The World League for Freedom and Democracy (WLFD) had its annual World Freedom Day Conference in Taipei recently, and it generated some comment in the media, some good, some bad. Having attended two or three of these events, my perception of the institution is somewhat different than those reported. For me, its distant history should be left behind as its present objectives are now in line with Tai-wan's democratization. But its structure and mentality, on the other hand, remain that of its distant past. The good is that its objectives are in the right direction; the bad is that its potential as a well-funded non-governmental organization (NGO) in an Asian democracy is not being realized.
There is no question that the pre-democracy governments of Taiwan had a purpose in organizing such an institution. It was to strengthen cooperation and gather support for defeating communism, but doing so by including authoritarian regimes like itself that were not embraced by liberal democracies. Embracing those regimes and using WLFD to help do it produced the image that many still have of this NGO. In Taiwan, much of that image, along with the "retake the mainland" credo and the Chinese civil war itself, has been relegated to history. Elsewhere, how-ever, the memory lingers and needs dispelling.
The first two WLFD objectives, to "spread to all parts of the world the ideas of freedom and democracy and support their universal application" and to "promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all peoples" are as solid as motherhood. The other objectives get a little grandiose in having WLFD be a coordinating center for cooperation in economic and educational development, and to "combine staunch efforts against aggression," both of which are considerably beyond its capabilities. Still, intentions deserve some credit.
The structure of the WLFD, however, like the original ROC Constitution, seems to be based on a somewhat different sponsor. It is organized as an international NGO that has branches or associations worldwide, with its main office in Taipei. The branches, for the most part, have existed for many years, often with the same people and apparently largely with the main purpose being to attend the annual meetings. Under these conditions, the message about Taiwan, its march to democracy and the example it should be setting, doesn't reach the people in those not-yet-democratized countries.
So whatever the WLFD parenthood was many years ago, the WLFD of this generation is quite different, but it has not sufficiently scrubbed that old image away and it is not sufficiently selling Taiwan as an example of successful democratization. I believe the reason is not its present objectives but its organization.
To make it even more important that it should address these two matters, WLFD is the only Taiwanese NGO that is registered with the UN. If it could succeed in demonstrating to the rapidly growing number of NGOs in Taiwan how to best conduct themselves in the international arena, perhaps the UN's China fever could be lowered enough to register more Taiwan NGOs.
In order to change its image and to strengthen Taiwan's image as a democracy, as well as for its relationships with international organizations, WLFD has to be seen as a bona fide Taiwanese NGO, not a group that in appearances at least, resembles a worldwide propaganda organization. Its "home" and its membership would be in Taiwan. It would build a different kind of network with like-minded NGOs of other countries. Contributing funds and sometimes volunteers to democracy-related projects of NGOs abroad is far more effective than meetings.
As always for Taiwan, there is the China factor. Some NGOs in other countries are reluctant to include a Taiwanese sponsor or participant, fearing it would damage their involvement in any China project. China clearly does nothing to discourage this, but it can be overcome. More difficult for Taiwanese NGOs is participating in projects in China. Culture, language, perhaps personal relationships may be tempting, but in some cases may not be welcome.
We often hear that democratic Taiwan could set a good example for China. A project that supports the idea of democracy in China probably would be one of those unwelcome cases. It may not only be unwelcome, on that subject it could even be dangerous.
Some countries, including the US, have publicly-funded endowments whose purpose is to support NGOs in efforts to spread the word about democracy and the human rights of the individual. It is the manner in which these endowments are organized that permit public funds to be used on a non-partisan basis for this purpose, and at the same time assure the international community that it is not a government institution. Transparency of the organization and where and how its money is spent is critical to gain public confidence, as is the selection of oversight committees.
Perhaps WLFD, which is publicly funded, can transform itself into that kind of institution. In the past, it seemed, there were times WLFD activities would overlap with what would normally be Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Government Information Office matters. This would not be the case with a WLFD that was directing its own efforts, and working with other Taiwanese NGOs, in non-government participation in projects that strengthen democracy abroad.
President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has often spoken in public about his wish that Taiwan should be a strong advocate of human rights and democracy. There are many ways for Taiwan to support activities that foster internationally recognized human rights. An institution that could take the lead in getting Taiwan's private sector involved in supporting the spread of democracy abroad could be one of those.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expres-sed in this article are his own.
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