Taipei Times: You were in Seoul to observe the ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) III. What are the major achievements in the meeting under its political, economic and cultural/civil society pillars?
Paul Lim: For an EU participant in the ASEM, there were achievements such as inserting a paragraph on human rights in the Chairman's Statement in reference to the World Conference on Human Rights, the discussion of sensitive issues and the agreement that no topic of discussion is to be excluded beforehand, subject to judiciousness in choice of topics. It must be noted that wordings to arrive at agreements, and therefore achievements, were a compromise, a result of negotiations or bargaining. The different concrete initiatives such as anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, the initiative to combat trafficking in women and children, a symposium on Law Enforcement Organs' Co-operation in Combating Transnational Crimes, an initiative on HIV/AIDS, are seen as achievements, too. For the outsider or observer, the implementation of such initiatives will demonstrate the worth of ASEM while such initiatives can very well be carried out by other international organizations such the UN agencies. By being under the umbrella of ASEM, the implementation of such initiatives puts ASEM's credibility to the test.
Illustration: Mountain People
There were no disagreements in the economic [area of ASEM's portfolio]. This refers to the implementation of the Investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP) and the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP); in adding e-commerce as a new priority area; in having a new round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations and supporting WTO accession of China and Vietnam; on the achievements of the ASEM Trust Fund (ATF) and its extension into a phase two; also addressing the digital divide. An important initiative of this second area was the Trans-Eurasia Information Network.
PHOTO: EIAS
As to the cultural/social/ educational sector, again [there was] agreement on the importance of people-to-people exchanges; educational, student and academic exchanges including electronic networking and mutual recognition of degrees; and dialoguing on socio-economic issues including social safety nets. The one important initiative under this third pillar was the Duo Fellowship Program of educational exchanges at the university level.
The disagreements leading up to agreement were mostly in the political area. On civil society, for both sides, the first meeting between a NGO delegation and a delegation of senior officials led by a Korean Minister was progress. It must be noted however the senior officials did not represent ASEM but were there in their personal capacities. Only senior officials from the EU member states plus Korea and Japan attended -- in fact, the OECD countries. The question is raised why did not the other Asian member states attend?
TT: What are the different perceptions and expectations of the Europeans and Asians about the ASEM as a "process" to strengthen their relations and to improve mutual understanding?
Lim: I am in no position to speak of the different perceptions and expectations of the different member states about the ASEM process but what I can say is that these perceptions and expectations are conditioned by how important Asia is, let's say to the individual EU member state.
It depends upon how important Asia is to them as compared to other parts of the world, their past connections and familiarity to Asia, their priorities and their strengths. For the former colonial powers of Asia, Asia will be more important which will condition their perceptions and expectations of ASEM. Those with major economic interests in Asia will have certain expectations and perceptions over others.
ASEM is not all important to all EU member states. Overall, of course, both sides want to strengthen their relations and improve mutual understanding but who among the member states really would benefit from this? I would think that Asia wants Europe to play a role in Asia as it provides more room for maneuver in relations to the US and even Japan, another ASEM partner, both economically and politically. The Asian side see ASEM with economic eyes while it was Europe which brought in the political and security agenda. The Asians wanted to focus primarily on the economic process in the political dialogue.
I suspect that the Asian countries saw ASEM like another APEC except this time their counterpart is Europe. The three [areas] ASEM [deals with] are the result of a compromise. Further, one speaks of the triangular relationship but this has also to be placed in the context of the EU's other relations with other parts of the world, particularly closer to home, because the question of expectations and perceptions is also affected by priorities in international relations. If one speaks of a multi-polar world, why speak of a tri-polar world?
TT: You co-edited a book Asian Values: An Encounter with Diversity, which deals with their essence and various cultural and religious characteristics in Asia. Among other aspects, Lee Kuan Yew singled out the different significance Asia and the West attach to the notion of "right" and "duties" toward the community and advocated that the western democracy is not completely applicable in Asian societies. As a scholar who specializes in EU-Asian relations, to what extent have you observed the manifestations of Asian values in EU-Asia interactions?
Lim: In Seoul, Asian values were talked about between the leaders but the range of topics was such that there was no actual discussion but rather comments made without being challenged which would have led to in-depth discussion. Leaders suggested a more focused agenda in the future so that there could be more exchanges and interaction between them. The book you referred to was the result of study commissioned by the European Commission before ASEM I to be presented at a forum in Venice organized by the commission in which Asian values were a topic. It was then giving recognition of Asian values as propagated by Lee Kuan Yew and Dr Mohamad Mahathir.
