening Bush's viewpoints and making him do what he did in Beijing. For Tai-wan, the next step should be to stabilize and consolidate its status in the US-China-Taiwan triangular relations through US support.

  Arthur Ding is director of Research Division III at the Institute of International Relations of National Chengchi University.

  Translated by Jackie Lin
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