Taiwan, like some countries in Southeast Asia, is surrounded by water and heavily dependent on sea transportation to maintain its economic and energy needs. Therefore the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea and the western Pacific Ocean are very important to Taiwan's survival and security.
The pivotal role played by the Spratly Islands in the region geographically contributes to a close connection between Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Chinese mainland. The Spratlys are claimed all or in part by the ROC, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.
Over the last two decades, there have been several military conflicts in the South China Sea -- the PRC versus Vietnam in the Paracel Islands in 1974, the PRC versus Vietnam on Johnson Reef in 1988, the PRC versus the Philippines on Mischief Shoal in 1995 and fishing clashes between the PRC and the Philippines in 1999 and between the Philip-pines, Malaysia and Vietnam.
Malaysia's occupation of Investigator Shoal and Erica Reef in June 1999 prompted protests from the ROC and the PRC. Later, Vietnam's expansion and construction of structures on Oct.13, 1999 on Tennent Reef, Cornwallis South Reef and Alison Reef (all in the Spratlys and all first occupied by Hanoi in 1992) triggered protests from the Philippines and the ROC government.
Countries in the South China Sea region have suggested several approaches to resolving such conflicts and maintaining peace in the Spratlys. For example, Indonesia hosted a multi-lateral conference in 1990 -- the Workshop on Man-aging Potential Conflict in the South China Sea -- and ideas proposed at the conference were submitted to the respective governments for adoption.
But not one suggestion has yet been accepted by any participating government. There is no easy and available way to deal with the Spratlys problems via multi-lateral approach. On the contrary, a bilateral approach appears to be cooling down some disputes.
For example, after conflicts over Mischief Reef in 1995, the Philippines and the PRC reached a bilateral agreement on a code of conduct in the Spratlys.
The Philippines and Vietnam also drew up a draft of a regional code of conduct for ASEAN's Ministerial Conference of July 1999. But Malaysia argued that the scope of the South China Sea region must first be clearly defined and the jurisdictional rights of coastal states over the sea area be clarified.
Because each state in the region has its own perception of the South China Sea, the execution of a regional code of conduct is complicated. Malaysia wants the code to focus on the Spratlys instead of the entire South China Sea area. But Vietnam wants the Paracel Islands included, since it has a dispute with the PRC there.
A draft code of conduct was finally presented at the ASEAN Senior Official Meeting held in Manila on Nov, 25, 1999. ASEAN members then sought the PRC's support for the draft.
But Beijing has proposed its own code of conduct for dealings with ASEAN and there are several differences between the two.
First, ASEAN emphasizes on conflict resolution though a multi-lateral approach while the PRC favors a bilateral method.
Second, ASEAN says the scope of the area should cover the entire South China Sea, but the PRC wants it to concentrate on the Spratlys.
Third, ASEAN emphasizes co-operation through the bilateral or multi-lateral agreements, but the PRC argues for joint development.
Fourth, ASEAN's code empha-sizes the suspension of further occupation of islets, a point not mentioned in the Beijing's draft.
Fifth, ASEAN's code does not mention the avoidance of military exercises, reconnaissance, or patrols, while the PRC's code op-poses such actions in the Spratlys.
Several countries, including the ROC and the PRC have suggested the joint development of the Spratlys, but not everyone agrees.
The ROC has seen the benefits of such joint development, given its exploration, along with Japan and South Korea of the East China Sea in 1970. The method used at that time was to shelve territorial disputes and establish a private company for the joint development of fisheries, scientific research and pollution prevention.
President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) re-emphasized such an idea in 1994, suggesting that the feuding parties jointly develop the Spratlys through a private company, putting aside their territorial disputes for the common good.
However, most ASEAN countries did not support the proposal on the grounds of lack of diplomatic relations and suspicions over joint development operations with the PRC.
No matter what kind of joint approach is suggested by the states concerned, it seems that it is not easy to touch the hearts of all the states involved in the disputes.
However, Hasjim Djalal, a prominent Indonesian scholar, agrees with Lee's idea.
"Joint development should initially start with non-official arrangements, including private commercial companies," he said.
I have a different idea. Hasjim Djalal has argued for the inclusion in a joint development project of those "directly interested parties which maintain a presence in the zone." In my view, it is better to limit the participants in a joint development to those disputed parties because the possibility of resolution would then be higher.
I would also argue that the so-called "zone of joint development" or "zone of cooperation" should be limited in the overlapping areas, which only involve the disputed parties.
Even though Taiwan has no diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries, it should not be excluded from any multilateral agreement or regional code of conduct.
From a historic and modern legal base, Taiwan has more reasonable legal rights of territorial sovereignty in the Spratly Islands than the other disputants. It occupies one of the largest islands in the Spratlys, Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island).
The willingness of Taiwan to look for common interests via the organization of a private company to resolve the disputes does not mean it is inclined to give up its claim to the Spratlys.
In addition, a regional code of conduct, whenever it established, should not be regarded as recognition of the status quo in the Spratlys.
Chen Hurng Yu is a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Cheng Chi University.
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