Key officials in the Bush administration, especially Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, have long been on record urging Japan to play a more substantial role in East Asia's security affairs. Some of them even want Japanese leaders to repeal, or at least modify, Article 9 of the country's constitution, which renounces war and prevents Japan from taking military action except to repel a direct act of aggression against its own territory. The underlying assumption of those American policymakers is that a Japan free of Article 9's restrictions would be a much more useful and reliable US military ally.
With the recent rise of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, part of Washington's wish may come true. In his first statement to the press and public, Koizumi emphasized the need to change Article 9 and to admit that Japan had a fully functioning military dedicated to the defense of its security. Since that time, the prime minister has given other indications that Japan intends to be much more assertive in defending its interests in East Asia and beyond.
But Armitage and other officials who assume that a more active Japan will be an obedient junior partner of the US are in for an unpleasant surprise. Tokyo shows signs of not only being more active on the security front, but also of being more independent of the US. No where is that trend more evident than with respect to policy toward China. Japanese leaders have long been uneasy about the possible negative consequences for their country if a confrontation erupted between the US and China. The recent incident involving the US spy plane brought those concerns to the forefront.
The plane operated from a US base in Japan's prefecture of Okinawa, and more than a few Japanese opinion leaders fretted that, if a US-Chinese conflict ever broke out, those bases would likely be targets for Chinese military strikes.
There is also smoldering resentment in Japan over Washington's habit of ignoring or marginalizing Tokyo in dealings with China. The latest episode was President Clinton's conduct during his 1998 summit meeting in China. Not only did the president fail to stop in Japan either on his way to or returning from the summit, but US and Chinese officials issued a series of joint statements that callously impinged on Japanese interests.
Koizumi's government has signaled a clear desire to distance itself from Washington's policies and to improve Tokyo's own relations with Beijing. Koizumi himself stressed the need for such improvement in a key speech to the Japanese Diet in early May.
Even the appointment of Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka sent such a signal. She is the daughter of Kakuei Tanaka, the prime minister who normalized relations with China in the 1970s. In Japanese culture, children are normally expected to carry on the views and policies of their parents. In the course of her political career, she has also acquired her own reputation of being somewhat pro-Chinese.
The foreign minister's initial actions tend to confirm that impression. After unceremoniously canceling appointments with several visiting foreign dignitaries, including Armitage, she found time to meet with China's foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan (
Tang responded with a surprisingly conciliatory statement, playing down the previous controversy over a new Japanese textbook that critics contend whitewashes Imperial Japan's atrocities during the 1930s and 1940s. Instead, he emphasized that China would not make "unreasonable demands" on Japan.
The conditions are in place for a rapprochement between Japan and China. Tokyo probably will not adopt a position of complete neutrality between the US and China. Japanese leaders regard the alliance with the US as too important as an insurance policy for Japan if China should turn aggressive to ever do that. But the Koizumi government is showing every sign of pursuing an independent policy toward China -- one that is designed to advance Japanese, not American interests.
Those in the Bush administration who wanted a more active and assertive Japan are about to discover the price of that change. It means a Japan less subject to US influence on China policy, and probably on an assortment of other issues.
Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.
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