The opportunity exists for US President George W. Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin (
Their common concern about international terrorism provides a basis for cooperation. However, China must be prepared to go beyond tokenism and lay out more concrete measures for supporting the US-led anti-terrorist campaign. In addition, both leaders must demonstrate some give and take in addressing other major issues that have plagued bilateral relations.
The end of the Cold War deflated much of the strategic rationale behind Sino-US cooperation, just as the 1989 Chinese crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square ended America's growing fascination with all things Chinese.
Subsequent attempts to "build toward a constructive strategic partnership" during the Clinton administration were more style than substance, as was painfully revealed by the Chinese response to the US' accidental bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade. (Of note, more Chinese citizens, not to mention ethnic Chinese, were killed as a result of the Sept. 11 attacks than during the Belgrade accident).
The April collision between an American EP-3 reconnaissance plane and Chinese fighter jet and the Bush administration's decision to aggressively pursue missile defense were just two of many recent points of contention that further degraded Sino-US relations, as were Bush's comments about being prepared to do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan defend itself against China.
Given this history, prospects for genuine cooperation with Beijing on strategic issues seemed slim before Sept. 11. However, the war on terrorism presents Washington and Beijing with a common objective upon which to build greater strategic cooperation (even if none dare call it a "strategic partnership"), given China's serious concerns about terrorism in its western regions (in part supported by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network).
Washington sees support for its war on terrorism as the "litmus test" for future cooperation with the US. Thus far, Beijing has passed, but just barely. China joined the rest of the international community in condemning the Sept. 11 attacks and also acknowledged the appropriateness of a military response, but with three caveats: any military response should be directed at those proven to be guilty, should avoid civilian casualties (always a US objective) and be preceded by "consultations" with the UN.
While Washington was likely not thrilled to have Jiang calling other UN Security Council members to reinforce these preconditions, they were not particularly onerous -- Washington feels it has consulted with and received a mandate from the UN to conduct the strikes (in self-defense) against the terrorist network and its safe havens.
On the positive side, Beijing sent a team of counter-terrorism experts to Washington to explore ways the two sides could cooperate, amid positive signs that China was willing to share "useful intelligence" with Washington. China has also been generally supportive (or at least not obstructionist) regarding the ongoing military campaign.
What was most troublesome about China's response to Sept. 11 was its initial attempt to create linkages between Chinese support for the US with American support for China's own fight against "terrorism and separatism," which seemed to imply a Taiwan quid pro quo. The Taiwan link was not pursued, however, and would no doubt have been rejected by Washington. It did, as was no doubt its purpose, make Taiwan nervous about possible under the table deals.
The real moment of truth in redefining Sino-US relations should come when Bush and Jiang meet in Shanghai. The assembled APEC leaders are expected to issue a joint declaration condemning terrorism but the question is how supportive Jiang will be, especially if there is talk on expanding the war beyond Afghanistan. Expressions of "understanding" by Bush regarding China's crackdown on "terrorist elements" in western China could go a long way in assuring more enthusiastic support by Jiang for America's war.
A failure of Jiang to go beyond his previous caveats will likely scuttle any hopes for deeper strategic cooperation.
On Taiwan, the best one can hope for is an agreement to continue to agree to disagree. Bush can be expected to underscore Washington's "one China" policy and to encourage cross-Strait dialogue and a peaceful solution. He is not likely to repeat the infamous three no's -- no independence, no "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," and no membership for Taiwan in international governmental forums -- uttered by Clinton during his 1998 Shanghai visit.
The Sept. 11 attacks have opened the door for a new strategic relationship. The key question now is if Bush and Jiang will be willing to take the next step forward.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
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