Recently, there has been much discussion about the possibility of the ruling DPP forging a majority alliance in the legislature to move out of its current position of legislative impotence. Various possibilities for cooperation or alliance between the opposition parties before and after the year-end elections have also been subjected to much media scru-tiny. Can a majority alliance in the legislature involving the DPP really resolve the current political deadlock? How should the parties cooperate with one another in the coming elections? What problems might affect the various possibilities for inter-party cooperation? All these questions deserve our attention.
A legislative majority alliance involving the ruling party is definitely preferable to the current situation. We cannot be so naive as to believe, however, that a ruling legislative majority would miraculously resolve all the matters on which the legislative and executive branches are currently deadlocked. Consider the US. It is generally agreed in the US that a "split government" -- in which the White House and Congress are in the hands of different political parties -- is a major cause of political deadlock. Studies indicate, however, that whether the White House is also in the hands of the majority party in Congress does not significantly affect the performance of the Congress. In addition, most of the bills passed when Congress was controlled by the opposition were passed by decisive Congressional majorities. While the US has a different government structure and political culture, the American experience sheds some light on the prospects for inter-party political cooperation in Taiwan.
Judging from the numbers of candidates that each party has nominated, we can say that it is almost certain that none of the three major parties will win a majority of the seats in the Legislative Yuan in the year-end elections. A legislative majority alliance could emerge in one of the two following ways.
First, the DPP may form an alliance with independent lawmakers and factions outside the major political parties. On the surface, this kind of alliance would cost the least. If all the factions outside political parties together hold more than 30 seats in the legislature, the DPP could enjoy a weak legislative majority by forging an alliance with them. But the problem would be that the group would make up a so-called "vulnerable majority." Any small circle of individuals within this ruling alliance could hold the ruling party hostage. The price that the ruling party might have to pay to appease them could in the end be much greater than expected. This is one of the most critical reasons why many political parties in other countries would rather forego the formation of a weak legislative majority.
An alternative would be for the two leading parties to forge an alliance. This should result in a stable and strong majority. There are potential problems in such an alliance as well. Three possible modes of inter-party cooperation exist in Taiwan. First, cooperation between the DPP and the People First Party (PFP). These two parties, however, have no intention of cooperating, due to their different voter bases and considerations relating to the presidential election three years away.
If the KMT and DPP want to talk about cooperation -- the second possible mode -- they will have to first reach an agreement on the allocation of Cabinet seats in the event that they secure relatively equal numbers of seats. In addition, the two parties' differences on certain issues, such as the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant
An alliance between the KMT and PFP -- the third possibility -- is probably the most likely scenario, in the light of the similarities in their policies and voter bases. The biggest problem, however, is that President Chen Shui-bian
Finally, it is generally believed that the existing opposition alliance between the KMT, PFP and New Party will only be able to cooperate in the elections for county commissioners and city mayors. Each party will have to fight independently in the legislative elections. This view needs some modification.
In fact, the key to successful cooperation between the opposition parties in the legislative elections is not whom these parties nominate, but how many candidates each party nominates. Take, for example, an electoral district where 10 legislative seats are up for grabs. If the DPP expects to nominate five candidates and win 35 percent of the votes, critical to the election outcome will be the total number of candidates nominated by the KMT, PFP and New Party. If the three parties nominate seven or eight candidates in total, the DPP's prospects in the election will be poor; two or three of its candidates could suffer defeat. If the three parties together nominate 10 or even 12 candidates, all of the DPP's candidates will stand a chance of being elected.
If the opposition parties wish to begin negotiations about cooperation in the election, therefore, they should first talk about the number of candidates to be nominated.
If the opposition parties reach an agreement to cooperate but it turns out to be nothing more than an empty formality, and if all they really care about is expanding their own territories, they had better be prepared for a lonely and bloody fight to the death.
Emile Sheng is an assistant professor in the department of political science at Soochow University.
Translated by Jackie Lin
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