During his annual "state of the world" address last Thursday, Pope John Paul's remark on cross-strait relations came as a surprise, hinting at possible developments in the triangular relationship between the Vatican, China and Taiwan. For the first time, the Holy See referred to Taiwan and China respectively as the "Republic China (ROC)," and the "People's Republic of China (PRC)" while expressing his pleasure at seeing the two co-exist in the WTO.
It was only two months ago in October when the Pope openly apologized to China for past "errors" committed by the Catholic Church's missions in China and pleaded for the re-establishment of diplomatic ties. At the time, the Pope's statement created speculation that the Vatican may be forsaking its diplomatic ties with Taiwan. This was because Beijing had responded to the Pope's statement with a predictable and arrogant demand -- the Vatican must drop formal recognition of Taiwan.
However, the Pope's statement on Thursday could easily be interpreted as conceding the existence of "one Taiwan, one China," "two Chinas," or, at the very least, "two equally sovereign political entities" respectively ruled by the "ROC" and the "PRC." That is the interpretation the Taiwan government is adopting. The vice chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, Chen Ming-tung (
Also significant is the Pope's emphasis on the co-existence of China and Taiwan in the WTO, which may be an indication that the Pope thinks the WTO model is to be encouraged.
While it is too early to conclude that this interpretation of the Pope's speech is accurate, that kind of talk is certainly the last thing China wants to hear. For a regime that has consistently demanded recognition of the "one China" principle under which Taiwan is a mere province of China and the Taiwan government a mere provincial government, such talk is tantamount to blasphemy.
Is the Pope being unintentionally insensitive to the feelings of Beijing at a time when the Vatican is supposedly trying to re-establish diplomatic ties? Or perhaps the Vatican's attitude has changed since the Pope's open apology in October. While it is too early to tell, it should not surprise anyone should the latter scenario be the case. After all, too many issues between the Vatican and Beijing remain deadlocked, such as what to do with the Catholic Patriotic Church in China, a church established by the Communist Party of China, and whether the Vatican should give up its right to appoint bishops to China.
On an even more fundamental level, one issue will forever remain a sore spot between the Vatican and Beijing, that is, the latter's religious persecution. Besides China's usual crackdowns on members of the Falun Gong and members of the underground church in China who continue to recognize the Pope, the Chinese government has recently arrested Hong Kong resident Li Guanqiang (
Should the Vatican decide to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing -- a government that treats bibles, at least versions that it disapproves of, as contraband and those who believe in the bible as "cult members" -- how will it face its followers?
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