The most significant difference between South Korea and North Korea is that the one has a democratic political order, while the other is a communist dictatorship. Unlike in dictatorships, in democracies public opinion plays a significant role. The government, the ruling party and, yes, also the opposition must take into account the general public preferences, as they devise their political strategies. This is no concern for dictatorial leaders, be they left-wing or right-wing. They are not accountable to anyone, except themselves. There exists hardly a more impressive testimony for this state of affairs than the stunning statement by Chairman Kim Jong-il some days ago, when he told the heads of South Korean media-organizations, it was up to him to decide when to unify the North and the South.
No doubt, in South Korea, too, the President wields extensive political power. Koreans often state that he who has made it to the Blue House is capable of moving anything, the sole exception being the direction of the flow of the Han river. In spite of this near omnipotence, that is not untypical for presidential systems. The president in a democratic country is always at the center of public scrutiny and often the target of criticism, even condemnation. More recently President Kim Dae-jung has earned a lot of negative censure. Importantly, and maybe even surprisingly, the critics do not focus only on the real or alleged misdemeanours of Kim's political cohorts in the party and the government. They also lash out with vigor against what for most foreign observers
is the show-piece of this administration's two-and-a-half-year tenure: the Sunshine Policy and it's obvious success in bringing to the negotiating table the North Korean neighbours, in opening a new era in inter-Korean relations aimed at peace and reconciliation, thus creating an essential precondition for eventual reunification.
By Yu Sha
A look at editorials of leading Korean dailies reveals a lot of unhappiness with the outcome of last week's inter-ministerial meeting in Pyongyang. According to one writer, the three-day session was extremely disappointing.
Another editorial writer complained, that the South had once more been ragged around by the North and that the communists showed complete disregard for the universal principle of reciprocity.
The political background for the critical remarks are clear: the South's delegation obviously did not manage to move the North to a more conciliatory posture regarding the South Korean POWs and abductees, allegedly being held in the North. The uproar in parts of the public could well have been anticipated, as many South Koreans were perplexed to see the 63 unconverted communists spies and fighters leave the country for a heroes' welcome in the North, with no immediate and visible return for the South. In short, the whole procedure had the odour of a unilateral concession.
The discontent is not only promoted by relatives of individuals longing for their loved ones assumed to be holed up somewhere in the North. At the forefront of the campaign to discredit the government's policy in North Korea stand the main opposition party and influential sections of the Korean press. In the more recent past hardly a day has passed, without quite vigorous attacks of the opposition against the government's policy. One of the verbal onslaughts culminated in the accusation, that the government's plans to construct an expressway and reopen a rail link between North and South Korea would actually guarantee the bloodless take-over of Seoul by Kim, Jong-il and his forces.
It has always been a speciality of conservative critics to bring up security concerns, and use security arguments to block progressive policy initiatives. The year-old debate regarding the abolition (or revision) of the notorious National Security Law has shown again and again that conservative forces are prepared to disregard basic liberal and democratic rights for alleged or imaginary security concerns.
On the other hand history teaches, that liberalism prevailed over communist dictatorship not because of Western military supremacy.
It has been mainly the political and economic superiority combined with a Western strategy of cooperation and engagement that let the liberal order prevail in the ideological rivalry. This has been the case in Europe some 10 years ago. And eventually -- this is my prediction -- it will not be different in this part of the world.
One could say that the poorer a government does its job, the better this is for the opposition. If this observation is correct, then I do not envy the Grand National Party, South Korea's main opposition party today. Seriously, who just half a year ago would have dreamt that members of divided families of North and South Korea would actually get together? Who just half a year ago would have dreamt that officials of the two sides would sit down together and discuss the technicalities of the exchange of letters? All this and much more is truly overwhelming. What has happened these past months can not be evaluated too highly, if we consider an historical perspective.
Obviously it is impossible that all the problems piled up during half a century of division and hostility are solved overnight.
One of these problems, that remain to be solved and the President has left no doubt about this is the fate of the South Korean POWs in the North. On the other hand it is just as obvious that possible (and maybe even understandable) disapproval of the tactical handling of this issue by the South Korean negotiators, does not justify the fundamental condemnation of the whole strategy of cooperation and engagement. In this context a speech by the opposition leader Lee Hoi-chang at the beginning of the week was impressive. In a departure from the usual belligerent statements the politician stated: laud the Kim Dae-jung administration's efforts toward reconciliation and cooperation with the North.
Quite surprisingly Lee then went on and for the first time agreed to the revision of the draconian security law. The speech culminated in an announcement that the opposition party would henceforth support the government on South-North issues.
It will be interesting to see how the conservative (and reactionary) elements in Lee's party will react to these conciliatory remarks.
Another point of interest in this context is, how South Korea's leading opposition leader would react, should he be invited to visit Pyong-yang. Should Mr. Lee travel to the North, and one can only hope that he does this as soon as possible, this would be the first genuine signal of a bi-partisan North Korea policy. In the end this would strengthen the South more in its dealings with the communists than the backbiting and the nagging, we have become accustomed to.
Ronald Meinardus represents in Seoul the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, the German foundation for liberal politics.
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