Iran is marking the 23rd anniversary of its Islamic Revolution with nostalgic blasts at "America, the Great Satan," thanks, in part, to President George Bush naming Iran as part of the "Axis of Evil" involved in terrorism and the production of weapons of mass destruction.
Beneath the surface, however, Iran is no longer Ayatollah Khomeini's sharia state.
ILLUSTRATED: YUSHA
Iran does deserve to be classified as a regional and, perhaps, a global promoter of instability; its support for the fundamentalist Islamic terrorism of Hizbollah in Lebanon is, indeed, aimed at further undermining the diminishing chances for an Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. But internal developments in Iran are complex, and demonization of the Islamic Republic is not helpful. Neither is drawing a simple dichotomy between "conservatives" and "reformers," the latter led by President Khattami, helpful.
In many respects, Iran is perhaps the most interesting country in the region, with the greatest potential for development leading to -- not a Western-style democracy -- but greater opening and liberalization. The paradox is that Iran's potential is embedded in its ideology as an Islamic state. After the first turbulent and murderous years of the Iranian revolution, the last few years have shown some remarkable developments. Among them:
Elections: these are confined to an Islamic discourse, and all candidates and parties must secure the imprimatur of the highest Islamic authority in the land before they can be listed on a ballot. But despite these restrictions, there is a fierce contest between various groups and interpretations:
Women can vote and participate actively and publicly in political life. Moreover, the general image of Iranian women suppressed behind their black chadors is more complicated than it first seems. For example, in medicine: because male doctors are prevented by strict Islamic law from treating women, the government has encouraged the training of female doctors. Today, there are many more women doctors in Iran than under the Shah, and the number of women dying at childbirth is among the lowest in the region.
The government has also instituted a very pro-active birth control program, and has found a way of legitimizing it within an Islamic context, saying "we want educated Islamic families, not just large Islamic families." Iran, as a consequence, has one of the lowest birth rates in the region.
Because elections to the Majlis (Parliament) and the Presidency are contested, they are meaningful. It is, for example, clear that President Khattami was elected with the support of women and younger people, and the "establishment" candidate was not elected. There is nothing like this in any Arab country: In Egypt or Syria (just as in Belarus) there is virtually only one candidate, and he receives between 97-98% of the vote.
Parliamentary debates are real, and real contested voting takes place. Again, this is nothing like the rubber-stamp sham parliaments of countries like Egypt and Syria.
The shades of gray have real consequences for policy towards Iran: as an Iranian political scientist recently put it at a seminar in Germany, younger people in Iran do feel themselves to be Muslims, and Iran will never become a secular society. But they view their Islam as part of their Iranian identity, whereas the older clerics viewed Islam as a universal revolutionary identity. These younger people -- the Iranian scholar claimed -- are first of all Iranian nationalists, and would like to dissociate themselves from Middle Eastern politics, in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict. They will continue, of course, to give verbal support for the Palestinian course, but it is not at the top of their agenda.
In sum, Iran presents a complex, sometimes confusing picture. But anyone who knows European history can identify a parallel: the Calvinist, Puritan revolution. The Calvinists of Geneva, or Cromwell's Puritans, were -- like the mullahs of Teheran -- biblio-centric, with a Holy Book as their model for the ideal society. Their society was meant to be puritanical, frugal, non-permissive, with laws against conspicuous consumption and luxuries. It was also anti-feminist, anchored in patriarchal family structures.
Because the Calvinists did not accept a Church hierarchy, they -- like the Iranian Shi'ites who are not part of the Sunni majoritarian universalism -- based their legitimacy on the community of believers and so introduced elections. But once you hold real elections, different modes of interpretation of the Holy Book become possible and legitimate. Suddenly, there exists a mechanism for participation, control, dissent (limited as it may be) and the introduction of innovative strategies that seek to legitimize change within a traditional context.
In Europe, after all, Calvin's Geneva -- an autocratic theocracy, more similar to Khomeini's Teheran than to any other regime -- eventually developed, through English Puritanism, towards modern parliamentary government. Indeed, in Britain until the l820's only members of the Church of England could vote in Parliament or be elected to it.
Will Shi'ite Iran follow a road similar to that of the European Calvinists? Nothing is pre-determined; but the parallel is striking. For all of today's involvement of some Iranian leaders in terrorism, the picture is more complex, more interesting -- and perhaps more promising than President Bush's speech suggests.
Shlomo Avineri is Professor of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a former Director-General of Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. copyright: Project syndicate
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