Qian Qichen's (
The visit also needs to be understood in light of the fact that the US and Taiwan have new administrations, and that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is in the midst of preparing for its 16th Central Committee meeting (
With the new US president already in office, Beijing is naturally deeply concerned about whether the consensus regarding Taiwan previously established with Bill Clinton will be respected by the new US administration.
The consensus between Beijing and Clinton -- the so-called "strategic partnership" -- followed China's missile exercises in the seas off Taiwan in 1995 and 1996. Working strenuously to improve its relations with China, and trying to avoid the possibility of war, the US began at that time to slant its policy in favor of China.
Since then, despite NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade -- which caused a lot of friction between Washington and Beijing -- the basic policy of the Clinton administration was to maintain stable relations with China. This can all be clearly seen in the US' handling of Lee Teng-hui's (
The reason, then, behind Qian's eagerness to visit the US is that China hopes the new administration will adopt the stance taken by the previous one -- and not change anything.
There are two main factors underlying Beijing's urgency. First, during the US presidential election, George W. Bush, like all of Clinton's challengers, attacked the incumbent president's China policy, contending that it was overly biased in favor of China.
Though this was election rhetoric, it nevertheless made China anxious, just as it did back in 1981 when Ronald Reagan took office, and in 1993 when Clinton initially took power.
History, however, has shown that following elections, campaign rhetoric is for the most part replaced by pragmatism. Thus, Beijing's current anxiety over the Bush team is unnecessary.
The second force comes from China's impending political "changing of the guard," and as Jiang Zemin's (
In a nutshell, domestic factors within the US and China spurred Qian's visit to the US. The transfer of power in the US makes Beijing anxious, while the imminent transfer of power in China has precipitated the intense expression of this anxiety.
Now that the US presidential election has passed, the Bush administration will quickly abandon the idealism it displayed during the election, and edge ever closer toward pragmatism.
In addition, Beijing's power struggles are just beginning. Those vying for power are unwilling to compromise on the Taiwan issue. Whether or not Washington's pragmatism and Beijing's gradually hardening line regarding Taiwan will be able to mesh is difficult to say at the present time, but at least it is clear that both positions are unfavorable to Taiwan.
In the coming days, if domestic political factors cause Beijing to demand too much of the US -- and Beijing thus crosses the line drawn by the pragmatic Bush government -- a serious conflict between the two sides could result.
Bush's administrative team is brimming with military and defense experts. Though they treat China as an imaginary enemy, political pragmatism dictates that they respect its power. If Beijing goes too far (for example significant increases in its military budget or large-scale deployment of missiles near the Taiwan Strait), the US' reaction will be confrontational. It may even place Taiwan's inclusion in Theater Missile Defense on its agenda.
Apart from the arms race, another source of friction between Washington and Beijing is Russia. Bush has hardened Washington's foreign policy, emphasizing the importance of US military strength and that military force will definitely be used if necessary. To countries that have been excluded from the US' "new world order" -- such as China and Russia -- this constitutes a big source of pressure.
Recently Bush decided to expel a large number of Russian diplomats from the US, a move which inevitably added tension to US-Russia relations. One can imagine that Beijing and Moscow will, as a result, form an even closer bond.
Bush has surrounded himself with experts on the Russia question (most importantly his national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice) -- advisors whose concerns about Russia may translate into a policy of appeasement and compromise vis-a-vis Beijing.
In the coming months, Beijing will certainly hold on tightly to this "Russia factor," hoping to pressure the US to reduce its commitment to, and support for, Taiwan.
Because Russia's national power is currently at a low ebb, however, playing the Russia card offers only limited potential for China. Should China overdo it, the US will respond with a large-scale strengthening of ties with its long-time ally, Japan.
Over the next several years, Beijing will surely harden its own foreign policy. The pragmatic Bush government will respect the China as a rising superpower, but at the same time it will be fiercely protective of US interests.
If China can take its rapidly increasing national might into the arena of international politics more gradually, the chance of friction and conflict with the US could be reduced. If China rushes in too quickly, however, -- whether in terms of large-scale arms increases or playing the Russia card -- it could provoke a negative reaction from the Bush government. This is the basic configuration of international relations that Taiwan must face.
Wu Yu-shan is a professor of political science at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Scudder Smith.
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