The change of power in the US has considerable impact on political developments in and around Korea.
The governments in Seoul and Washington have lost little time initiating discussions aimed at fine-tuning their respective policies.
Although South Korea's Foreign Minister Lee Joung-bin was not the first foreign politician to meet with the new US Secretary of State, he belongs to the very early visitors of the new administration, underlining the significance attributed to the Korean issue in the US.
It is too early to say what will be the new US administration's policy about Korea, and specifically North Korea. Washington is presently reviewing the options available. It may take some months, before the political strategists arrive at final conclusions. In the meantime, analysts greedily pounce upon every utterance emanating from the lips of the new decision makers.
A lot of fuss was made about Secretary Powell's characterization of the North Koreas leader Kim Jong-il as a dictator during the Senate confirmation hearings. Some analysts concluded this was a clear indication of a toughening of the the US position. Much more important than this wording, which at least from the angle of political science is accurate, I found Powell's statement that the new administration is "open to a continued process of engagement with North Korea, so long as it addresses political, economic and security concerns, is reciprocal and does not come at the expense of our alliances and relationships." This is a dense political announcement, obviously authored by someone with a clear understanding of the broad direction of future US policy.
"Basically we are on the same track," South Korea's Foreign Minister Lee said after his talks with Powell last week. Both sides were eager to convey the picture of a harmonious relationship. The press reports highlighted Washington's full support for Kim Dae-jung's engagement policy. In reality, though, things are not that simple. When politicians proclaim that "basically" all is OK, they often mean that some issues remain unresolved. It would be naive to assume, that within days of the inauguration of the new Administration, the widely publicized differences between the Seoul government and the Republicans regarding the handling of the regime in Pyongyang have vanished.
During his visit to Washington Minister Lee met a group of US experts on Korean peninsula issues. During what one correspondent called a lively discussion behind closed doors the Americans and the Korean minister apparently could not agree as to the relevance of reciprocity in the dealings with the North. As reported, Lee insisted the controversial concept be conditional, and introduced the term of "reciprocity with flexibility" regarding South Korea's dealings with the North. The term reciprocity has a long history in international relations, mainly in economic affairs: Concessions in trade matters usually do not occur unilaterally, but are the result of bi-or multilateral agreements for reciprocal reduction or adjustments of tariffs or trade barriers. In diplomacy, too, reciprocity plays an important role. I remember vividly my first encounter with the South Korean consul in Germany, before coming to this country nearly five years ago. The diplomat would not give me more than a prelimenary visa valid for only three months, and asked me to reapply for a new permit once in Seoul. I pointed out that this was a rather burdensome procedure, only to be presented an unsolicited lecture on the principle of reciprocity governing the diplomatic relations even between the two friendly nations Germany and South Korea. In short, reciprocity is another word for a relationship conditioned by a mutual exchange of rights and privileges, and sometimes also favors. The Romans coined the phrase quid pro quo, meaning nothing else but tit for tat.
The assumption that Kim Dae-jung's North Korea policy does not respect this fundamental diplomatic principle is the common denominator of most critics who reject his Sunshine Policy. They accuse the South Korean president of being too generous in dealing with the North, of making too many concessions and not getting back enough from the other side. It is noteworthy that Kim's critics in South Korea and the US use the same argument.
"One-sided concessions to North Korea have sustained Kim Jong-il's repressive regime at no political cost to him," says a report published by the Heritage Foundation. The report calls for a policy of disciplined reciprocity.
These days the editorials of influential South Korean newspapers are filled with criticism, lamenting with sharp words that the South has allegedly received little in return for its aid to the North, that the South Korean government is being dragged around by the communist regime, yes, that Seoul is supposedly kowtowing to Pyongyang.
This critical posture is shared by a large segment of the South Korean population: opinion polls indicate, public support for Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy has declined significantly since the historic summit meeting in Pyongyang last June. According to one such survey, some 55 percent of South Koreans are worried about what is termed "reckless assistance to the North." The reason the government's North Korea policy is drawing criticism is not so much because of the scale of its aid for the North as the fact that the aid is being given unilaterally, regardless of whether the North responds in kind (or not).
Ronald Meinardus is the resident representative in Seoul of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation
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