Sun, Jun 03, 2001 page8

• Taiwan's door is open to reason

  • By Shu Chung-hsing 舒中興
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  Ever since Taiwan experienced the first ever peaceful transfer of political power in ethnic Chinese history last year, global attention on the change seems to have focused on the development of Taiwan's domestic political and economic situation. When it comes to cross-strait relations, a core issue bearing on Taiwan's national interests, substantive development has been limited due to China's negative treatment of Taiwan, as well as to the government's "non-regression means improvement" principle.

  As regards China's Taiwan policy, the Beijing government has continued a two-pronged "peace and war" policy toward Taiwan over the past year. On the one hand, in an attempt to appear to be loosening China's Taiwan policy, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen (錢其琛) put forth a new syllogism -- ?there is only one China in the world; China and Taiwan belong to the same China; and China's sovereignty and territory are inseparable. On the other hand, China has deployed a large number of ballistic missiles along the Chinese coast near Taiwan. Its intention to make military threats is clear and obvious.

  As for Taiwan's attitude, the new government must handle the cross-strait issue through democratic procedures because Taiwan has now become a democratic nation and because cross-strait relations involve critical issues such as national security. The DPP-led government must first build a consensus within the nation, and then communicate with Beijing in a discreet manner and with goodwill.

  Even though no important breakthroughs have been made in cross-strait relations over the past year, the situation has remained basically stable. This indicates that although the DPP, which has a pro-independence platform, has won power, it still has to practice democratic politics and deal rationally with the cross-strait issue. The "non-regression means improvement" principle upheld by President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) administration can be seen as a safe and steady method of upholding the national interest.

  The Koo-Wang talks (辜汪會談), which took place eight years ago, were a milestone whereby the two sides of the Strait began to replace confrontation with negotiation. A few of the key issues in current cross-strait relations are:

  First, Beijing should heed Chen's idea of "political integration."

  As a leader of Taiwan, Chen must implement policies in accordance with the will of the majority but also respect the opinions of minorities. This is the spirit of democracy. With regard to cross-strait relations, Chen said the following in his Inaugural speech: "I will not declare independence;" "I will not change the country's name;" "I will not call for the inclusion of the so-called `state-to-state' formula in the Constitution;" "I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in respect of the question of independence or unification;" and, "There is no question of abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification (國統綱領) and the National Unification Council (國統會)."

  Later, he put forward a more proactive idea of political integration in his New Year's Eve speech. It is clear that Chen has made great efforts to improve cross-strait relations. Beijing should not deceive itself with its own subjective viewpoints.

  Second, the "small three links" can serve as a bedrock for expanding cross-strait exchange and communication.

  For Taiwan, economic development cannot be achieved without national security. Before Beijing renounces the use of force against Taiwan, the government should use the small three links to prepare for the direct links. But we should also keep in mind that the focus of China's "united front" work against Taiwan has been to use direct links to infiltrate Taiwan, and to try to fan Taiwanese public dissatisfaction toward the stagnation in cross-strait relations under the DPP government. China intends to gain more support for the "one country, two systems" policy. This is Beijing's basic strategy.

  Third, both sides should put aside the controversy over the "one China" principle and resume negotiations.

  Since the cross-strait negotiation channel was cut in 1999, Beijing has set acceptance of the "one China" principle as a prerequisite for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue. Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫), chief of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (海基會), once explained that the "1992 consensus" reached by the two sides was the idea of "one China, with each side having its own interpretation," but not "both sides upholding `one China'" as China has proclaimed. President Chen has stressed clearly that according to the ROC Constitution, the "one China" principle is not a problem. In fact, Beijing has used the "one China" principle to deliberately contain Taiwan's China policy so as to create an impression that Taipei, rather than Beijing, should be responsible for the severance of cross-strait relations. Beijing's "one China" principle has therefore become an obstacle to cross-strait contacts.

  Looking back on cross-strait relations over the past year, China has had many misgivings about and little confidence in the democratically elected DPP government. Perhaps the main reason is that the Beijing administration has failed fully and objectively to understand the Taiwanese people's thinking. This has created some blind spots in Beijing's Taiwan policy. Its biased judgement on Taiwan's 2000 presidential election serves as a good example. Undeniably, Taiwan's domestic politics has been in chaos since the transfer of power and remain to be improved.

  An excellent channel for negotiation used to exist between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait. If Beijing can dispel its prejudices and re-open its door to negotiation, the standoff can be resolved.

  Shu Chung-hsing is a PhD candidate at National Chengchi University's Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies. Translated by Jackie Lin
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