Wed, Jun 06, 2001 page8

• A sorry example of a legislature

  • By Wang Yeh-lih 王業立
  • • 
    • 
    • 

  The fifth session of the fourth Legislative Yuan is almost at an end. To be able to show a pretty political score sheet, the ruling and opposition parties rushed to create results and actively engaged in negotiations to arrange a large clean-up of legislation. There were also attempts to push through several pieces of financial legislation before the end of the session. The legislative agenda was carried out with more efficiency this week than in the previous four months put together, but if you put yourself in the shoes of the general population, you can't help but shake and tremble.

  It's already been a year since the transfer of power, but there has not been any marked improvement in the actions or output of the Legislative Yuan. As President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) said with a sigh in his speech to commemorate one year at the helm, the ruling and opposition parties have still not successfully transformed.

  Regardless of whether it is the DPP caucus or the opposition alliance, there is still a lot of room for improvement of the parts they play in the Legislative Yuan. Apart from this, there are also several aspects of the legislative system itself that urgently need improving. In particular, we face a possibility that the year-end elections may result in a new kind of Legislative Yuan with none of the three parties winning an absolute majority of seats. Unless reasonable ground-rules are established at an early stage, this may cause the legislative agenda to slip even further into the doldrums.

  At the moment, the most fiercely denounced aspect of the way in which the legislature operates is the manner in which negotiations between ruling and opposition parties are conducted. According to the rules laid out in the "Law Governing the Legislative Yuan's Exercise of Power," when disagreements arise over motions in the legislature or in a committee, inter-party negotiations can be initiated.

  Any caucus or alliance consisting of five or more people, including independents, may appoint a representative to participate in these negotiations. After the caucuses have reached a consensus, signed an agreement and had it approved by the legislature, participating legislators are not allowed to protest. Further, during discussions on already negotiated motions, only lawmakers requested by the party caucuses, and in numbers based on the proportion of seats held, are allowed to speak. No other lawmakers may do so.

  The basic idea of this kind of party negotiation system is to raise the level of efficiency with which the legislative agenda is handled and the functional roles of political parties. But beginning with its implementation during the fourth Legislative Yuan, it has been criticized as a protective shield for closed door negotiations. The discussion of motions has become an exchange of benefits and even blackmail attempts.

  Party negotiations behind closed doors are already overriding the committees and even the Legislative Yuan itself. Under the negotiation system, motions already reviewed and finalized by committees may be overturned in negotiations behind closed doors. Unless voting is used, it only takes the refusal of one representative of a group or alliance of five people or more to boycott every piece of legislation, something that can even be used for blackmail purposes.

  In a future legislature where none of the three parties has an overall majority, this kind of secret negotiation process may further cripple the normal functions of the Legislative Yuan and exacerbate the rot of "black gold" politics.

  In the parliaments of advanced countries, all kinds of specialized committees serve as arenas for the discussion and deliberation of motions. Even if negotiations are held between parties, it should also be done according to the principles of seniority, specialization and transparency.

  In Taiwan we are doing it the other way round, neglecting not only the specialist functions of the committees (for example, using the rarely seen method of drawing lots to decide the number of committee members), but also the basic legislative principles in democratic countries of avoiding conflicts of interest, the moral principles of seniority and legislative discipline. Instead we emphasize the leadership of party negotiations and trade benefits.

  When shouting "legislative power," "supervisory balance" and other slogans, it wouldn't hurt "the mighty politicians of the Legislative Yuan" [a term often used by the former speaker of the Legislative Yuan Liu Sung-pan (劉松潘)] to ask themselves why the people, who are not satisfied with the performance of the government in general, value the Legislative Yuan even less.

  When the ruling and opposition parties emphasize "legislative dignity" by bringing up advanced democratic countries, it seems they choose to forget about those countries' principles of respect for specialization, avoiding conflicts of interest, the moral principles of seniority and legislative discipline.

  The performance of the ruling and opposition parties this week is a clear reflection of what is wrong with the way the legislature works.

  Wang Yeh-lih is a professor in the department of political science, Tung Hai University.

  Translated by Perry Svensson
• Most Popular

  • 1

    Manila enhancing defense cooperation with Taiwan: report

  • 2

    China drills ‘incompatible’ with Strait peace: Japan

  • 3

    Drills focus on stopping enemy landing

  • 4

    Tropical Storm Nari not a threat to Taiwan: CWA

  • 5

    One in four fruit and vegetable samples in Taipei fails safety tests for pesticides