Wed, Jan 24, 2001 page8

• Economic links must come first

  • By Kao Koong-lian 高孔廉
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  At the year-end banquet of the President's Advisory Group on Cross-strait Affairs (跨黨派小組), Lee Yuan-tseh (李遠哲) called for "successful integration." There are also rumors within the DPP that President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) deliberately adopted the EU model in order to explain his integration theory. Everywhere there are signs that, on the issue of cross-strait policy, the government has already formed definite ideas, and is full of confidence. However, this writer would like to point out that "economics first, politics second" is the only option left to break the cross-strait stalemate, just as it was with the EU. Rather than debate integration theory, it would be better to take a look back and consider whether the "three links" (三通) will be able to benefit both sides of the Strait.

  Several days ago, this writer, accompanied by many legislators, traveled to China to examine the three links question, particularly to observe the Communist Party's view on the matter. What we discovered was that, because of China's boycott, the "small three links" (小三通) exists in name only, and that the "big three links" (大三通) is but a distant prospect. If things continue like this, it will indeed be to the detriment of Chinese on both sides of the Strait. I write this piece, therefore, to provide first-hand observations and conclusions for the new government to consider as it ponders cross-strait policy.

  First, in terms of the three links, from top to bottom, Chinese officials have been saying the same thing, contending that an official document back in 1979 advocated opening postal, trade and transportation links across the Strait. China further insists that preparations for these connections have already been made, and that as long as aviation links are opened under the principle of "special `one China' domestic air services," they could immediately be discussed and put into effect by local organizations. Chinese officials also advocated using the Taiwan-Hong Kong model to resolve the question of opening transportation links, although actual content -- including the breadth and depth of such an arrangement -- were not clearly stated. Anyone with a discerning eye can see the so-called "principle" here: politicizing the three links issue.

  In fact, taking a look back to 1979, there was almost no cross-strait trading activity taking place -- and thus there was no need for the three links. Raising the three links issue was merely a political appeal, and to this day this stiff one China stance has not been adjusted. In the 20 years since then, however, the international situation, cross-strait relations, and developments on both sides of the Strait, have already seen some basic changes. In the international arena, democratic and communist groups have gone from conflict, cold war, and blockade, to a state of actual exchange. Cross-strait relations have also progressed from nothing to exchanges that are close and warm. China's marketization has reaped considerable results, and Taiwan has undergone thorough democratization. With changes such as these, stubbornly clinging to the same old framework will only delay opportunities for the two sides to benefit each other.

  China's policy should be based on facts, and work from an economic perspective. Only if the three links issue is used as a starting point can the cross-strait stalemate be broken. Just look at the offshore transshipment centers, which, in the span of four short years, have handled over one million containers -- 400,000 in the last year alone. Of course, this is a result beneficial to both sides. As for the definition of the transportation links, however, Taiwan advocates a special "international" service, while China supports a special "domestic" service. Both sides are playing word games. Actually, the Taiwan-Hong Kong model can be regarded as a practical method.

  Second, I discovered that even if it is just the small three links, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still wants to define both cross-strait relations and the links before sanctioning any negotiations. Furthermore, China thinks that because the small three links have been quietly taking place at the local level for some time already, Taiwan's actions are merely "decriminalization." The CCP feels that nothing substantial has resulted, and as the small three links aren't on a par with the big three links, there's not much reason to be interested. No wonder China uses the excuse that "it's too late" to complete the paperwork that will allow former residents of Kinmen stranded in Xiamen to pass the new year with their fellow villagers.

  Recently, one disheartening development has been the way China continues to adopt a "listen to what he [Chen] says and observe his moves" attitude towards the new government. The main thing is that China sees only Chen's passive inaction and not his positive policy initiatives, so it is unable to understand the new government's positioning and direction towards cross-strait relations. I have also found that China can't understand why Chen calls himself "ethnic Chinese" (華人) but not "Chinese" (中國人). Unless the new government can propose an even more positive policy initiative than the small three links, the "listen to Chen's words" policy currently in practice could, unfortunately, persist.

  In addition, I have discovered that China is extremely concerned about short-term political turmoil in Taiwan (such as the recall issue, and the executive/legislative stalemate) and the legislative and county/city elections to be held at year's end. China also feels a keen sense of uncertainty regarding the new US government's cross-strait policy and personnel appointments.

  In sum, in the short space of a few days of interviews, I arrived at the following conclusions.

  On high-level political and economic issues, both sides of the Strait are all "blocked up." With a consensus lacking, in the short term, it would be better if cross-strait relations remained stagnant, though the situation could deteriorate with changes in US and Chinese policy or personnel. As for opening up transportation links, this writer thinks that if there is no way to make the transition from "politics first" to an economic perspective, the big three links will remain a distant prospect.

  The small three links are a one-sided wish, and might exist in name only. It would be better to adopt a policy that allows foreign-registered, flag-of-convenience, direct shipping. Opening up customs doesn't pose any national security problems, and can dispel various political and legal obstacles. If the small three links can really be put into action, trans-shipment also needs to be opened up before Kinmen and Matzu can benefit substantially, and before the goal of developing these outlying island groups can be achieved.

  Without economic integration, political integration won't be easy. The new government should think it over.

  Kao Koong-lian is a fellow at the National Policy Foundation.

  Translated by Scudder Smith
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