One-by-one, President Chen Shui-bian (
Since the major political obstacle for Chen is the DPP's lack of a majority in the Legislative Yuan, he will need to make compromises with opposition parties just to keep the government running. Therefore, it is important that he seeks a truce with the leaders of the opposition parties and makes efforts to reach a certain degree of consensus.
Of the three party chiefs, Hau of the New Party is closest to an opposition leader we typically find in a parliamentary democracy. Not only is Hau himself a member of the Legislative Yuan, the New Party leadership is made up of those who hold office. James Soong does not hold a government position, although important members of the PFP are legislators who have some weight in the legislature. Since Soong carries with him the support of some four million voters and has had a long career in public service, his authority in his party is well recognized.
Lien Chan is the chairman of the KMT and since he stepped down from the office of vice president, he no longer holds any government position. Part of the KMT leadership is made up of ex-government bureaucrats whose experience and long years of service are reasons that they were elected to positions of power inside the party. The remainder of the party is comprised of those legislators who suddenly acquired newfound political influence inside the party and might not share the same view as those outside the government. Even though Lien himself was humiliated in the March election, he was the only candidate that could hold the party together after Lee Tung-hui (李登輝) stepped down as chairman.
At first, Lien did not assume a very strong presence. However, with the KMT gradually recouping from the defeat and beginning to act like an opposition party, Lien has solidified his position as the head of a loyal opposition. Thus, while Lien is not a legislator and does not lead the fight in the Legislative Yuan, he and the KMT's Central Standing Committee still have power over how the KMT legislative caucus behaves.
The opportune moment for a coalition government slipped away when Chen decided to form a "government for all the people." Since the DPP remains a minority in the Legislative Yuan, it has to work with other parties and compromise. When the DPP decided to govern by itself without reaching out to other parties, there was a sense of uncertainty and insecurity among people in Taiwan. Now Chen has taken the initiative to reach the opposition and some concerns about political instability should begin to dissipate.
However, the announcement that the government has decided to discontinue the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant has dampened the rapprochement just created by these meetings. This has suddenly altered the political atmosphere of Taiwan. If this decision, as expected, brings instability to the government and the possibility of a no-confidence vote and dissolution in the Legislative Yuan, any goodwill and trust between the ruling and opposition parties will evaporate because the "trust" will no longer be there. It is hard to be optimistic about the future.
Chen-shen J. Yen is a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University.
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