When Bill Clinton was elected president in 1992, Taiwan and the Taiwanese-American community had high hopes for the new Democratic administration. Taiwan had just gone through its first open election for all seats in the Legislative Yuan (most seats had previously been held by lawmakers elected in China in 1947). The nation was just taking its first tentative steps on the road towards full democracy.
We thought this new and young US president would surely want to significantly improve relations with Taiwan and bring about a fundamental shift in Taiwan's relations with the international community. Hadn't he emphasized human rights in his campaign, and hadn't he lambasted President George Bush's administration for "coddling" the Chinese dictators?
Even Clinton administration officials had high hopes, and in the beginning of 1993 they initiated the Taiwan Policy Review, which was intended to significantly upgrade relations between the US and Taiwan.
By 1994, however, it was clear that we were in for a disappointment. Led by the late commerce secretary, Ron Brown, the admin-istration became increasingly mesmerized by the "trade with China" hot air balloon. The Taiwan Policy Review turned out to be a dud and the State Department was telling China on every occasion that then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) would not be allowed to enter the US to attend a function at his alma mater Cornell University.
In fact, the Taiwan Policy Review was a step backwards. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) emphasizes that, "Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization," thus supporting Taiwan's membership in international organizations without any pre-conditions.
In the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review, however, the Clinton administration suddenly went on record as only supporting Taiwan's membership in international organizations that do not require statehood, a distinction that was not made in the TRA or in any other earlier policy statement. While in 1995, after heavy pressure from Congress and the near-unanimous passage of two resolutions in the House and Senate, the administration allowed Lee to visit Cornell, the half-hearted manner in which it did so was a signal to Beijing to increase the pressure on Taiwan. This it did.
During the summer and fall of 1995, there were missile firings, military "exercises" and increasingly shrill warnings from Beijing against Taiwan. The Clinton administration sat on its hands and only vague mumblings came out of the State Department and White House. It wasn't until early 1996, when a Chinese general uttered a threat to strike Los Angeles with a missile, that Clinton and his team woke up to the fact that China's threats were for real. In February 1996, when China was increasing its threats in the run-up to Taiwan's first democratic presidential elec-tions, the US put two aircraft carrier battle groups into place.
The episode convinced China to tone down its warmongering, but behind the scenes the Communist leaders in Beijing turned up the pressure on Clinton to distance himself from the increasingly democratic Taiwan. They succeeded when Clinton, during his June 1998 trip to China, uttered his infamous "Three No's" thereby betraying freedom and democracy in Taiwan, and prompting the Congress to adopt near unanimous resolutions in the House (HR 301) and Senate (SR 107) condemning Clinton's statements and reaffirming the US' commitment to Taiwan.
Since the summer of 1998, several in the administration, in particular Kurt Campbell at the Department of Defense and Richard Bush at the American Institute in Taiwan attempted to steer the administration back on track by pushing for adequate weapons sales to the island and by emphasizing that the future of Taiwan needs to be decided with the consent of the people of Taiwan. This latter principle was picked up by Clinton's use of "assent of the people of Taiwan" in speeches in early 2000.
If the people of Taiwan and Taiwanese-Americans expected the administration to change its policy after the victory of Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) in the March 2000 elections, they were deeply disappointed: the overall attitude of the administration is extremely stand-offish towards the new government, as exemplified by the shunning of President Chen and Vice-President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) during their transit stops this year and the restrictions imposed on them during those stops.
As we have asked before: Why is the democratically-elected leader of one of the most free and democratic nations in Asia shunned and being treated like a pariah, while the leaders of a repressive, communist-led government in Beijing get red carpet treatment in Washington?
The overall assessment of the Clinton years is thus that they were deeply disappointing to the newly-democratic Taiwan and to the Taiwanese-American community. The only rays of hope were a highly encouraging Congress, which showed strong bi-partisan support for Taiwan in critical situations, and the supportive positions taken by key individuals in the administration, Campbell and Bush. These two were an exception rather than the rule, however, in an administration dominated by a White House and State Department pre-occupied with "engaging" communist China at the expense of democratic Taiwan.
Chen Mei-chin is editor of Taiwan Communique.
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