Taiwan should not celebrate Tuesday's passage of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act in the US House of Representatives. The bill has all the downsides of a major initiative on Taiwan policy -- it offends the PRC and risks raising tensions in the Taiwan Strait -- while doing nothing substantial to "enhance" Taiwan's security.
In pushing the law so soon before Taiwan's second direct presidential election, the leadership of the House of Representatives showed little concern for Taiwan. Americans tend to focus on how the TSEA might affect the debate over permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status for the PRC and its entry into WTO, rather than really looking at how the legislation might impact cross-strait relations. The House leadership put off consideration of the TSEA last fall to avoid interfering with the WTO negotiations with Beijing yet apparently did not consider Taiwan's presidential election next month as reason enough for further delay.
Nobody on Taiwan needs reminding that it was during the last presidential campaign four years ago that the PRC "test fired" missiles into waters near Taiwan. Although furious over Taiwan's adoption of a "special state-to-state" model, Beijing has so far refrained from repeating its reckless saber rattling of 1996. The House vote only gives Beijing a reason to second guess its restraint. Senate leaders, who have indicated they will delay consideration of the bill until after the March 18 ballot, are showing more wisdom in this regard.
Despite the dangers and the potential for unintended consequences, its easy to see why the Act passed yesterday by a veto-proof 341 to 70 votes. It makes a strong symbolic statement in support of a democratic Taiwan and those who authored and support the bill do so with noble intentions. Those who oppose it risk appearing supportive of China at the expense of a democratic Taiwan. But the problem is the legislation does not make any improvements to current US policy that could justify the likely damage to Taiwan-China and US-China relations.
By far the most significant provision of the bill is the one requiring the Secretary of Defense to certify that "direct secure communications" exist between the American and Taiwanese militaries. If enacted, this measure creates the appearance of an alliance-like relationship between the US and Taiwan, yet does not require the kind of commitments that normally come with such a relationship. Establishing alliance-like communication links in the absence of real operational links between the two militaries (the kind the US has with its NATO allies in Europe) arguably only adds to the ambiguity in US policy that the authors of this legislation want to dispel.
Other provisions of the bill -- including reserving additional spots at US military schools for Taiwanese officers, increasing the number of technical staff at the American Institute in Taiwan and a slew of reporting requirements -- all lack any real security protein.
Although some in Washington hope the TSEA will pressure the Clinton administration to approve more weapons sales to Taiwan, the results could be just the opposite. Those in the administration who oppose the sale of four Aegis destroyers to Taiwan could use the increased tensions caused by the TSEA debate to dig in their heels and further delay approval. This would be especially true if enough senators oppose the TSEA to sustain a presidential veto.
All this leads to the question of why this bill is even necessary. In its findings section, the TSEA notes that: "The Taiwan Relations Act has been instrumental in maintaining peace, security and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific since its enactment in 1979." Indeed, everything in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act could be done under the TRA. Like the US Constitution, the TRA works well because it is clear on basic principles yet allows flexibility in implementation. The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act sets a precedent for congressional micromanagment that will not necessarily work in Taiwan's favor in the future, given that the political makeup and priorities of Congress change over time.
Although the Clinton administration is fiercely opposed to the TSEA, it is also indirectly responsible for its creation. The President's June 1998 "three no's" pledge -- no support for Taiwan independence, two Chinas or Taiwan's membership in state-based international organizations like the UN -- was a mistake. The statement broke past tradition of public neutrality on the question of Taiwan's ultimate status, raised anxieties in Taipei and prompted Congress to step in on Taiwan's behalf. Taiwan's adoption of a "special state-to-state" model for cross-strait relations and the TSEA are both unintended consequences of the "three no's."
But, despite the "three no's" misstep, the Clinton administration has supported Taiwan when the chips are down. Not only did President Clinton elevate Taiwan-US political relations by allowing more cabinet-level exchanges, he also unambiguously dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region during the March 1996 missile crisis. The Clinton administration has overseen the sale of the Patriot missile, the Stinger and Avenger surface-to-air missiles, 300 M-60 tanks, the Harpoon anti-ship missile, additional E-2T early-warning aircraft and a new ground-based early warning radar, among other high tech arms. The administration has also significantly expanded "unofficial" exchanges with the Taiwanese military. This was demonstrated in October 1998 when Taiwan's Chief of the General Staff Tang Fei (who is now defense minister) met with Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Henry Shelton.
In assisting in Taiwan's defense, the US needs to act in the spirit of a well-known shoe commercial and "just do it." That is, in addition to selling Taiwan the defensive equipment its needs (including missile defense technology), Washington should quietly but firmly make it clear to the PRC that the US will not tolerate the use of armed force in the Taiwan Strait. This was the message sent in March 1996. Four years later, there is little purpose served by rubbing China's nose in the fact that it still cannot take Taiwan militarily and, ultimately, this is all the TSEA accomplishes.
Greg May is assistant director of The Nixon Center, a non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Washington, DC. He can be reached by email at gmay@nixoncenter.org.
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