For a while, we thought PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Zhou Minguei (周明偉) accurately summed up our feeling about the "small three links"(小三通) when he commented "[we] could hardly get all emotional about it." But things changed within a matter of days, when a Fujian Taiwan Affairs Office indicated that China would offer assistance to implement direct sea links between Fujian and the off-shore islands of Kinmen and Matsu.
We couldn't sense any excitement until now because China had remained mute, creating doubt about anything positive the small three links might bring to the cross-strait relationship. The Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration has apparently forced China to return a fairly positive response. This may be considered a small victory for Chen, since China has turned its back to Chen since he step into power.
However, China has also insisted that the direct sea link with Kinmen and Matsu is a domestic link, for which negotiations between private organizations on both sides is sufficient. By doing so, China has successfully linked the issues of the "small three links" and the "one China" principle.
China has also demonstrated that it is no fool by exposing that the small three links is basically a ploy by the Chen administration to evade political issues, namely the "three links" (大三通), and create a general feeling that cross-strait tensions are easing. The very fact that China had to return a positive response, knowing full well this secret agenda, tells us that the small three links was indeed a check-mate by Chen. The only thing China could do under the circumstances was expose Chen's underlying motives, as a way of minimizing the latter's maneuvering power.
The sharp exchanges between China and the Chen administration demonstrate some very difficult negotiating tactics. Now that China has made a move, the ball is back in the Chen administration's court. It must think carefully before taking any actions. Afterall, haste has already caused the new administration to make way too many unnecessary mistakes.
On the economic side, so far the residents of Kinmen and Matsu remain less than enthusiastic about any possible economic benefits accompanying the small three links. This is of course because they have been engaging in "unofficial three links" for years. The only thing accomplished by the small three links is the decriminalization of such trading activities.
One way to ensure Kinmen and Matsu residents get something out of the small three links is more government assistance in local economic development. A Matsu resident reportedly sneered "The total population of Matsu eat just three pigs a day, so it makes no difference to us if we have the small three links or not." The Director of Kinmen Harbor Affairs Office reportedly scorned "[Xiamen] take over Kinmen? Why? It is more prosperous than Kinmen." He of course overlooks the possibility that China may wish to use Kinmen as a stepping stone to get to Taiwan.
In any event, the above remarks indicate that much room exist to help Kinmen and Matsu's economic development. There have been a number of proposals to develop vacation resorts, tourism, and casinos on these off-shore islands. These are all suggestions that the Taiwan government should seriously consider. Let's give the local residents some reasons to feel positively about the small three links.
After nine days of holidays for the Lunar New Year, government agencies and companies are to reopen for operations today, including the Legislative Yuan. Many civic groups are expected to submit their recall petitions this week, aimed at removing many Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers from their seats. Since December last year, the KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) passed three controversial bills to paralyze the Constitutional Court, alter budgetary allocations and make recalling elected officials more difficult by raising the threshold. The amendments aroused public concern and discontent, sparking calls to recall KMT legislators. After KMT and TPP legislators again
Taiwan faces complex challenges like other Asia-Pacific nations, including demographic decline, income inequality and climate change. In fact, its challenges might be even more pressing. The nation struggles with rising income inequality, declining birthrates and soaring housing costs while simultaneously navigating intensifying global competition among major powers. To remain competitive in the global talent market, Taiwan has been working to create a more welcoming environment and legal framework for foreign professionals. One of the most significant steps in this direction was the enactment of the Act for the Recruitment and Employment of Foreign Professionals (外國專業人才延攬及僱用法) in 2018. Subsequent amendments in
US President Donald Trump on Saturday signed orders to impose tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China effective from today. Trump decided to slap 25 percent tariffs on goods from Mexico and Canada as well as 10 percent on those coming from China, but would only impose a 10 percent tariff on Canadian energy products, including oil and electricity. Canada and Mexico on Sunday quickly responded with retaliatory tariffs against the US, while countermeasures from China are expected soon. Nevertheless, Trump announced yesterday to delay tariffs on Mexico and Canada for a month and said he would hold further talks with
Taiwan’s undersea cables connecting it to the world were allegedly severed several times by a Chinese ship registered under a flag of convenience. As the vessel sailed, it used several different automatic identification systems (AIS) to create fake routes. That type of “shadow fleet” and “gray zone” tactics could create a security crisis in Taiwan and warrants response measures. The concept of a shadow fleet originates from the research of Elisabeth Braw, senior fellow at the Washington-based Atlantic Council. The phenomenon was initiated by authoritarian countries such as Iran, North Korea and Russia, which have been hit by international economic