From Taiwan's perspective, the historic visit by top EU officials to Pyongyang and Seoul last week may offer something worth contemplating in terms of a fresh diplomatic role it may play in Northeast Asia. An important point to make is that if Europe, geographically distant from Northeast Asia and arguably having little direct interest in the region, finds some reasons to get involved, then there is no reason why Taiwan should consider itself a complete outsider to the evolving development on the Korean Peninsula.
Markku Heiskanen, Deputy Policy Planning Director for the Finnish foreign ministry and head of a working group studying the role of the EU in Northeast Asia in 1999, wrote in a special report shortly before the EU's trip that "the main instruments of the EU to contribute to resolving international and regional problems is its economic wealth, and on the other hand its politically `neutral' position in the eyes of the parties of conflicts."
This statement shows the Europeans understand where their diplomatic strengths lie in Northeast Asia, where the EU is a relatively new and in some senses inexperienced player.
This is key to understanding the success of the EU's landmark mission to Korea. The achievements of the EU mission, most significantly North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's commitment to uphold the 1999 moratorium on missile tests until 2003 and a formal human rights dialogue with the EU in Brussels, should not be downplayed, especially when we take into account the fact that the rapprochement process between the two Koreas has been stalled for months and that Washington-Pyongyang relations have been frozen since US President George W. Bush took office.
The EU delegation emphasized that its unprecedented mission was not intended to supplant the US' lead role. But it also made clear the EU's ambitions in becoming a more active global player in international politics. From this perspective, the EU's well-received visit to Pyongyang and Seoul should also be hailed as a successful initiative in consolidating its common foreign and security policy toward Asia.
Defining the EU's role as a "catalyst" and complementary to former president Bill Clinton's soft-landing approach toward North Korea, the EU's delegation turned out to be a useful "messenger" between the two Korean capitals, and less directly, between North Korea and the US, which is deemed by all parties concerned as the key interlocutor.
The success of the EU's mission also partly lies in its increasing understanding of the entangling and dynamic Korean problem and the imperative of international and multilateral support to its resolution.
Notably, apart from the growing economic and trade ties between Europe and Korea (Europe is South Korea's largest investor, and South Korea is its third largest export market in Asia), Europe's awareness of and involvement in Northeast Asia has been raised and extended through its participation in the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which was set up in the mid 1990s to deal with North Korea's nuclear problems.
Most EU member states have begun to improve or normalize their relations with Pyongyang in the last two years. Collectively the EU has also been a major donor of aid to the economically-stricken country.
In terms of the joint efforts to pursue peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia, Taiwan arguably may play a similar role to, and even more constructive than, that of the Europeans'.
At the very least, like Europe, Taiwan's economic power is also its mightiest diplomatic tool. And unlike most of North Korea's neighboring countries, against which Pyongyang to varying degrees bears historical grudges, Taiwan is probably the only country in the region which makes a generally positive and trustworthy impression on the hermit kingdom and its people. Many Taiwanese scholars and businessmen who have visited North Korea acknowledge the relative good feelings that their North Korean hosts have toward Taiwan.
Moreover, since Taiwan is regarded by the Bush Administration as one of America's allies in East Asia, the US can only be assured that Taiwan's presence in the region or any progress it makes in befriending North Korea would not be detrimental to American interests, and therefore the US should welcome Taiwan's endeavors.
These favorable factors can be the basis on which Taiwan seeks to enhance its diplomatic role in the Korean Peninsula. With proper consultations with the countries concerned, Taipei may even be able to serve as a "mediator" between Washington and Pyongyang.
In fact, Taiwan had demonstrated its willingness to contribute to peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula by proposing to join KEDO and offering funding to the consortium. In his visit to China in late 1998, Taiwan's top envoy Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫) proposed the move, but it was met with Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen's (錢其琛) outright rejection. China's reaction is unreasonable not only because it denied the KEDO project another much needed source of support, but also because China itself is not even a member of that organization.
Given the pervasive and persistent choking of Taiwan's international breathing space by China, Taiwan must take up a more proactive approach and make use of its advantages to the fullest in order to break its diplomatic isolation.
For example, Taiwan's acclaimed experiences in "export processing zones" and its investing and technology capability makes it a qualified participant in the UN-sponsored Tumen River Area Development Program, which is designed to vitalize multilateral economic cooperation in the Sea of Japan area. The participating countries, including China itself, have so much at stake in its success, and there should be little obstruction to Taiwan's potentially beneficial participation.
Seeing what the EU's mission to the Korean Peninsula achieved, not least its raised international profile and credibility in the region, Taiwan should carefully study the opportunities of a more engaged role that it may play in Northeast Asia, be aware of the strengths and resources at its disposal, and try to come up with more innovative measures to enhance its international visibility.
Wu Pei-shih (
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