There exists general agreement among analysts of Korean developments that the fate of North-South affairs depends to a great degree on the development of relations between the US and North Korea. The key to progress in inter-Korean relations lies in Washington DC, one hears from all sides. In a way, it is amazing, that this view is shared also by the North Koreans: "Before improvement of inter-Korean relations is possible, the relations between the US and North Korea must be improved," says Kim, Myong-chol, Executive Director of the Center for Korean-American Peace in Tokyo, who speaks on behalf of the government in Pyongyang, and who I met recently at a conference on North Korea in Washington DC.
In my eyes, this one-sided focus on the US is problematic, as it violates the spirit of the Joint Declaration of June last year, in which the leaders of the North and the South agreed to strive for unification independently, that is without foreign interference. In spite of their at times pathetic nationalist rhetoric, the North Koreans don't seem to take seriously their pledge for a Korean -- as opposed to an international -- framework of conflict resolution. One practical result of Pyongyang's tactics has been, that the South Korean government has recently lost the political initiative in the diplomatic process. This is a major setback. For this political achievement, Kim Dae-jung was rightly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. But, then, this is history, and many South Koreans seem to regard this singular distinction as not much more than an episode, quickly to be forgotten.
Not only the North Koreans have made life difficult for President Kim Dae-jung. The domestic opposition, too, has added to his headaches. The passage of the non-confidence vote against Unification Minister Lim Dong-won has been a major blow to the president, possibly even the most severe political setback on the home-front since he set foot into the presidential mansion some three-and-a-half years ago. "Despite the parliamentary action, I will go ahead with the policy, with a resolute and responsible attitude," the president was quoted as saying on the day after the passage of the no-confidence motion against Lim. Seoul's foreign minister Han Seung-soo struck a similar note in a meeting with foreign and local journalists, stressing that he can think of no viable alternative to the policy of engaging the North: "If you ask the skeptics what are the alternatives, they will not give you answers," he said. But then, one should add, the opponents of the president are not interested in giving answers, nor do they seem interested in a rational political dialogue. Their main intention is to inflict as much political damage to the ruling camp as possible, a year ahead of elections. The opposition has discovered, that North Korea-policy is a suitable instrument for this strategy -- suitable, as there is hardly another issue in the South with which the emotions of the electorate may be manipulated so easily.
Considering the present political turmoil on the domestic front in South Korea, it is rather fortunate that inter-Korean relations are not exclusively dependent on what is happening in Seoul. There are numerous indications beyond the shores of the peninsula, that new movement in the stalled process may soon be expected. Foreign Minister Han correctly says, that South Korea's "sunshine" policy "is supported by the people of the world". All governments with an involvement in Korean matters support the strategy laid out by President Kim Dae-jung. Even more important -- from a South Korean angle: they seem to be doing what they can to convince the North Koreans to return to the negotiating table. The Europeans and the US are on record to have pushed in this direction; so are Pyongyang's old and new allies, the Russians and the Chinese, who have urged Kim to stick to his promise and pay a return visit to Seoul. During his recent visit to North Korea, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin was unusually direct in expressing his desire that Seoul and Pyongyang come to terms.
The Chinese even encouraged their communist ally to take part in the summit meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) in Shanghai in October. Should Kim Jong-il accept the invitation, a rare chance would open for an encounter not only with President Kim Dae-jung but also with US-President Bush.
The South Korean government has hastened to clarify that Seoul would -- strongly oppose -- any attempt to substitute a Shanghai meeting for a summit in Seoul. But this does not mean that Seoul would necessarily object to a meeting between the two Kims in Shanghai in addition to the envisaged reciprocal North Korean visit to the South. A meeting between the Dear Leader and the US president in Shanghai would, of course, be even more sensational than a second inter-Korean summit in China. More than anybody else, the North Korean and the US leaders would be in the position to cut the Gordian Knot on the peninsula. Such a brave -- and visionary -- step presupposes, that Bush and his administration are aware of, where they want to go in their relations with the North Korean "rogues."
Ronald Meinardus is the resident representative of the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation in Seoul. and a commentator on Korean affairs.
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