It looks like the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is destined to end with a whimper not with a bang. Earlier doomsday predictions notwithstanding, Washington's unilateral withdrawal from the treaty (the required six month's notice was given on Dec 13) is not expected to usher in a new Cold War between the US and Russia. Nor is it likely to undermine the other Soviet-era strategic arms reduction agreements or to prompt a new arms race between the two nuclear giants.
In fact, both sides have agreed to significant new reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals coincident with the treaty withdrawal announcement.
Nonetheless, abrogating the ABM Treaty was a singularly bad idea. While Moscow has little alternative but to accept Washington's decision and to proceed with the crafting of a new, more positive relationship with Washington, this unilateral decision will damage Russian President Putin's domestic credibility and make it harder for him to expand his level of cooperation with the US.
While the Russians had initially been inflexible about amending the ABM Treaty, Putin had demonstrated a certain amount of political courage since Sept. 11 by announcing his willingness to adjust the treaty to take Washington's security concerns into account. The announcement comes across as an unnecessary snub to a new-found friend. Putin's critics in the Duma will take great delight in pointing out the foolishness of trying to cooperate with Washington.
The decision has also revitalized and reinforced earlier accusations of American unilateralism that the Bush administration, in its thus far skillful handling of the war on terrorism, had been slowly overcoming. The man who promised the American people "leadership without arrogance" once again seems to have forgotten the second half of that pledge.
Reinforcing a unilateralist image hardly seems to be in America's best national interest at a time when Washington is still attempting to hold together or even build upon its current coalition against international terrorism, especially when one recognizes that garnering international support for whatever step comes after Afghanistan will be even more difficult.
Washington's decision to unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty may also unnecessarily strain relations with its two key Northeast Asian allies, Japan and South Korea. Tokyo has taken some giant leaps forward in its bilateral security cooperation with Washington, for the first time sending military forces abroad (albeit with severe restrictions) to support the war on terrorism.
But Tokyo remains deeply committed to global arms control efforts and sees the latest action (and Washington's continuing disdain for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) as evidence of a growing gap in strategic thinking between these two important allies.
Likewise, Seoul worries about the impact this move will have on already strained relations between Washington and Pyongyang and on North Korea's already growing hesitancy to negotiate in good faith with the South.
Ironically, the announcement could prove to be a mixed blessing for US-Sino relations. On the one hand, Beijing was quick to express its condemnation, as it does over any decision that even remotely deals with the subject of missile defense. On the other hand, it may finally prompt Beijing into serious dialogue with Washington; discussions that Beijing previously seemed to be avoiding, hoping instead that its strategic partner, Russia, would somehow be able to hold America's national missile defense program in check.
Of great significance in this regard was President Bush's decision to call Chinese President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) shortly after the ABM announcement, to reassure him that neither the treaty withdrawal nor America's missile defense plans (which could now more aggressively be pursued) were aimed at China. Bush then repeated the US offer to engage China in a strategic dialogue that would address both nation's missile-related security concerns.
In my own discussions with Chinese officials and other senior security specialists, I get the distinct impression that China somehow feels that improved US-Sino relations and cooperation on sensitive issues such as missile defense are primarily up to Washington. China, they appear to argue (although not in these terms) is like a willing maiden waiting to be seduced, if only Washington would come courting.
At the risk of hopelessly overplaying this analogy, I would argue that the Bush phone call and offer of strategic dialogue is the diplomatic equivalent to Washington's knocking on China's door with a bouquet in hand.
It's time for Beijing to stop playing hard to get. The best way for China to protect its own national security interests -- for example, to ensure that Bush's missile defense system will in fact not negate China's strategic deterrent capability (as Washington currently promises) -- is to sit down and discuss the issue while Washington is still willing to talk. By the time Putin decided to talk about changing the ABM Treaty, Washington had decided to go in another direction. Beijing should not make the same mistake.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS [pacforum@hawaii.rr.com], a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
“I compare the Communist Party to my mother,” sings a student at a boarding school in a Tibetan region of China’s Qinghai province. “If faith has a color,” others at a different school sing, “it would surely be Chinese red.” In a major story for the New York Times this month, Chris Buckley wrote about the forced placement of hundreds of thousands of Tibetan children in boarding schools, where many suffer physical and psychological abuse. Separating these children from their families, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aims to substitute itself for their parents and for their religion. Buckley’s reporting is
Last week, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), together holding more than half of the legislative seats, cut about NT$94 billion (US$2.85 billion) from the yearly budget. The cuts include 60 percent of the government’s advertising budget, 10 percent of administrative expenses, 3 percent of the military budget, and 60 percent of the international travel, overseas education and training allowances. In addition, the two parties have proposed freezing the budgets of many ministries and departments, including NT$1.8 billion from the Ministry of National Defense’s Indigenous Defense Submarine program — 90 percent of the program’s proposed
RSS