Coping with the aftermath of Sept. 11 will take a long time and surely change the way we travel. The difficulties will not just be in changing travel security arrangements, however, but will also encompass the struggle to adapt our free and open culture to a more stringent discipline.
Since there is endless speculation on what this means in regard to almost any subject, we should narrow our examination of the attacks to the issues that comprise the relationship between the US and Taiwan (and also US-China relations), and speculate what the impact of the attacks on those relationships is likely to be.
The first thing that comes to mind is how this might influence the unusual security arrangements between the US and Taiwan. Before Sept. 11, it was clear that the Democratic Party, including some of its powerful senators, Tom Daschle and Joseph Biden, had decided to make American foreign policy, and especially national missile defense, a major partisan issue. Biden, in fact, argued that terrorism and non-proliferation issues, not missile defense, should be the US' primary security focus.
This partisan offensive quickly crumbled after Sept. 11. It crumbled not only because it was unseemly (and politically risky) to criticize the president at such a moment, but also because it was clear that defense against terrorism and missiles are both necessary, and both will be very difficult to resolve.
The US has a long history of refusing to link its arms-sales program to other issues in its relationship with China. In any event, Chinese missiles, the PLA's periodic exercises and the frequent reminder of their use of force, are all still there on the other side of the strait. The present administration's policies and Congress' interests also mitigate against any change in arms sales policy.
Progress on WTO membership continued despite the 911 tragedy, and is likely to proceed regardless of the counter-terrorism campaign that will occupy so much of the world's attention over the weeks and months ahead. Few countries, if any, oppose the idea of China and Taiwan entering the WTO. Most major countries believe it will benefit them in terms of trade, and many believe the responsibilities of membership will temper China's behavior. That all remains to be seen, just as was the case before the attacks and is still true today.
The only question is whether this heavy focus on a counter-terrorism campaign will permit precedents to be set in the WTO, through inattention or a lack of priority, that would normally be challenged. The recent decision by China to penalize Credit Suisse First Boston by canceling its participation in a bid, citing the company's contract to help attract foreign investment in Taiwan with Taiwanese officials, is apparently going unchallenged.
As a result, based on personal experience, it will be very difficult to convince more US firms to invest in Taiwan, as they will fear doing so might jeopardize their interests in China. Such behavior by China encourages what essentially amounts to a boycott. Taiwan has also not voiced any strong opposition to the incident, and the international community has been silent as well.
Taiwan's most immediate problem is its economy. The basis of the problem has little to do with terrorism, and though it might be indirectly influenced by any forthcoming US military campaign, that would have been the case however the American economy might move. I have not heard any economist familiar with China's economy and that of Taiwan's, who thinks that the growth of cross-strait economic interchange will be the basis for Taiwan's economic recovery. The point they make -- almost unanimously -- is that it will only be the reform of Taiwan's economics and its banking laws and regulations that will revive its economy. So there, too, the counter-terrorism campaign is unlikely to have a major impact on Taiwan.
One of the most striking features of the days following the attacks was the effort to develop a consensus and unify the people behind the US president and the country. To be sure, unlike Taiwan, nationalism, the flag, tradition, even an old song, God Bless America, could all be used to strengthen national confidence and garner support.
The lack of consensus in Taiwan may restrict its ability to use nationalism as a means of unifying the people, but what would happen if an attack -- terrorist or otherwise -- were to take place here?
The US also has its own obstacles to overcome even in this regard. It is one of the most heterogeneous societies in the world, with people from all cultures, ethnicity, race, and even language. Americans are not easily unified on any subject. And the US is large, meaning much is done by local governments, businesses and individuals almost instinctively, without specific instructions from the federal government.
The continuous live television coverage of the drama that unfolded on Sept. 11 was spectacular, although it has becoming the norm. There are also continuous analyses of what the attacks mean. There are also many pictures that will be hard to forget: the planes hitting the World Trade Center and the mayor of New York leading the people out of the rubble, for example.
One thing that I will remember, though not spectacular, are the comments on how this tragedy seems to have galvanized America's young people. Patriotism, so important in bringing a people together when hardship or sacrifice for the country is needed, seems to be returning in this younger generation. Their parents -- people of the Vietnam era -- had lost much of that sense of patriotism, and their children, raised in a relatively peaceful world, had never thought about it. Now they are thinking about it.
Is the impact the sudden attack has had on the American people, especially the younger generation, relevant to Taiwan? Whatever side they might be on in Taiwan's great debate over national identity, Taiwan's youth, and their parents have seen tremendous change but experienced relatively little danger.
As in the US before the attacks, there seems to be little sense that the political debates they have heard and read on security, cross-strait matters or economics, are matters that could bring them close to losing their freedom and their way of life. One has to hope that a greater awareness of Taiwan's position will not need a tragedy to coalesce public opinion.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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