You don't have to consult opinion polls to understand, that in general terms South Koreans are not happy with their government. It is enough to occasionally read editorials of the big papers, or -- this is always the best solution -- to engage in political discussions with Korean friends, colleagues and neighbours.
Then you will detect a very basic disenchantment with all those who govern or pretend to govern.
For obvious reasons the national media focus on the big national events, including the major scandals, and the verbal -- and sometimes also physical clashes -- between the government camp and the opposition. The people are appalled to see how effectively the parties are immobilizing themselves. Poor, yes very poor indeed, is also the reputation of the local governments (with few exceptions).
Low voter turn-outs in local elections are but one indicator of a crisis of local autonomy, another one being the widespread popular contempt for elected local public officials, be they mayors or councilmen. Quite obviously Korea's politicians are not meeting the people's expectations.
Top of the agenda
Political reform, and also the reform of local politics in the sense of more local democracy, has been on the very top of the agenda of the Kim Dae-jung government, ever since it moved into power nearly three years ago. Interestingly the central government is now criticizing the local authorities for what it says is unsatisfactory performance: "We are facing many problems from our local authority system", Choi, In-kee, the Minister of Government Administration and Home Affairs, said at a recent meeting.
The minister's critique is in tune with the media, which more recently have been full of dismal reports regarding local governments. Many stories deal with a lack of financial discipline on the side of the local authorities, accusing them of being spendthrifts and wasteful.
At the heart of the problem of Korean local government lies the crisis of local finances. It is no exaggeration to say, that these are in disarray. If you ask local officials for the reasons, they will most certainly blame the central government in Seoul for handing down too little subsidies and limiting the base of local taxation. If you discuss this issue with people at the centre they will point their fingers at the proven cases of carelessness with scare financial resources by the local authorities. To give you another example for the discrepancy of viewpoints regarding the state of local autonomy in Korea: While the government professes full of pride, that it has handed down from the central to the local authorities no less than 183 functions, other -- also serious -- observers call this window-dressing, claiming that genuine political decentralization is yet to come: Said one specialist at a recent conference on local government innovation, sponsored by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, in Seoul: "Certainly, we have elected mayors. But at the same time, the central government decides what kind of car the mayor may drive and what size the garbage bags should be."
Meanwhile the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs is preparing drastic measures to cope with what it sees as a structural crisis of local government.
A while ago Minister Choi announced that he is considering the introduction of the so-called recall system for local government officials: "The government is studying the recall system to permit the residents to vote and decide whether mayors and governors are implementing their community business in a democratic and transparent manner," the Minister said.
In practical terms this means, that Seoul is considering introducing legal provisions, that allow local citizens to vote out of office those local officials they find either incompetent or corrupt. It comes as no surprise that many local government officials are up in arms.
They strongly reject these plans, which some term as yet another scheme to re-centralize political and administrative authority.
Common practice
The political instrument of recalling local government officials has been practiced for many years in the US and also in Germany. It is a very democratic instrument, as it enables the local community to rid itself of incompetent local leaders, before the end of their official terms. Recalls just as referenda give a dose of direct democracy to our representative, and indirect political systems. From a liberal point of view referenda and local recalls are excellent tools to increase citizens' participation in local government.
But regarding the Korean case I have my reservations, whether the time is ripe for this fundamental innovation. Unlike the two countries mentioned above local self-government has only a very short tradition in this part of the world.
The people are just getting acquainted with the rules of representative local government, and much space remains for improvement in the "traditional" system of checks and balances. My guess is also that it would not be that easy to win the hearts and minds of the citizens for yet another reform. All the more so, as this reform -- much like most other reforms in this country -- would be installed from top to bottom, and not be the result of a political process originating at the grass roots.
"In Korea we have a real discrepancy between our real and our nominal life", says a Korean scholar, whom I discussed this matter with. "We need more time to internalize the system of representative democracy, before we move on to new political experiments", he said. Building democracy is more complex than constructing bridges or factories. Considering the long authoritarian past, it will take time -- definitely more time than one presidential term -- to educate the people about the importance of active participation in representative politics. Introducing the recall system should stand at the end of this process -- and not at the beginning, where we find ourselves today.
Ronald Meinardus is the resident representative in Seoul of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, the German foundation for liberal politics, which enjoys close links with Germany's Free Democratic Party.
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