Taipei Times: What are your assessments of Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen's (
Robert O'Neill: Vice Premier Qian's visit was an opportunity for both sides to get to know each other. I think it was productive in the sense that both sides were frank and open. But whether the visit was really a success depends on what impressions Mr Qian takes back to Beijing and what he says when he gets there. Because I think the Bush Administration was trying to give him a very clear message not to try to meddle in matters that essentially concern the US or US relations with Taiwan.
I think he was given a very clear message that one of the reasons that the US has to think about national missile defense is the problem of proliferation. China has not been completely absent in that problem. On the question of the US provision of arms to Taiwan, this is something that the US will decide in accordance with what it recognizes as its obligation to Taiwan in its relations to Taiwan.
PHOTO: GEORGE TSORNG, TAIPEI TIMES
John Chipman: I think one thing the People's Republic of China (PRC) would seek in its relations with the US is clarity. If there is one advantage of the visit its that the US explained very clearly to Vice Premier Qian what the US' security priorities are and what it's foreign policy goals are in the Asia Pacific region.
And I think what can be destabilizing in the relations between the US and China are uncertainty and changes in priorities ... I think what the US essentially said to the PRC was that the decision relating to arms sales to Taiwan was a decision of the US. And they were related to a need to maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and I think in the Bush Administration's interpretation, the balance of power [in the region] has changed recently not because of the action taken by Taiwan or the US, but because of the deployment of ballistic missiles by the PRC in the southern provinces and targeted in Taiwan's direction. Any arms sales or any increased assistance of the US to Taiwan would be merely adequate to [equalize] the balance of power of the two sides.
O'Neill: I think it is very interesting that President Bush stressed that nothing the US does threatens China. In other words, he is completely dismissing Chinese claims that they themselves sometimes feel threatened by the American presence in the Asia Pacific region.
PHOTO: GEORGE TSORNG, TAIPEI TIMES
TT: Many think that the key members in the Bush Administration's foreign policy team are experienced in the sense that many of them served in Bush senior's administration. But some are also concerned that there could be a danger that these people might fall back to their Cold War experience in certain foreign policy conduct. Is such a worry justifiable?
O'Neill: I don't think they are likely to commit the simple mistake of thinking that China is like the former Soviet Union. But having lived through the Cold War and seeing the outcome really as a defeat of communism, I think they will be strengthened in their own belief to uphold free, liberal and democratic values, and not give way to pressures ... to step back from defending allies or other countries that have agreements with the US, such as ... the Taiwan Relations Act.
Chipman: I agree. I think this administration is one that will emphasize the balance of power and alliance politics that they have known well from 50 years of conducting this kind of activity in the post-World War II era. They will bring a fresh attitude toward these questions. These are extremely intelligent and subtle people who are at the top of the Bush Administration. They are not unaware of the huge political changes that have taken place in the last 10 years.
Also, [there are] the effects of the process of globalization on the political perspective across the globe. But they will be firm, as Professor O'Neill said ... they are the generation that felt that they won the Cold War because of firmness, and they won't want to put down their principles simply because they are being opposed one way or the other ... this is a self-confident administration.
I think the advantage is there will be clarity in their political programs and the real challenge is to engage early with the administration in order to help shape its policy.
TT: In your lecture, you talked about the importance of the formal alliance under the Bush Administration. In Asia, some are worried that the continuing political and economic instability in Japan is undermining the US-Japan alliance. What are your views on this?
Chipman: The US will emphasize the US-Japan alliance. In its view, the Clinton Administration over-emphasized the strategic partnership with China that didn't really exist and dismissed the importance of maintaining strong relations with the one Asian ally that the US has in the region, which is Japan. So the initial goal of the US would be to warm up relations with Japan. President Bush has already met Prime Minister Mori and I think there will be a major effort to increase and elaborate the consultation with Japan in Asia Pacific international relations.
