A classical drama consists of five acts.
Usually, the key part to the story plays in the third act. In this regard, the North Korea policy of President Kim Dae-jung may well have something in common with classical theatre.
South Korea's constitution grants the president five years to complete his political mission. It seems Kim's efforts aimed at reconciliation with the North have reached an historic climax in the third year of his term: The unprecedented summit meeting with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in June last year, followed by the equally unprecedented Nobel Peace Prize-award virtually guarantee Kim Dae-jung a prominent position in the pantheon of Korea's national history.
At mid-term the president has achieved more than had generally been expected in the beginning. In a democracy it is nothing unusual that the opposition highlights the negative points, and has difficulties acknowledging the achievements of the government.
It is also for this reason that regarding the Sunshine Policy I attach more weight to the judgment of foreign experts and analysts than to the opinion of the domestic opposition, which all too often is guided by petty partisan considerations.
Beyond the shores of this country the praise, even admiration, for Kim's policy is quite unstinted.
In an assessment of Kim Dae-jung's North Korea-policy, the summit-meeting in Pyongyang should receive special attention. In a dramatic manner this event has changed the coordinate system of politics in this part of the world. The summit created the political groundwork for peace and reconciliation with the aim of eventual unification.
Every single paragraph of the North-South-Declaration signed on June 15, 2000 contains a program aimed at a radical change of the political status quo on the divided peninsula.
Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy did not start with the historic summit meeting in Pyongyang.
There is a history before the crucial gathering in the North Korean capital, a history of relations very different from the ones we have become accustomed to ever since.
These relations were not focused on cooperation, they lacked harmony, and may be termed hostile, even belligerent.
When Kim Dae-jung came to power in early 1998 he inherited from his predecessor not only a desperate economic situation -- in itself a nightmare for South Korea's society -- which after years of economic achievement had forgotten what misery means.
Regarding relations with the North, the incoming president was confronted with a situation of tension and conflict, and virtually complete absence of any direct communication.
Some observers doubt whether Kim Dae-jung's predecessor Kim Young-sam actually possessed a consistent policy vis-a-vis the North, let alone a strategy. According to one observer, Kim Young-sam used to adjust his policy regarding North Korea more often than other people change their underwear.
It is a special irony that of all people this failed politician has become the most noisy opponent of the successful North Korea-policy of his successor. In the final stages of his presidential campaign back in 1997 Kim Dae-jung used to say that he was prepared.
Regarding North Korea this slogan may be called accurate: Kim laid out the basic principles of his North Korea-policy in his inauguration speech. It is remarkable that he has not strayed from them since.
On Feb. 25, 1998 President Kim proclaimed the three golden rules, that should guide his policy: "First, we will never tolerate armed provocation of any kind. Second, we do not have any intention to undermine or absorb North Korea. Third, we will actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North."
It took a while for a breakthrough to be reached in dealing with the country that for nearly two generations had been perceived not as a partner but as a dangerous enemy.
In 1998 a North Korean submarine infiltrated the territorial waters of the South, an incident reminiscent of similar military occurrences before the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung administration. The threat of military escalation was real, when North Korean navy vessels confronted the South Korean navy off the west coast in June, 1999 in a deadly sea-battle. Seoul responded resolutely to these situations, thus communicating to all sides the validity of the primary principle of its North Korea policy, that it would not tolerate any armed provocation.
In the meantime the diplomatic process continued on two levels: In Geneva delegates from the North, the South, the US and China assembled in an effort to find permanent peace for the divided peninsula. Not very much came out of these talks. Just how unsuccessful they were, is seen from the fact, that minute progress achieved in a procedural issue pertaining to the introduction of working groups was hailed by the diplomats as a major achievement. The second center of the diplomatic process was, after a four year interruption, the first government-level meeting between the two Koreas was held in April, 1998 in Beijing.
Seoul aimed at a political trade-off: the South would deliver desperately needed humanitarian aid to the North. In return Pyongyang should make concessions regarding the issue of the divided families.
But the talks in Beijing failed to produce any substantial results.
An indication of how tense inter-Korean relations were less than one year before the triumphant summit of Pyongyang is that, at the vice-ministerial meeting in July, 1999 the North Korean negotiators reportedly refused to shake hands with their Southern counterparts.
Future historians dealing with the Korean unification process are advised to take a closer look at developments in March 2000.
This month may well be termed a turning point in inner-Korean affairs. It was in that month that Kim Dae-jung visited the German capital, Berlin. There Kim delivered what may be called his most important speech regarding the relations of the South with the North.
Speaking to members of the academic staff and students of the Free University, the South Korean president pronounced three important promises to the North Korean rulers
-- He would guarantee their security
-- He would assist their economic recovery efforts
-- He would actively support them in the international arena.
About the same time Kim Dae-jung was touring Europe in an effort to mobilize international diplomatic support for his Sunshine strategy, the North and the South started secret negotiations with the aim of holding a summit meeting between the leaders of the two sides.
One very central question for the scholar of this crucial phase of Korean history is: What caused the North Koreans to suddenly accept the South Korean invitation to meet on the highest political level?
Kim Dae-jung gave a conclusive answer to this query: Addressing an audience in New York last September he listed four reasons: First, he said, the North Koreans had come to trust his Sunshine policy. Second, he mentioned the firm US position. Third, he said, the global public opinion called for inter-Korean dialogue. And, fourth, the most decisive reason was North Korea needed to overcome its economic difficulties.
The North-South-summit has laid the groundwork for a multitude of inter-Korean interactions in the fields of diplomacy, the economy, culture, the media and -- not to forget -- also the military.
Most progress has been achieved in the political and the economic fields. Much public attention has been directed at the two family reunions. Everyone agrees -- even the most apologetic government officials -- that very much remains to be done regarding inter-Korean relations.
Everyone knows it is still a long way before the relations between the two Koreas may be called normal in any sense of this term.
On the other hand, there should be no doubt, that an historic process has been initiated.
In spite of his enormous accomplishments in bringing North and South Koreans together after decades of division, the Nobel peace prize laureate remains modest regarding his plans for the rest of his term: "During my tenure, I would never seek unification. My objective is to prevent war on the Korean peninsula and to promote inter-Korean exchanges and contacts", he said shortly after the summit last summer.
The South Korean government deems it will take two to three decades before the two Koreas become one again.
This means not Kim Dae-jung but future leaders will bring to an end the process of reconciliation, and reunify the divided peninsula. Unlike the classical Greek drama, where the hero usually ends up in tragedy in the final act, President Kim deserves to be remembered in history as a political statesman with a great vision -- and (so far) a successful record of promoting it.
Dr Ronald Meinardus is the Resident Representative of the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation in Seoul and a commentator on Korean affairs.
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