In his effort to respond to the opposition's request for clearer articulation of the government's cross-strait policy, President Chen Shui-bian (
In addition to proposing a long-term framework for cross-strait relations, Chen also delivered two significant messages with the aim of pursuing major breakthroughs across the Taiwan Strait. First, Chen admitted that under the constitution of the Republic of China, "one China" is not a problem. Second, in terms of modifying former President Lee Teng-hui's(
Since this was the first time Chen had proposed a long-term framework for cross-strait relations, it triggered a new series of debates in Taiwan. The opposition's instant reaction was quite positive, although with some doubts on the content and the methods of implementation. But, after the President's Advisory Group on Cross-Strait Affairs submitted its "three acknowledgements and four recommendations" to the President, Chen's New Year address on cross-strait policy could not have come at a better time.
A closer look at Chen's latest announcements reveals his intention of generating a domestic consensus. In the face of opposition boycotts of most of his key policies, Chen has had no choice but to make more goodwill gestures to the opposition. Without directly touching upon the sensitive issue of the so-called "one China" principle and with no clear attempt to embrace the notion of "one China with each side having its own interpretation," Chen chose instead to offer a general direction consisting of constructing a framework for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The idea was to bypass the semantics war on the "one China" debate and pave the way for a broader concept of discussion.
In his inauguration speech last May, Chen suggested the two sides deal jointly with the question of a future "one China." This means that the new administration hopes both sides can discuss the content and definition of "one China" first and then discuss whether or not they accept the principle of it. Whether or not there was a "consensus" reached in 1992, remains a matter of some debate. On June 20, Chen said that if there had been one, it was that "the two sides agreed to disagree." In my mind, Taipei and Beijing never had a consensus. The PRC's interpretation of Beijing-Taipei relations, namely that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the PRC is the only legitimate representative of China, makes it inconceivable that Taiwan will ever accept the PRC's stance.
Most domestic reaction to Chen's statement tended to focus on the "one China" description without taking a full look at the rest of the statement, which constitutes the key to the stalemate in cross-strait relations. China still insists on Taiwan's acceptance of the "one China" principle as the precondition for the resumption of bilateral talks. That insistence downgrades the ROC to a local government under the PRC, which is unacceptable to the majority of the people of Taiwan.
The opposition in Taiwan further joined the PRC camp in pushing Chen to accept the idea of "one China with each side having its own interpretation" or keep reunification as the final goal. Under both domestic and external pressure, Chen has reiterated that the people of Taiwan cannot accept that "one China" means the PRC. Even more unacceptable is that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. We should not doubt Chen's determination to stand firm on the issue and uphold Taiwan's sovereignty, dignity and security. Nor should we worry Chen might be too conciliatory toward Beijing.
Beijing's attitude toward Chen's gestures deserves special attention. So far the PRC has not responded positively to Chen's conciliatory approach. What is the strategic thinking behind such a negative attitude? Obviously, it is Beijing's intention to take advantage of Taiwan's internal debate on the administration's China policy. The more Chen's government fails to generate domestic support on cross-strait policy, the more likely it is that Beijing can apply more pressure to force Chen to make concessions. This is the key to the current stalemate in cross-strait relations.
In this regard, nothing is gained by the KMT and the People First Party boycotting Chen's administration's cross-strait policy. In the face of China's intimidation, a joint effort must be made by all parties in Taiwan to search for common ground. The political, economic and cultural integration of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait must be based on three foundations. The first is the respect of the free will of the 23 million people of Taiwan. The second is that integration must be carried out in a peaceful and non-military manner. And the third is that integration must contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Let's rally behind Chen. After all, we are all in the same boat.
Liu Kuan-teh is a political commentator based in Taipei.
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