I think the US will be looking to the Japanese to do what they can to give meaning to the US-Japan security guidelines, which were agreed to under the Clinton Administration, and making practical steps to enable Japan to fulfill its commitment under the guidelines. That would put some pressure on Japan at this time of difficult domestic politics because it would eventually require the Japanese to look again in their constitutional commitments and to look again to ways in which they can project power beyond their shores. So if there is some possible tension in the US-Japan relationship, they would come from the pressure that the Bush Administration might put too early on Japan to increase its level of security commitment in the region. But at the same time, the US would spend a great deal of time emphasizing the value of the US-Japan alliance as the anchor of stability in the region and that should give comfort to Japan.
TT: Recently, some people in Taiwan have proposed that Taiwan should seek a stronger Japan-Taiwan relationship in the framework of the US-Japan-Taiwan triangular relationship and to emphasize Japan's role in cross-strait relations. Do you see such a proposal as viable?
O'Neill: I don't really. I think it is the kind of idea that is left without being fully articulated at the government level. Obviously Japan is extremely concerned that they should not be in friction across the Taiwan Strait because it affects the whole region.
By the same token, the Japanese do not want to do anything which is going to upset the PRC, or perhaps lead the PRC to be much more demanding in its views of cross-strait relations.
Chipman: It is right to say that Japan is not in the best position to mediate between the PRC and Taiwan on this issue. I think it is important for Taiwan to find many different ways in which you can continue the informal dialogue with senior officials in the PRC government. I would like to add that the International Institute for Strategic Studies can play a very, very modest role in this regard insofar as we are very proud of have members in all the key countries in the Asia Pacific region, including the PRC and Taiwan. Through our meetings, there are informal opportunities for officials of both countries to meet. And they take up every opportunity to meet when they bump into each other in IISS conferences. So I think given the very special status of Taiwan in international affairs, it is normal that you also find informal networks in order to develop closer ties with the PRC and to develop pragmatic ways to solve their differences.
TT: Does that mean that the so-called "track-two" channels of contact are very important?
Chipman: Precisely. The very absence of the formal diplomatic links means that the bulk of the diplomatic activity has to take place with what might be called the "track-one-and-a-half" meetings where indeed there is a participation of governmental officials acting in their private capacities in order to ensure that dialogue is maintained to some extent.
TT: The US has been contemplating deploying the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in Asia. And there are debates within Taiwan about whether we should join that costly project. What are the key factors that Taiwan should take into account on this issue?
Chipman: The first point to make is that the TMD is a long way off ... I think the first consideration for the Taiwan military is to ensure that from the bottom up the Taiwanese military is trained to deal with more sophisticated technology, new software, including new information and new command and control systems because the inability to absorb that kind of equipment would make it impossible for Taiwan to develop indigenously or to absorb from aboard the TMD structures.
I think the first debate for Taiwan to have is to find what kind of investment and training is available, so the Taiwan military can grow fully in the 21st century.
O'Neill: I just want to underline that the TMD is really a long-term prospective. A lot could happen in terms of the political and economic context in the region while the system is being developed and brought to the stage when it could be deployed. I think Taiwan's priority needs to be its defense, without placing too many hopes on some kind of theater missile structure ... from which it can derive support.
TT: You wrote in Newsweek in July last year that the G8 Summit in Okinawa should take up cross-straits relations and encourage the resumption of talks. But the G8 heads seem to have failed to do so. Now that regional and international circumstances have changed -- particularly with a new US administration in place -- do you see new prospects for the internationalization or multilateralization of the cross-strait issue, for example in the upcoming APEC meeting?
Chipman: What I tried to say in that article was that it was important to underscore that the stability across the Strait is an international issue, and could not be dealt with merely as an internal matter of the PRC, or even a bilateral issue between Taiwan and the PRC. Instability in the Taiwan Strait will have global effects.
Therefore I felt it was an important opportunity for the G8 meeting in Okinawa, [which is] so close to Taiwan. In a second sense, there was, at that time, uncertainty about the prospect of a PRC-Taiwan dialogue and [I think that] a basic statement encouraging the two sides to resume formal talks would have been a useful contribution.
A great deal has happened since then ... the PRC has now understood more clearly the limits of President Chen Shui-bian's (
O'Neill: Even though the G8 didn't actually make a statement on the cross-strait question, I find it very hard to believe that they actually didn't discuss it because this issue is of very grave concern to the major trading powers in the world.