TT: And as a European with Asian ethnic origin, what are your views about Lee Kuan Yew's interpretation of Asian values? What's your view about Taiwan's former President Lee Teng-hui's comment that the so-called "Asian Values" are indeed "authoritarianism"?
Lim: "Value" is a European concept, not Asian. Why? Indeed it becomes evident in translation that, in Asia, values are expressed in terms which hold connotations different from those in European languages. Efforts to translate the word "value" show that the main languages do not provide one equivalent word. Words cover different interpretations of "value". There is no distinction between value, religion, way of thinking, belief, purpose, or custom as in Western languages. The meanings of these words are partly distinct, partly overlapping. In Chinese, it must be noted that jia zhi guan(
The reason to bring this up is to ask whether the proponents of Asian values are using the term, Value, in the Western sense and thinking in a Western frame of mind. What happens with this way of thinking is to make a list of values as we see in the Far Eastern Economic Review. In a survey in its issue on "Managing in Asia" (August 10, 1995, Vol 158, no. 32, page 37), it looked at `Asian Business Values,' and cited what people in the region think these values are: Asians place community rights over individual rights; Asians believe more strongly in the family; Asians let their governments dictate their community's moral stance; Asian communities are hostile to permissive values; Asians are not indulgent parents; Asians have a knack for capitalism; Asians don't expect welfare; Asians place a higher value on education; Asians save more of their earnings ..."
Making a list is contrary to the assertion that there is no distinction between value, religion, way of thinking, belief, purpose, or custom as in Western languages. Values have to be placed within the context of where they come from and their place in these Asian philosophical and religious traditions. In so doing, we realize the complexity and will not try to generalize values so easily as Asian values.
However, going along with Western frame of mind and the Western sense of values, values may be distinguished according to different categories: religious, moral, social, political, and aesthetic. There are values which are cherished by an individual or society, in general (note not universal), like truth, honesty, harmony, order and liberty.
Some values are easily identifiable while doubts remain about others: it is difficult to draw a clear line between values and codes of conduct. For example, does shaking hands as a code of conduct express the value of politeness or is it a value in itself? We tend to deny that such conventions are values.
Codes of conduct can be seen as the practice or expression of values like harmony and respect in everyday life. In the holistic mind, probably these questions are not raised.
So, what can we conclude of values and Asian values? If we follow the holistic mind, we will not make distinctions between categories of values and between values and religion, way of thinking, belief, purpose, way of doing things, custom and codes of conduct. We will see everything as interconnected, overlapping, inseparable, every part as held together by every other part or aspect. They are one. One will not speak of Asian values at all in this way of thinking. To attempt to analyse takes the reality apart. It is the linear, cartesian, and I add, scientific mind that does so. The object of study is to be taken apart to be analysed, defined, and categorized.
To the question of Asian values and authoritarianism, any human rights advocate will see Asian values as a reason to dismiss human rights, that human rights do not fit into Asian culture and here the reference is to Confucianism. We have the well-known article of the present South Korean President, Kim Dae-Jung, "Is Culture Destiny: The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values," a response to Lee in his interview in "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew."
For activists in Singapore at the time, the talk of Asian values was a rationale for the suppression of political dissidence with the threatening use of the Internal Security Act. But Asian values were another anchor to command the loyalty of Singaporeans to the multi-ethnic State. It was the way out to avoid ethnic sensitivities.
Then there was worry about cultural erosion in Singapore as the reason to promote Asian (Confucian) values.
On the international stage at that time, Asian values came into prominence to challenge what was claimed to be the attempts of the West to establish its global intellectual and cultural hegemony by imposing Western notions of rights under the guise of universalism.
It was feared, too, that social and political trends including the Western agenda on human rights and democracy generated by the new international environment, globalization and economic growth in the post-Cold War era would have an influence on the general population of these countries.
Asian values were produced by elites fearing the resultant changes of such trends which could undermine discipline, their authority and the stability of their power. These countries believe that developing countries needed strong regimes for growth and development.
They were resentful also of conditionality, which derogated from their political and economic sovereignty. They were anxious because of the effects of the emphasis on rights on their competitiveness in the framework for international trade ushered in by globalization, and claimed to detect in this emphasis a Western conspiracy to undermine newly growing economies. The Western human rights and democracy agenda was seen as Western attempts to make up for its declining economic influence.
