Amid an atmosphere of confrontation, the Legislative Yuan voted to overturn the KMT's version of the Law Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures (財政收支劃分法). The dispute between the central and local governments over financial allocation is now back to square one.
The Executive Yuan has pro-mised to draft amendments to the law within three months. But if tax revenues cannot grow naturally along with the economic recovery, the Executive Yuan may be unable to come up with a proposal that satisfies everyone.
By looking at the number of votes cast, we can see an outline of the future battles between the ruling and opposition camps at the legislature.
On Feb. 1, the KMT's Wang Jin-pyng (
However, if we look at the personalities of Wang and Chiang and their partisan connections, Chiang's victory at best reflects the anti-Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) sentiment among KMT and PFP lawmakers. It cannot be viewed as indicative of cooperation between the KMT and PFP. Nor does the number of ballots cast for Chiang reflect any partisan cooperation. At best, it only reflects former president Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) shrinking influence on the "pro-localization" lawmakers within the KMT.
In comparison, local factions and the government pressure on lawmakers undergoing criminal investigations both had an impact on the financial allocation issue because there was no "personality" influence.
Under intensive lobbying by the Executive Yuan, more than 90 percent of lawmakers showed up for the vote. Normally, such an attendance rate is only seen at the speaker and vice speaker elections and meetings where Cabinet appointments are approved.
Apparently, the ruling and opposition camps are still in a confrontational state. Looking at the 109 votes cast for the opposition in the financial allocation law ballot -- down from 115 votes in the vice speaker's election -- we can boldly predict that 109 is the largest number of votes the opposition camp can get in future showdowns over legislation.
The opposition legislators who did not show up for the vote included Aboriginal representatives and the "pro-localization" lawmakers. There have been rumors that the "pro-localization" lawmakers were planning to leave the KMT. Excluding the 109 votes cast for the opposition, the rest of the legislature (116 votes) may be an invisible "National Stabilization Alliance."
In reality, however, only 103 votes were cast in support of the proposal to overturn the amendments to the law. The pan-green camp still got fewer votes than the pan-blue camp.
Victory for the ruling party is quite likely in the future if the KMT's capacity to mobilize its lawmakers continues to slide, if the government's counter-mobilization efforts are effective and if DPP and TSU lawmakers can maintain high attendance rates. However, the cost of victory will become ever higher if it is built on threats and gimmicks.
In the past, when the DPP was still an opposition party, the more fiercely the DPP struggled for political reform and over legislative agendas, the more candy the KMT would shell out to its own lawmakers who made noises. The same is true for today's situation.
In the future, the DPP will need to carefully handle its relations with Wang and Chiang, respect the partisan negotiation mechanism and tone down partisan confronta-tion. Only then will the DPP be able to gain control over legislative operations.
Given the narrow gap between the two camps' prowess, opportunists drifting between the different parties may become a "decisive minority." The top leaders of each party should calmly consider how to prevent this group from becoming de facto decision-makers. Only with cooperation can the two sides have a win-win situation.
The DPP should show even more sincerity and respect for the partisan negotiating mechanism and maintain harmony. Only then can it ensure the smooth promotion of its policies in the future.
The success of the DPP government over the next three years will depend on how ferocious the opposition resistance is, as well as the diligence of DPP lawmakers in attending legislative sessions.
Given the difficulties the DPP went through in selecting its three caucus whips and allocating their responsibilities and the disputes over registering for committee seats, we can say that the future difficulties facing Chen's government lie not in the opposition camp, but in the DPP's legislative caucus.
Jan Shou-jung is an assistant to Taiwan Independence Party Legislator Lee Ching-hsiung.
Translated by Francis Huang
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