Once again, news about Taiwan has to do about "one China," "one China policy," or "one China principle" and to be even more confusing, about "our one China policy," "the one China policy," or "a one China policy." Most people will not see any distinctions betweem these expressions. Those few that do see a distinction will either be confused, or accept whatever spin the writer has put on the use of the term. Within this latter group, the remaining very few who are cog-noscenti on the subject are left to decide the bias of the writer, or the bias of his sources.
US correspondents who only sporadically visit or write about Taiwan very often source their information from either Taiwan correspondents, or academics, or even government officials. If one knows the source, one can know the bias, but unfortunately not many foreign correspondents in that category can. And like anywhere else, Taiwan correspondents, academics and government officials have biases. The competition among the three groups is to try leading policy in the direction they would like to see it go. That's hardly unusual in any country, but the way this sensitive subject is reported in the US does have an affect on opinion makers there.
The confusion doesn't come from only that source, however. The US, like both Taiwan and the PRC, treats this subject with considerable ambiguity. The most benign way of saying this is that the policy toward China and Taiwan "evolves." Some says it evolves too much; some say it doesn't evolve enough; and most simply say it hasn't changed, even when it has. It is no wonder then, that the ordinary citizen who wants to keep up with international affairs but has no time to be an expert in it, gets thoroughly confused.
If one looks back at the US' China policy since 1971, one can see a continuing evolution. Especially during the present administration in Washington, the English language has been stretched to extraordinary lengths to produce words that are different but sufficiently nuanced to claim the meaning has not really changed. The first communique with China, for example, includes the well-known difference in using the words "acknowledge" and "recognize" to describe the PRC's version of "one China."
It is a key point which is still highlighted in formally describing the relationship. Subsequently, however, in 1979, the US dropped the qualifying phrase that followed "acknowledge," ie, that "the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintained" ... in effect saying that the US, not "the Chinese people on both sides ...." acknowledge one China.
Then later still, in 1982, according to testimony given by Senator John Glenn, the president wrote that "Our policy will continue to be based on the principle that there is but one China ..." Senator Glenn complained that "one China" had now become the US' own policy even while the US was still maintaining policy had not changed. Thereafter, verbally, the US began stating that it was up to the people on both sides to resolve the issue. Even more recently the US president stated, verbally, that the "assent" of the people of Taiwan was necessary.
Another example of verbal jujitsu was the US policy regarding Taiwan independence. At first the US would "not pursue," then "not support," then reportedly at one point "oppose" or "respect" (there are two different reported versions), then yet again back to "not support" this option for Taiwan.
This brings up yet another complication. Verbal statements of policy made by even the US president do not automatically carry over unless they are endorsed by the following presidents. (If made in private, that is much less likely to follow). The same is true of the communiques, (or the six assurances). Treaties on the other hand must be approved by the Senate and do remain in force unless specifically abrogated.
The complications continue. In the three communiques between the US and the PRC, "China" is never defined. In addition, many in the US believe the US supports unification, but to this day, in writing or orally, the US has consistently encouraged a "resolution" or "settlement" of the cross-strait issue, but never what it prefers for an outcome. And even with regard to the US-Taiwan relationship, the term "unofficial" never appears in the Taiwan Relations Act. Likewise in legal terms, the US position on the status of Taiwan remains undetermined. But all of these terms, while they are facts and do have important meanings, are matters that are so political in nature that realistically they can only be treated or resolved on that basis.
While all these complications are examples of the ambiguities of the US' policies toward the PRC and Taiwan, one could doubtless research similar circumstances in both Beijing and Taipei. Like the US however, Taiwan must deal with this issue on a different standard than the PRC. Especially in the burgeoning information age, open societies face much greater constraints on what they can do and face greater pressure for transparency, than is necessary in the PRC. There is a greater appreciation of this in the US, including in the US government, than is generally recognized in Taiwan.
The PRC plays heavily its stated objective of "the one China principle," clearly knowing it is unacceptable to Taiwan, perhaps stalling until the annual Beidaihe meetings. Perhaps also, however, due to its reluctance to accept dealing with the new government even indirectly. On the Taiwan side, the familiarization phase of the new government is taking place, often resulting in more voices being heard than ought to be. And in the US, though the government is pleased with Taiwan's efforts to pursue dialogue, there is the difficult need to appear impartial between the two sides of the Strait, even when it is clear it is not warranted.
With a new government in Taipei, a government in Beijing that seems will come forth with some kind of new Taiwan policy direction after its meetings next month, and a new government forthcoming in Washington in six months, the vocabularies, and the attendant ambiguities, emanating from these three sources on the subject of "China", will likely surpass even the robust production of the past few years.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.
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