However, the rise of the Asian values world-view also stems from a common experience of past European colonization which is still very present in the collective memory of the present political leadership. The 1990s with their economies on the climb provided the moment to exert themselves via Asian values and insisting on being treated as equal partners to Europe and the US.
So, Asian values were the attempt to have a balance and equitable relations with the West. Besides, it is also a result from the pride Southeast Asia found in its development. As a developing region, Southeast Asia compared itself to Africa or Latin America and took great pride in its achievements. The financial crisis cracked the pride of achievements.
TT: You have written extensively on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in Asia and your researches have shown the hitherto limited application of CFSP in Asia. Apart from the geographical distance between two continents, in your view what are the main impediments and difficulties of the CFSP in Asia?
Lim: What I am saying is that the coverage of CFSP as announced are Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans included, Russia, the Mediterranean basin, the Middle East and "areas of abiding concerns such as EU-US relations. A political decision has to be taken to say that Asia is important for CFSP. Now, the EU also has to decide that it must not always let the US take a lead in foreign affairs. There are observers of the EU who say that the CFSP is led by the US. One can observe on the international scene that, in trouble spots of the world, it is the US that leads. However, for the EU to lead, it means that it must get its act together. It means that the EU member states and the commission must co-ordinate, must reach common positions but unfortunately national priorities come in the way in this matter. The CFSP is still in the making and hence the importance of the political union of the EU. It is a question of the willingness to ceding or pooling sovereignty together.
The High Representative of the CFSP is trying to bring about a co-ordinated coherent CFSP. It also means that the High Representative has to be able to work with the Commissioner for External Relations. I am here referring to the operation of the CFSP whose effectiveness has a bearing on whether Asia will become a priority for CFSP. The member states have to come together to choose the decision that Asia is more important than another region of the world but this is not easy as the EU has commitments to other parts of the world as with each individual Member State. Asia must climb up the ranking of priority countries for CFSP.
The impediments and difficulties of CFSP in Asia lay also in the member states getting their act together in putting Asia on top of the agenda so to speak. I am not going to speak of any future deployment of the EU's Rapid Reaction Force in Asia, a force which is supposed to back up the CFSP. There has been a comment about the deployment of four contingents of member states troops in East Timor. If they were deployed as an EU force, the "EU's voice in the mission would be stronger." We are speaking here of CFSP but a defense of the EU in Asia would be its development and economic co-operation programs there. The EU is not abandoning Asia at all.
As said in the conference, the "F(oreign)" of CFSP has been applied to Burma and East Timor, for example, with regard to human rights using the instruments of common positions and joint actions. On the "S(ecurity)", it has been applied to KEDO, the Korean peninsula, to the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in rivalry.
TT: You have been following the EU's participation in North Korea's development plan (KEDO) when you were an advisor to the European Parliament. Please give a brief update of the EU's participation in KEDO beyond 2000. To what extent do you think the EU's participation in KEDO has changed European perceptions about Asian security?
Lim: The European Commission in the yearly draft EU budget proposed doubling its contribution to KEDO to 30 million euro which had the support of the European Parliament but the Council of Ministers of the EU, ie, the Foreign Ministers sitting in the General Affairs Council agreed only to an increase from 15 million euro to 17.5 million euro. [It's] only a slight increase. This much for CFSP in Asia.
If the security of Korea was a priority more should have been given.
TT: On Dec. 4-5 the European Commission-funded European Institute for Foreign Studies (EIAS) in Brussels held a conference on China-Taiwan and Europe's role. While it is recognized that the American influence on cross-strait relations is paramount, to say that the Europeans have no role to play in this would seem to miss the point as well. How do the EU and its members states (particularly the UK, France, and Germany) perceive their role and policies towards Taiwan and China? To what extent is it correct to say that the EU's policy towards cross-strait relations would simply follow that of the US?
Lim: I do not know the thinking of the UK, France and Germany and will not try to attempt to answer the question, but the important trade and investment ties ask for a policy and role. The EU's policy toward cross-strait relations would follow the US but this may not be the way to say it. Rather, they will follow China's demands. What I mean here is the one-China policy. Now, the European Parliament has come up with resolutions favorable to Taiwan but so long as the Parliament has limited or no powers on CFSP and external relations in no way, for example, can it pressure the EU and its member states to change its stand on the one-China policy, for example. Its resolutions are just political supports. It is nice to dream that the EU could play a mediating role between China and Taiwan but what weight has it? The EU has to pull together for its CFSP role in the world and in Asia. Does China want a EU role?
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