TT: Some have observed Qian's recent softening of rhetoric on the "one China" principle by stating that the PRC and Taiwan are both parts of the same "one China" and the lack of the DPP government's positive response to the rhetoric, which it tends to see as another Chinese maneuver to absorb Taiwan. What do you think of this development?
O'Neill: I think that the DPP government has big problems itself in being able to actually define a response to the Chinese position. As we all know, there are various different schools of thought on the whole question of cross-strait relations.
I think President Chen Shui-bian defined the position very wisely in his inaugural statement, and that is the right base on which to advance.
Bear in mind that China ... is going through the process of political development and change ... and likely changes in the senior leaders in the next couple of years. They have to be very careful not to create an opening in their own debate for people to use the cross-strait issue in a way to make things much more difficult for the leadership. So I think it is probably too hard to handle for a while.
Chipman: I agree. We have gone through a period of losing almost one year where both sides have conducted a monologue across the Strait about the meaning of "one China." ... The real challenge over the next year, especially given the difficult political situations in both countries, is to find ways for the two sides to carry on their dialogue and indeed to find practical ways to implement the useful initiatives that President Chen took in proposing direct links between the two sides ... finding ways to implement this in a pragmatic way. And if there is no opportunity to put to one side the formula [of "one China"] under which the talks may take place, and looking instead for ways in which one [side] might pragmatically improve the situation, then this should be welcomed at least by outside observers of security across the Taiwan Strait.
TT: In his New Year address, Chen talked of an approach of integration in relations vis-a-vis China, although Chen has yet to specify the terms of his interpretation of "integration," many regard this approach to be inspired by the European integration process.
To what extent do you think that European integration can shed some light on cross-strait relations or Chen's integration approach?
O'Neill: Well, I think "integration" is a very worrisome term to use in the context of present cross-strait relations because integration does imply some willingness on the part of all parties concerned to merge their sovereignty. And there are rather basic differences in political system and beliefs between the PRC on the one side and the ROC on the other. I don't think it really makes much sense to talk about integration. I'd prefer to talk about continuing cooperation, which does not diminish the authority of governments on either side, but at the same time leads to a fuller understanding and a warm relationship rather than one which is full of tension.
Chipman: I think it is important to distinguish between economic cooperation and the lowering of trade barriers and freeing of channels of communications from an EU model.
The EU model absolutely does not apply to the relations between China and Taiwan because what was central to the EU model were two things: first the recognition by all participating in the EU on the sovereignty of each country as a member, and second, confidence in that sovereignty allowed the pooling of sovereignty. Neither case exists yet [in the context of cross-strait relations] where the PRC does not recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan and the consequent insufficient confidence by which the sovereignty can be pooled across the Strait.
But clearly if there are many, many years of economic contacts and investment that flows in both directions, [and] economic interaction that increases the commonality of political points of view that might allow ... for greater political cooperation eventually.
So I think when people speak about economic contact, they look to see the political consequences of that, and over a long period of time the economic interaction can have that kind of effect.
I think the broader perspective is that once China enters the WTO, Taiwan will as well. I think Taiwan will want to find as many different ways as it can to integrate itself fully into a global trading system, in which trading with China will be an important but not an exclusive part. And as Taiwan integrates more into the global trading system, it will gain the respect and confidence of those who wish to understand Taiwan's political place as well.
I think that is natural in the first 15 months of a new administration. It needs time to find out and look for all sorts of political and economic experiments to improve the relations across the Strait.
If you look at it in sum, what President Chen has been trying to do is to reassure the PRC that Taiwan means well, and that is the way the international people would interpret the various different gestures and statements ... It is time to go back and settle down and for the focus to be on what pragmatic measures can be taken.
TT: What are your views on the "interim agreement" across the Taiwan Strait that was proposed by Stanley Roth and Kenneth Lieberthal?
Chipman: My view is that there needs to be pragmatic arrangement between the two sides. I wouldn't rush into anything that might be without a hint of formality. Even the phrase "interim agreement" sounds as if it's a few steps away from any final agreement; we are many steps away from some final agreement between the two. I find the vocabulary is even too formal for the situation.
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