"Absolutely not," responded Matt Gobush, spokesperson for Leon Fuerth, when asked if Al Gore's National Security Advisor meant to signal a shift by the vice president toward recognizing the PRC's claim that Taiwan is part of China. Fuerth "did not mean to go beyond the established US `one China' policy," stated Gobush, referring to remarks Fuerth made at the State Department on Oct. 26 that were reported in the Taipei Times two days later.
Fuerth's statement that the vice president recognizes and supports the `one China' doctrine were meant as a reaffirmation of long-standing policy, and were not a reference to the language of the Three Communiques where the US "acknowledges" the PRC position.
The distinction between "recognizes" and "acknowledges" is an important one and has been clarified over the years of debate on this issue.
In the Senate debate on the Taiwan Relations Act (February 1979), Senator Jacob Javits stated, "I notice that the Chinese translation, according to our staff, of the communique [referring to the January 1979 Joint Communique], which is the basis for our action here, uses a Chinese word which means `recognition' in respect of the PRC's view of Taiwan, the `one China' view, whereas our translation -- and I have it here before me -- uses the words `the Government of the US acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but `one China' and that Taiwan is part of China,' and that is the language of the Shanghai Communique -- acknowledgement. Now is it going to be made clear to the Chinese that our position remains consistent? They have their interpretation. Whether Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) made the mistake of his life we won't know, probably, until long after I am gone. But that is their interpretation and not ours. We accept it. It is very important that we not subscribe to it either way."
Warren Christoper, the State Department's representative at the hearing, replied, "Senator Javits, we regard the English text as being the binding text. We regard the word `acknowledge' as being the word that is determinative for the US. We regard the Chinese word as being subject to that as one of the meanings to it. I simply give you assurance on that point."
Christopher had also said during the TRA debate, "It is our position that if there is to be `reunification,' it is of great importance that it be peaceful and not destabilizing in the area. But we do not have a position of encouraging the people on Taiwan to do something against their will."
In June, Fuerth reflected this historical approach when he had this to say about Gore's position, "As for the Taiwan Straits, I think the most important thing is for the US to maintain stability and predictability in its approach to the issue, because we have to continue to make it clear that we adhere to the doctrinal lines that have been laid down for several administrations now about `one China,' we need to make it clear that we strongly urge the parties to find a way to deal with the question of the future of Taiwan by peaceful means. And to the extent that we carry a big stick, we have to speak softly."
Gore is himself on record as stating, "We also have concerns over tensions building between China and Taiwan. We need to maintain our commitment to the `one China' policy, but urge China and Taiwan to intensify their dialogue and to resolve their problems by peaceful means."
The Democratic Party platform avows that a Gore Administration "will fulfill its responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act," and will also "remain committed to a `one China' policy. The platform also notes, "We support the resolution of cross-straits issues that is both peaceful and consistent with the wishes of the people of Taiwan."
Fuerth echoed this latter phrase, and Christopher's 1979 statement, in his recent remarks when he noted that Gore believes it is imperative for China and for Taiwan to settle their issues peacefully through dialogue and ultimately in a manner that reflects the free will of the people of Taiwan. Concluded Gobush, Fuerth's remarks "were a reiteration in keeping with the position of every Administration since at least the Shanghai Communique, fully supporting the `one China' policy."
Michael J. Fonte is a policy analyst for the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA).
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