Sat, Oct 20, 2001 page9

• Strengthening deterrence of biological war

  In comparison to explosives, devices that use chemical and biological weapons offer few attractions and much uncertainty. Techniques to deal with their effects are being developed from industrial and medical experience of similar incidents

  • By Graham Pears / THE GUARDIAN
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  Immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks, in his statement to the British parliament, the British prime minister said of the terrorists: "They would, if they could, go further and use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons." The British foreign secretary said they "would not be deterred by human decency from deploying chemical or biological weapons" hence "we must therefore redouble our efforts to stop the proliferation and the availability of such weapons." How scared should we in the UK be of chemical or biological attacks and what can we do about this danger?

  Chemical and biological weapons attack human beings or animals primarily by the dissemination of the agent into the atmosphere and its carriage downwind to the target population. In the case of chemicals, sufficient has to be delivered to cause harm to the victims and, for an effective attack, significant quantities -- tonnes -- need to be available and spread at the right time and in the right way. With biological agents, enough to infect an individual has to be inhaled and quantities needed are correspondingly less -- typically kilograms. It is, however, misleading to hold up a bag of sugar and suggest that if this were biological agent then it could kill everyone in the UK -- the analogy is to a sharp sword which can kill a lot of people but the sword has to be taken to each and every individual.

  There are significant technical problems with biological attacks -- an agent has to be obtained, enough has to be grown, then it has to be disseminated and for effective infection the particle size has not to be so large that they fall harmlessly to the ground or so small that they are inhaled and exhaled without being retained in the lungs.

  As biological agents are living microorganisms, they are fragile and may be killed through the forces needed to disseminate them or the ensuing exposure to sunlight and the open air. Finally, local micrometeorology determines whether dispersion into a turbulent atmosphere is such that the target population fails to receive enough to be infected.

  In comparison to terrorist devices using explosive, chemical and biological weapons offer few attractions and much uncertainty. With explosive devices, the effect is immediate when the device is functioned and effects can be accurately predicted. In chemical and biological attacks, there is much uncertainty: has enough of the agent been disseminated, is the particle size optimum for retention in the lung, are the meteorological conditions right to spread the agent to the target? To these is coupled the delayed effects -- possibly hours for chemical and days or weeks for biological agents.

  If, nevertheless, such an attack is made or is threatened, how can the danger be countered? The answer is a web of assurance which together assures the public that all reasonable steps have been taken to prevent and minimize the effects of such an attack. This web is made up of four key strands:

  1. Comprehensive prohibition both internationally through the biological and chemical weapons conventions and nationally through legislation -- the Biological and Chemical Weapons Acts;

  2. Effective controls both internationally of transfers and nationally of the facilities handling, storing or using such materials;

  3. Preparedness and protective measures to counter any threat of use or actual use of such materials;

  4. Determined international and national responses to all who breach the prohibitions and controls.

  Much can be gained from strengthening all the elements of the web of assurance -- and thereby strengthening the web of deterrence -- which may lead the perpetrator to judge that chemical or biological attacks will not serve his aims. When US President George W. Bush addressed Congress on Sept. 20, he said that to fight and win this war, "We will direct every resource at our command, every means of diplomacy, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war."

  The US should urgently reconsider its rejection on July 25 of the protocol to strengthen the biological weapons convention -- which would bring benefits in ensuring that all countries signed up to the convention enact penal legislation to make biological weapons illegal and implement export controls on biological agents and technology that can be misused to cause deliberate disease.

  Preparedness for chemical or biological attacks should build on national preparations to deal with disasters resulting from accidental releases of chemicals from industrial facilities and unexpected outbreaks of disease resulting from a traveller infected with an exotic disease arriving by air in the UK. Emergency planning here has long addressed the possibility of disasters, however caused.

  The UK's Home Office Web site provides guidelines for dealing with disaster which set out how the emergency services, central and local government will work together in responding to such an emergency -- an example of truly "joined-up" government. This strategy of responding to chemical or biological attacks by building on existing national capabilities to deal with accidental releases and unusual outbreaks of disease is also advocated in the World Health Organization's early provision on its Web site, following the events of Sept. 11, of a new book entitled Health Effects of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

  In summary, while chemical or biological attacks are possible, they present much uncertainty to the perpetrator and are unlikely to be a weapon of choice.

  Graham Pearson, a former director general of the UK's Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, is currently visiting professor of international security in the department of peace studies at the University of Bradford, northern England.
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