Was it a 1992 "consensus" or a "spirit?" It really doesn't matter what was reached in the Koo-Wang talks in Singapore, but whether the "one China" principle should be recognized.
Those who believe that a consensus was reached emphasize that there was an agreement on "one China, with each side free to give its own interpretation [of what that term means]." Advocates of a "spirit" believe that no such consensus was reached. The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said that a "spirit" is something unilateral and one-sided, while a "consensus" is an agreement between two sides. In other words, no documentation exists to verify a consensus for "one China, with each side free to give its own interpretation."
Be it China's white paper, or the principle repeatedly offered by China as a precondition for negotiation, the principle is unequivocally "one China." In other words, as long Taiwan commits itself to a "one China" principle, then nothing is non-negotiable for Beijing. The white paper gives a very precise definition for "one China": "The People's Republic of China (PRC) which became in 1949 the only legal government of China and the only internationally recognized legal government representative (of China)."
"Consensus" appears to put both sides on an equal footing. But since it can only be achieved when one side agrees to the other's position, inevitably, one has to be subordinate. Therefore, placing a consensus in a "one China" framework highlights the fact that the so-called "1992 consensus" is simply a version of "one China" principle obtained after extensive bargaining. So why would China accept inserting the term "with each side free to give its own interpretation."
Chin Heng-wei is the editor in chief of Contemporary Monthly (
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