China's stated policy towards Taiwan is that there is one China and Taiwan is part of that China. China sees three paths for action to realize this policy: negotiation, political victory for pro-unification forces in Taiwan or military conquest.
Today, China may see near-term hope for the first two options fading. If so, what might the signs be of a shift in Chinese tactics to achieve the goal of absorbing Taiwan?
The conventional wisdom has it that China's actions towards Taiwan tend to be clumsy and overbearing, often evoking a response from Taiwan and the world that is the opposite of what was intended.
But what if China has now learned that saber rattling and rude manners towards Taiwan only stiffens Taiwanese resolve? If so, how should we interpret China's recent behavior towards Taiwan if we assume that the leadership in Beijing knows exactly what it is doing?
With the Dec. 1 national legislative elections fast approaching, the prevailing thought was that China would do all it could do to enhance the prestige of the KMT, to ensure the latter's continued dominance of the Legislative Yuan.
Then, on Sept. 11, more than 4,000 people were killed and the calculus across the Taiwan Strait was dramatically altered. America's sole focus in national security and international affairs became its war on terror.
Many of the few US intelligence professionals who watched China were detailed away to other priorities. Policy makers concerned about Chinese intentions suddenly became too busy to follow up on recommendations or policy shifts. Naval forces in the Western Pacific whose mission it is to watch and deter China and North Korea were suddenly shifted to the Indian Ocean or the Arabian Sea.
China quickly took note of the situation, calling for a US quid for China's quo -- in exchange for American acknowledgment of China's own war on terror and "splittism" against Taiwan, China would give the US intelligence on the terrorists in Afghanistan. China later modified the offer to make it appear less self-serving, but the fact remains, the offer was made.
On Sept. 13, Beijing conducted a remarkable policy turnaround when it announced it was giving up hope on negotiating a unification agreement with the KMT. This appeared to pour cold water on one of China's major initiatives to achieve unification.
Then, China rejected Taiwan's chosen representative for the APEC summit in Shanghai, former vice president Li Yuan-tzu (
If Beijing knew its actions would bolster the DPP, what does that say about their intentions towards Taiwan now? Perhaps Beijing has garnered enough experience in its relations with Taipei that it is, in fact, playing Taiwan like a finely tuned
instrument.
Seen in this light, China's actions may be a deliberate attempt to create the pretext it wants for military action against the democracy of 23 million people. If so, what might we see next from China?
If China's intentions towards Taiwan are martial, we will soon see a resumption of large-scale joint People's Liberation Army, navy and air force exercises in the area around the strait. These exercises have become so commonplace that neither Taiwan nor the US seem to become alarmed at them any more. What they do seem to do, however, is inflame the passions of the pro-independence minded voters of Taiwan -- which is exactly what Beijing may now want.
If China's military maneuvers produce a historic defeat for the KMT, finally giving Chen a governing coalition, Beijing may soon have its pretext: Taiwan is preparing for the unthinkable -- independence from China.
China's attack would employ hundreds of missiles. Commercial shipping would be forced to lift troops and vehicles across the strait. But the main blow would fall from the sky in the form of vigorous commando strikes on key leadership, communications nodes and airstrips, followed by a massive airlift using China's now considerable civil air fleet (such a scenario was recently spelled out by Richard Russell in a piece in the Army War College's August issue of Parameters entitled, "What if China Attacks Taiwan?").
In less than seven to 10 days, it would be over; organized resistance on Taiwan would cease.
US intelligence, still focused on the war on terror, would be blind-sided. US naval and air power, concentrated in the Middle East, would never even have a chance to intervene. US President George W. Bush's pledge to do "what it takes" to defend Taiwan would be forgotten in stunned silence.
Democracy in Asia would be dealt a severe blow. The pressure on the Chinese Communist Party for democratic reforms would be crushed under the jackboot of nationalism.
A Chinese public wearied by endemic corruption, the highest gap between the rich and the poor in Asia, growing unemployment and a pending bad debt bomb will instead thrill with the prospect of righting past wrongs and restoring China to its historical greatness as the world's hegemon. In the future, the events of early next year may be viewed as the beginning of China's march to military conquest, analogous to Germany's 1938 Anschluss with Austria and its conquest of Czechoslovakia.
The world has now witnessed the dawn of a new and terrible era of warfare -- one unforeseen by most experts. While we are engaged in this new war, let us not blindly stumble into another surprise -- one that could rapidly undermine US national security.
Chuck DeVore is the co-author of China Attacks and vice president of research for the SM&A, Inc in Newport Beach, California.
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