Fri, Feb 04, 2000 page12

• Taiwan needs more than weapons

  • By Bruce Dickson
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  In its first major piece of legislation of 2000, the US House of Representatives on Tuesday passed the "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act" (TSEA) by a large, bipartisan majority. The House demonstrated that it is willing to jeopardize the fragile stability in the Taiwan Straits in order to voice its collective displeasure with China's domestic and international policies.

  This measure is not in the best interests of the US or Taiwan.

  In international affairs, the US is often accused of being heavy-handed with its use of symbols, plodding with big feet and excessive rhetoric where more carefully chosen steps are warranted. Similarly, the House is often accused of acting on impulse, too easily swayed by the emotions of the day instead of guided by a more strategic perspective.

  The House's action on TSEA shows why these reputations are so well deserved.

  House Republicans and Democrats (a majority of whom voted in favor of the TSEA) agreed that the act is symbolically important, sending "a clear signal" to China of US support for Taiwan. Their primary objective is to rebuke China and in the process embarrass the White House. TSEA is simply a vehicle for doing this.

  It is the most recent and most convenient means available to express wide-spread concerns with China's military build-up, its human rights policies, trade practices and other actions, most of which deserve criticism. TSEA is unlikely to change any of those practices, however. Instead, it will increase tensions in an already volatile situation.

  President Bill Clinton's policy toward China bears a large share of the blame for this predicament. Statements by the Clinton administration in recent years indicated a tilt toward Beijing's perspective on the Taiwan issue.

  Clinton's enunciation of the "three no's" policy while in Shanghai did not require any substantive changes in US policy toward Taiwan, since they repeated previous statements, but nevertheless carried tremendous symbolic importance to all interested observers (even though Clinton's advisors and others denied the practical significance of the statement).

  The Clinton administration has also achieved a subtle but telling change in the "one China" policy. In the three communiques that provide the basis for US-China relations, the US acknowledged Beijing's position that there was but one China and Taiwan was part of it. Now the Clinton administration has accepted this policy as its own: it does not simply acknowledge that Beijing holds this view, it has become the official American view as well.

  Ironically, these symbolic and subtle shifts have led to a peculiar response from Beijing: rather than be confident of the US' good intentions toward China, especially on the Taiwan issue, it sees recent US actions as a series of steps designed to contain China and to interfere in its domestic affairs.

  US actions, including the revised US-Japan defense guidelines, discussions of a future theater missile defense system (which may or may not include Taiwan), continued arms sales to Taiwan and now the TSEA are seen as threatening China's interests, not as part of a coherent and credible regional policy.

  Faced with domestic criticism of its China policy, the Clinton administration has been scrambling to appear neutral again. In recent weeks, it has approved new arms sales to Taiwan. More importantly, it told China that China's own actions are the motivations for these sales.

  During Lieutenant-General Xiong Guangkai's (熊光楷) visit to Washington last week, Pentagon officials bluntly told him and his delegation that there would be less need to enhance Taiwan's security if Beijing would stop trying to threaten it with its missile build-up aimed at the island.

  Taiwan is often accused of being the trouble-maker in cross-strait relations, but the blame for rising military tensions now clearly resides in Beijing. But to truly enhance Taiwan's security, policy makers and especially legislators in Washington and Taipei must reduce their preoccupation with advanced weaponry and emphasize non-military sources of security.

  Negotiations between Taiwan and China are unlikely to be renewed as long as current levels of mistrust and suspicion continue. Priority should be placed on building confidence on both sides of the straits, rather than building stockpiles of new weapons.

  The timing of the House vote on TSEA is important. It came on the heels of Xiong's visit to Wash-ington, which led to agreements to resume high level contacts and exchanges, including visits to China by Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Admiral Dennis Blair, commander in chief of the US Pacific command.

  Many in Congress, especially in the House, are concerned that military contacts between the US and China have led to improvements in China's military development, which in the future may pose a risk to American interests. The vote on TSEA allowed these critics to show their displeasure.

  The TSEA vote also came as Congress is beginning to consider whether to grant permanent normal trade relations (NTR) to China. The same day that the House voted to approve TSEA, Senate Republican leader Trent Lott and other Senate leaders were at the White House discussing the need for Clinton to make a strong and sustained effort to win support for permanent NTR for China.

  Many in Congress are reluctant to grant NTR without some other action to balance the scales. For at least some of these members of Congress, TSEA provides such a trade-off, but even in its current form, much watered down from the versions being considered at the end of 1999, it is excessive and ultimately counter-productive. Congress needs to find other more appropriate means to register its concerns about China's policies and actions than to put Taiwan's security at risk.

  The White House has correctly criticized the TSEA as unnecessary, because arms sales are already mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act. A forum sponsored by the Congressional Research Service in spring 1999 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the TRA concluded that because the TRA has provided for Taiwan's security, it did not need amending or supplementing with the TSEA.

  Critics of the TSEA have also correctly pointed out that it is potentially dangerous, because China is likely to respond with renewed efforts to intimidate Taiwan, leading to further rounds of escalating tensions. TSEA would be redundant at best and counter-productive at worst.

  The bill faces a major obstacle in the Senate. Unlike the House, the Senate is traditionally more reluctant to depart from existing precedents, especially when they continue to work effectively. Trent Lott said after the House vote that he did not want to complicate the already tense relations between China and Taiwan, and that the Senate "should proceed with due diligence" when it considers its version of the TSEA.

  Lott is a strong supporter of Taiwan and probably the most vocal critic of China in the Senate. Without his endorsement, the TSEA is less likely to come to a vote or be passed. The White House should also work harder with Senate Democrats to oppose this bill and to defeat its passage.

  Without Senate approval, the version passed by the House will have limited symbolic importance. And that is how it should be.

  Bruce Dickson is director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University.
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