Many high level Russian-US meetings have been held lately, including talks between the two defense ministers. All have spotlighted the looming Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) problem.
Although the tone of the dialogue has changed since the Bush administration came to power six months ago -- the US' rhetoric is softer, and the presidents of both countries have established a personal rapport -- don't think that this matters much. After all, the most significant agreements between the two countries were reached by Russian and US leaders who were distinctly unfriendly.
ILLUSTRATION: YU SHA
Indeed, personal relations often interfere with diplomatic dialogue, and can be seen as substituting for serious solutions and negotiations.
So improved rhetoric matters only at the margin. It is the practical dialogue that counts, and right now there is none. This is especially true concerning the vital issues of strategic relations, including the ABM Treaty and offensive weapons. I don't want to sound too gloomy but the Genoa agreements reached by presidents Putin and Bush in Genoa, and the "consultations" that have occurred since, have no solid base and are leading to nothing.
Why all this talk about consultations? Because America doesn't intend to hold talks. Diplomatic talks say that when I give you something that you give me something in return. I make a concession, and you make a concession in reply.
Diplomatic bargaining involves serious discussions and a search for a balance of interests. But consultations? In them, I give you my view, and you provide me with yours. I say that I don't agree with you, and you don't agree with me. That what "consultations" amount to -- nothing.
Of course one might say that consultations help clarify positions -- say, those provisions of the ABM Treaty that do not suit America. But be realistic. Washington is not going to lay its cards face up. Why should it? The Bush administration is embarrassed by the change in the line-up of forces in the Senate, the allies ask it not to act unilaterally, and it would not be diplomatically wise to break with Russia when US ties with China are difficult.
So, to soften these dilemmas, the US engages in "diplomatic dancing" around the issues of offensive and defensive weapons, but discusses nothing in earnest. One step forward, two steps back. Statements at the top are subsequently disavowed by lower level officials.
This situation suits the US, because time appears on their side. Continued diplomatic dancing will enable the US administration to resolve its problems with allies and the US Senate, convincing both that nothing terrible is going on so that it can gradually start doing what it wants. America is not worried now by the issue of deploying a missile defense system, for it is not yet confident in any of its schemes. It needs to test a wide range of activities prohibited by the ABM Treaty, including mobile, sea, and air-launched craft, and so on. The ABM Treaty is a hindrance the Americans seek to erode in an atmosphere of mutual assurances and general political declarations, so as to smooth the shock. This is why Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld did not hammer out any agreement during his recent visit to Moscow. He simply restated America's position once again, speaking about the nuclear threat posed by rogue countries but actually meaning China. The US cannot say openly that the NMD system is aimed at China and its limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The consultations, up to and including the planned visit of Vladimir Putin to the US this autumn will never produce practical agreements until a solid basis for negotiations, such as existed over the past 30 years, is created.
Meanwhile, the US will use the time to start tests to do away with the ABM Treaty. Indeed, the 1997 protocol on of strategic and theater ABM systems allows for the US to test numerous systems at permitted ceilings.
For example, it permits the testing of any weapons against targets flying at a speed of below 5km a second, and the testing of ground, sea, and air-launched interceptor missiles. The only limitation is that ground- and air-launched interceptor missiles should fly at no more than 5.5km a second, and the permissible speed for sea-based interceptor missiles is 4.5km a second. The US can work on these systems within the agreed ceilings for a long time.
In any case, the US will not withdraw from the ABM Treaty in a huff as many people imagine. They think the US president will say: "We notify all parties to the ABM Treaty [including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan] that under Article 15 we will cease to regard ourselves as bound by the treaty provisions in six months in view of the appearance of a threat to national interests."This will not take place anytime soon.
Instead, the US will only withdraw from the treaty when it starts deploying its anti-missile system, and this will not happen for several years. The treaty will not be killed by a blow, but will be eroded and undermined, until everyone believes that the treaty is dead. Meanwhile, the US will try to create reliable systems, and it is not a fact that they will succeed. After all, previous attempts failed. The technology was not ready then and nobody can guarantee that it is ready now.
Everything depends on technological achievements and on what Russia will do with its strategic nuclear deterrence. If Russia slashes its nuclear arsenal too much, a US system designed for defense against China will be also effective against Russia, no matter what political declarations are made. If the system the US is working on to intercept 200 warheads, in 15 years such a system can be used to neutralize Russia in view of what we intend to do to our nuclear deterrence arsenal.
Alexei Arbatov is deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee of the Russian Federation.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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