Taiwan's political parties are divided into two major groups -- the so-called "pan-blue camp," which consists of the KMT, the People First Party and the New Party, and the "pan-green camp" which is made up of the ruling DPP and the newly established Taiwan Solidarity Union.
This situation illustrates how the boundaries between political parties have gradually become blurred. Such a division, however, is undoubtedly a myth that took shape as each party began to try to expand its base of support.
Although the parties within each camp claim to be both cooperating and competing with each other in the run up to the year-end elections, a significant barrier to any party securing victory actually lies in the interactions between parties in the same camp. Whether or not a party can efficiently maximize its support is determined by its degree of collaboration with its allies.
Competition can improve party efficiency and cooperation can reduce campaign costs. Competition without cooperation may cause an increase in campaign costs; cooperation without competition may cause a reduction of efficiency. Each party's willingness to look for space to cooperate while competing is actually therefore driven by the possible benefits the party can yield from such a move.
Of course, party-to-party cooperation is not unconditional, as parties are willing to work with one another only when cooperation has something to offer. To gain from cooperation, the establishment of an infrastructure for such cooperation is indispensable.
However, looking at the cooperative systems and rules of the two alliances, dialogue and negotiation mechanisms only exist between high-level party leaders. Their significance is merely symbolic. No concrete approaches have been proposed for real party-to-party cooperation.
The problem lies in each party's future development. Although the parties are now confronting the difficulty of choosing between cooperation and competition, they will eventually make the appropriate choice. That choice is to spend one-tenth of their effort on antagonism, two-tenths on cooperation and seven-tenths on self-development.
The establishment of cooperative systems and rules may further promote party-to-party cooperation and reduce campaign costs. But each party has to strive in the elections even harder in the light of future party development, as other allies' attitudes have to be taken into account. Regardless of the camp, each party will basically put its self-development as its first priority.
Wang Chi-ming is a doctoral student in the department of political science at National Chengchi University.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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